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I. To BEGN: SOMETHING UNINTERESTING, AND SOMETHING NEW
Who still talks nowadays
of the extermination
of the Armenians?
- AdolffHitler l
... after all, present-day European integration is a reflection
of the experiences of the Second World War,
linked with the resistance to Nazism.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Czech Republic
2
1. Adolf Hitler, Speech to General Staff, Obersalzberg (Aug. 22, 1939) I.M.T., Nuremberg,
Doc. L-3 (US-28) in BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Series F, Pt. II, vol. 3, No. 314,
giving the original as "Wer redet heute noch von der Vemichtung der Armenier?". See infra note
318 et seq.
[Vol. 47:1
REMEMBERING SUDETENLAND
Let us concede that there is nothing fundamentally objectionable
about stripping millions of people of citizenship, seizing their homes,
and expelling them from the country in peacetime, given the right cir-
cumstances. To be sure, this should all be orderly and humane, killing
no more than, say, every seventh person; perhaps, too, one would wish
to limit the scope, emptying no more than a quarter of any country. But
that this can be, on balance, a necessary, just, legitimate, and legal un-
dertaking: yes, let us concede the truth of that.
For that is the law today, and the position of the powers that oversaw
or acquiesced in the expulsion of fourteen million Germans from Eastern
Europe after the Second World War, in which perhaps two million died
and the eastern fourth of Germany was entirely depopulated-the largest
single instance in history of what we now call ethnic cleansing.3 That
position was recently tested in a controversy over the accession of the
Czech Republic to the European Union, which was contested by Ger-
mans who had been expelled from what was once, to some, the Sude-
tenland. But that position, and our resolve, has been found as firm as
ever.
It was a minor controversy, in truth, a contretemps on the path to EU
membership that, though longer than some imagined, had long seemed
assured; and in the end, the Sudeten controversy, though good for head-
lines, did not alter that course. The Union expressed its clear conviction:
the past is past, the German question is answered, and Europe's future
must not be held ransom by the dead hand of history. On May 1, 2004,
to the music of An die Freude, the Czech Republic became a member of
the EU without making any of the changes advocates for the expellees
had demanded. For Europe and the legal order, the Sudeten issue is no
longer interesting. And that, as a matter for law, is fascinating.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, The Presidential Decrees of 1940-1945,
http://www.mzv.cz/_dokumenty/edekrety.html [hereinafter Czech Foreign Ministry Website] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2006).
3. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Reso-
lution 780, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter UN Final Report]. This report
notes that "[tihe expression 'ethnic cleansing' is relatively new.... '[E]thnic cleansing' means ren-
dering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given
groups from the area.. carried out by means of [inter alia]... forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population...." The expulsion of the Germans would seem to qualify.
2006]
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II. AIMS OF THE ARTICLE
What is the true shape of our commitment to prohibit ethnic clean-
sing? This Article explores that question by considering a case observers
have universally decided does not constitute ethnic cleansing. As we
shall see shortly, almost all analyses of this issue demonstrate that Sude-
ten Germans have no claim. This is all quite obvious, quite uncontrover-
sial, and, to many of us, quite right, but we must go further. What is the
consequence, not for a few Germans but for the European order and in-
ternational law, of saying that these kinds of claims are not valid? Does
the rejection of Sudeten claims-precisely because it is justified, and
because of the way it has been justified-define any limits to what we
are prepared to count as ethnic cleansing or unjustifiable human suffer-
ing? For make no mistake: the expelled Germans suffered; it is simply
that we say their suffering, so long ago, was regrettable but not wrong,
and most assuredly not compensable.
The natural assumption of many readers will be that this has nothing
to do with ethnic cleansing, that Sudeten claims have been universally
rejected because they are ancient or otherwise fail some technical hur-
dle; certainly that is how most analyses dispose of the matter. This might
be right except that we shall see how other claims, equally defective in
this way, have not been rejected. And so, we are compelled to recognize
a different, explicitly moral calculus to distinguish Sudeten claims from
those cases. This recognition is acceptable to most observers, just as re-
jecting Sudeten claims is acceptable; they were, after all, collaborators
with Nazism, were they not? The interesting point, however, is that this
calculus-which we must employ because it is the only way to distin-
guish the Sudeten case-creates a predictable potential for similar re-
sponses in the future. If this is accurate (and right), then our commit-
ments against ethnic cleansing are much more complex and qualified
than we currently admit. This leads to a final question: why does our law
not acknowledge this?
As so often seems necessary, first what this Article is not: It is not a
critique of actions undertaken by the victorious powers and their allies in
the 1940s. It is not, in other words, an argument that the expulsion of
millions of people in peacetime was a wrong that law ought to recon-
sider (as if to say that if only we knew the truth, we would treat the mat-
ter differently). Nor is it a critique of the European Union and its mem-
ber states' rejection of the normative force of Sudeten claims. On the
contrary, this Article is a description of the rules we can observe pre-
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cisely because states and societies have accepted the expulsions. It is
about how we will form law in the wake of great violence-about our
plausible, even predictable response to the weight, and the lightness, of
all that.
More precisely, this Article describes the customary legal norms logi-
cally arising from the observation that almost all relevant actors have re-
jected Sudeten claims in the context of the Czech Republic's EU candi-
dacy, and instead continue to assert the legality and rightness of the
expulsions-and in doing so have consistently relied on a limited num-
ber of identifiable rationales. The Article also asks why those norms do
not appear as acknowledged doctrine: Why is it that international law's
mechanisms for deriving norms about ethnic cleansing, especially those
for deriving customary international law, do not seem to draw conclu-
sions from an obviously important case such as this? The inquiry, then,
is not simply into the rules as such, but into law's construction of the
rules.
By the end, this Article will make two specific claims about that con-
struction as it relates to what we may call the Law of the Holocaust-
that gradual crystallization out of Nuremberg, the Genocide and Geneva
Conventions, and the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals of rules prohibit-
ing and punishing ethnic violence: 1) that despite our otherwise absolute
normative commitment against ethnic cleansing 4 the Sudeten case iden-
tifies a Corollary, an 'unthinkable potential' our law retains under spe-
cific, identifiable conditions; and 2) that the same case establishes limits
on our commitment to post hoc restitution for mass violence. 5
4. There is no specific international crime termed "ethnic cleansing." See Roger Cohen, Ethnic
Cleansing, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 136 (Roy Gutman & David
Rieff eds., 1999) [hereinafter CRIMES OF WAR]. Yet the acts that conventionally constitute ethnic
cleansing-including persecution, extermination and deportation-are all war crimes or crimes
against humanity. Cf UN Final Report, supra note 3, pt. III.B. ("'Ethnic cleansing' is contrary to
international law."). For convenience, this Article will use that term. In addition, while this Article
frequently discusses the acts of property confiscation, denaturalization, and expulsion separately,
it also in context often uses "expulsion" to represent the range of actions taken against Sudeten
Germans after the war. Some scholars insist on a distinction between these three acts. See, e.g.,
Andrea Gattini, A Trojan Horse for Sudeten Claims? On Some Implications of the Prince of
Liechtenstein v. Germany, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513, 514, n.5 (2002) (criticizing several writers
who adopt this view). These different acts indeed had discrete effects and could therefore elicit
different legal analysis, but considering them together in context is probative of the broader ques-
tions this Article raises. Indeed, the decision to disaggregate these elements in this case, but not
others, is itself representative of a worldview.
5. This Article uses "restitution" to identify a range of claims. Sudeten groups have variously
called for a right to return, restoration of citizenship, property restitution or other compensation, or
a formal apology. See, e.g., Jan Pauer, Moral Political Dissent in German-Czech Relations, 6
2006]
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As to the progress of this Article towards those claims: first, the his-
torical context now fading into memory; then an explication of the con-
sensus rejecting Sudeten claims and its rationales; the implications of
those rationales for our commitments on ethnic cleansing and restitution
(including an intervention concerning the interaction with Holocaust
claims); comment on how unsatisfying this may seem and why; and fi-
nally a reflection on how the obvious, uninteresting conclusions we have
reached on the Sudeten question reveal something troubling about law's
sense of memory and its construction of itself.
Throughout, this Article is a reflection on the responsibility of the
present to order itself in light of the past. What is the proper moral and
legal response to actions that implicate a bygone age and the suffering of
another century? There is a hidden trick in law's response to memory
that makes it seem profoundly irrational and unpredictable-but which
CZECH Soc. REV. 173 (Jiii Sirotek et al. trans., 1998). There are important distinctions among
these claims, and arguably it would be best to discuss them separately. For the most part, however,
these distinctions do not produce differences in the underlying debate about whether or not the
Czech Republic had any obligation linked to EU accession. Some scholars and advocates use
"reparations" to describe the broad range of responses to mass violence. Cf PRISCILLA HAYNER,
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 171 (2001) (reparations
"encompasses a variety of types of redress, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition"); Amnesty International, Still Waiting After 60
years: Justice for Survivors of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery System, ASA 22/012/2005, 4.2.1
(Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ library/index/engasa220122005 ("Repara-
tions can also serve to punish and deter.... Developing international norms on reparations have
also seen the concept broaden to include important symbolic and future-oriented measures, very
much linked to restorative justice."). Reparations are defined to encompass restitution, compensa-
tion, rehabilitation, satisfaction including determination of the truth and of criminal liability, and
guarantees of non-repetition. Id; John Torpey, Introduction: Politics and the Past, in POLITICS
AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Torpey ed., 2003) 3-5 (defining
reparations and describing the term's wide use and acceptance). Other scholars and institutions
employ the concept of "redress" with a similarly broad meaning. See U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Hu-
manitarian Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/35 (Apr. 19, 2005) (discussing the definition of re-
dress); Pierre d'Argent, Wrongs of the Past, History of the Future?, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 279, 286
(2006)
([In the leading human rights bodies] a refinement of the concepts of 'victims' and
'reparations' has occurred.., leading to the development of the contemporary notion
of 'redress'. The scope of that notion has become very large, since it includes not
only questions of restitution, reparation and compensation sensu stricto, but also the
ways in which victims are treated, rehabilitated and their fate reported, their access
to justice, and their right to know the truth through effective, prompt, thorough and
impartial investigations.).
My choice of "restitution" is a convenience and is not intended to convey any difference in the
range or relationship of possible claims. I could just as well have used "reparations."
[Vol. 47:1
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may be hard to justify if not kept hidden. It may be enough simply to de-
scribe the Sudeten Corollary in its fullness.
III. AN ATTEMPT AT AN UNCONTROVERSIAL HISTORICAL PRIMER
Denn da wir nun einmal die Resultate friiherer Geschlechter sind,
sind wir auch die Resultate ihrer Verirrungen, Leidenschaften und
Irrthfimer, ja Verbrechen; es ist nicht m6glich sich ganz von die-
ser Kette zu 16sen.
- Friedrich Nietzsche
6
Although this is not an Article about the expulsions and does not rely
on any particular history of the expulsions or their aftermath,7 some
agreed background is necessary solely to locate us in the contemporary
problem.8
A. Czechoslovakia and Munich
Speakers of German and Czech lived in Bohemia and Moravia for
centuries under the dynastic rule of the Habsburgs. Whatever history one
wishes to remember about the late Austro-Hungarian Empire and the
6. Friedrich Nietzsche, Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie fur das Leben,
UNZEITGEMASSE BETRACHTUNGEN, available at http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/
zeit2.htm#3, translated in UNMODERN OBSERVATIONS 103 (William Arrowsmith ed., 1990),
quoted in Torpey, supra note 5, at 2 ("For since we happen to be the products of earlier genera-
tions, we are also the products of their blunders, passions, and misunderstandings, indeed, of their
crimes; it is impossible to free ourselves completely from this chain.").
7. Consistent with the aims above, this Article does not require readers to embrace any par-
ticular view of historical events; it does rely on what relevant actors believe about history. This
section describes events relating to the departure of the German population from Czechoslovakia
in terms most scholars and observers could agree on (if grudgingly) as being accurate, if not nec-
essarily complete or "true." There are numerous points of contention: whether Germans fled or
were expelled; under what conditions; how many died; and what the causal relationships among
these contested processes were. It is expected-practically hoped-that polemicists on each side
will be equally discomfited by this summary.
8. See generally ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM: THE EXPULSION OF THE
GERMANS FROM THE EAST (1989) (providing an authoritative survey of the expulsions and Cold
War diplomacy up to 1989); TIMOTHY BURCHER, THE SUDETEN GERMAN QUESTION AND
CZECHOSLOVAK-GERMAN RELATIONS SINCE 1989 (1996); Vladimir Handl, German-Czech Rela-
tions: New 'Normality' and Lack of Empathy, in 3 GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY N DIALOGUE 21
(Marco Overhaus et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/newsletter/
issue8.pdf; Jeffrey S. Kopstein, The Politics of National Reconciliation: Memory and Institutions
in German-Czech Relations Since 1989, 3 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 57 (1997); WIKIPEDIA,
Expulsion of Germans after World War 11, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expulsion of Germans_
afterWorld_WarII (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
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peoples living within it, the Empire's dissolution presented a political
problem which, despite their disagreements about how to resolve it, al-
most all observers acknowledged: the presence of a large ethnic German
population within the borders of the new Czechoslovak state. The very
identification of "Sudetenland" as a political concept (as opposed to
simply "areas in which Germans live") 9 was practically synonymous
with the failure of Czechoslovakia as a state project. Of course, there
was nothing inevitable about Czechoslovakia's sharply divided ethnic
politics, but then evidently multicultural harmony was not inevitable ei-
ther. 0
With the rise of Adolf Hitler, Sudeten Germans (as they had come to
call themselves) gained a powerful ally 1 and their dissatisfactions with
their position in Czechoslovakia became, if anything, more pronounced.
Attempts to craft an internal solution failed to achieve a satisfactory out-
come, and at the Munich Conference in 1938, Hitler demanded the an-
nexation of the Sudetenland to Germany.1 2 This was broadly supported
by Sudeten Germans. The remainder of the Czech lands soon became a
protectorate, occupied and absorbed into the Third Reich.1
3
B. The Bene§ Decrees
The contemporary debate centers on the so-called Beneg Decrees.
These were emergency decrees issued by Czechoslovak President Ed-
ward Beneg shortly after the end of the war, 14 and confirmed with retro-
9. Unlike Bohemia or Moravia, Sudetenland is not an ancient political unit. See JORGEN
TAMPKE, CZECH-GERMAN RELATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM BOHEMIA
TO THE EU xiv (2003); see also ELIZABETH WISKEMANN, CZECHS AND GERMANS 97 (1938).
10. See, e.g., Roman Szporluk, War by Other Means, 44 SLAVIC REV. 20 (1985).
11. Jaroslav Ku~era, Between WilhelmstraJle and Thunovsk." Financial Support from the
Reich for the Sudeten-German Party, 1935-1938, in PRAGUE YEARBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
HISTORY 1998 18, 33-34 (Derek Paton ed., 1999).
12. See Agreement for the Cession by Czechoslovakia to Germany of Sudeten German Terri-
tory, Sept. 29, 1938, 142 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 438 (1938), available at
http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/-jobrien/reference/ob66.html [hereinafter Treaty of Munich] (concluded
at Munich between Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy).
13. Prior to the war, therefore, the entire state was dismembered; Czechoslovakia formally ac-
ceded to these changes, but under tremendous pressure. The major powers recognized these
changes--Great Britain and France were parties to the Treaty of Munich-but subsequently de-
clared these changes illegitimate, a view that has been generally accepted ever since. Perhaps half
a million Czechs left the Sudetenland when Germany annexed it, and the German protectorate
imposed brutal rule on the rest of the Czech lands.
14. See, Jochen A. Frowein, Ulf Bemitz & Lord Kingsland Q.C., Legal Opinion on the Beneg-
Decrees and the Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union, Luxembourg, 53-55
(Kingsland) (Eur. Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for Research, Working Paper No. 10-2002), avail-
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active effect by the reconstituted National Assembly in a constitutional
law in 1946.15
Beneg issued roughly 143 decrees, some fifteen of which relate to the
status of ethnic Germans and Hungarians as well as individuals disloyal
to Czechoslovakia.16 There is polemical controversy about what exactly
the Decrees provided--expulsion is never authorized, for example' 7 -
but unquestionably, individual Decrees or other legislation provided
for: 18
" confiscation of ethnic Germans' and Hungarians' property with-
out compensation;'
9
" loss of citizenship for ethnic Germans and Hungarians, with ret-
roactive effect for those who had taken German or Hungarian
citizenship, except those who had demonstrated loyalty to
Czechoslovakia;
20
able at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies/benesdecrees/pdf/opinionsen.pdf [hereinafter Le-
gal Opinion] (individual author indicated in parentheses); Christopher Kopper, The London Czech
Government and the Origins of the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 255-66 (Steven Bela Virdy, T. Hunt Tooley, & Agnes Huszdr
Vhrdy eds., 2003) (outlining the development of Czech proposals during the war years, including
interim proposals to transfer territory to Germany).
15. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 7 (Frowein). Thus, the original Decrees have no legal
force, but their content incorporated into Czechoslovak law is a different matter. In this Article,
'Decrees' generally means the incorporated legislation unless specified or clear from context.
Quotations do not carry this proviso--it is by no means clear that all authors or actors understand
the distinction.
16. See Documentary Appendix, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, su-
pra note 14, at 823-34 (cataloguing Czechoslovak constitutional and legal enactments affecting
ethnic Germans and Hungarians in the immediate post-war period).
17. See, e.g., George Anthony, What 's Behind the Fuss over the Benes Decrees? POSTMARK
PRAGUE, available at http://www.spectrezine.org/global/Benes.htm. The Czech Republic's posi-
tion is that the Decrees deal only with citizenship and property, and that the Powers conducted the
expulsion. See Czech Foreign Ministry Website, supra note 2.
18. See Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 8 (Frowein).
19. Id at 8 (Frowein) (citing Pres. Decree No. 12 of June 21, 1945, on the Confiscation and
Expedited Allocation of the Agricultural Property of Germans, Hungarians, Traitors and Enemies
of the Czech and Slovak Nations; Pres. Decree No. 28 of July 20, 1945; Pres. Decree No. 108 of
Oct. 25, 1945, on the Confiscation of Enemy Property and National Restoration Funds; and Pres.
Decree 5 of May 19, 1945, invalidating certain property transactions during the occupation that
arose out of racial or religious persecution as well as nationalizing enterprises owned by "persons
unreliable to the state").
20. Id. at 8 (Frowein) (citing Pres. Decree No. 33 of Aug. 2, 1945, Concerning the Right to
Czechoslovak Citizenship of Persons of German and Hungarian Nationality). Sudeten Germans
had been granted citizenship in the Reich, but also notionally retained Czechoslovak citizenship.
Charles A. Schiller, Closing a Chapter of History: Germany's Right to Compensation for the
Sudetenland, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 401, 419 (1994). Unsurprisingly, the reassertion of
Czechoslovakia's legal continuity meant that Sudeten Germans were, once again (or rather still),
citizens-thus the need to denaturalize them.
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* forced labor for those deprived of citizenship; 21
" trial in absentia for disloyalty to Czechoslovakia during the occu-
pation, with penalties including death and imprisonment;
22
" amnesty legalizing "[a]ny act committed between September 30,
1938 and October 28, 1945, the object of which was to aid the
struggle for liberty of the Czechs and Slovaks or which repre-
sented just reprisals for actions of the occupation forces and their
accomplices... even when such acts may otherwise be punishable
by law."
23
Controversy notwithstanding, on the core questions of loss of citizen-
ship, confiscation, and expulsion, this formulation is defensible: any
Czechoslovak proven to have collaborated could be stripped of citizen-
ship, property and other civic protections, but ethnic Germans and Hun-
garians had to affirmatively prove that they had not collaborated. The
Decrees deprived large numbers of ethnic Germans and Hungarians of
Czechoslovak citizenship, expropriated their property, and provided for,
facilitated, or confirmed their expulsion.24 Certain of the relevant De-
crees were repealed by the Czechoslovak legislature; 25 others never
were, and their continuing validity and effect has been at the heart of the
controversy.
21. Pres. Decree No. 71 of 1945, in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 53 (Kingsland) (applying
to those deprived of citizenship under Decree 33).
22. Pres. Decree No. 16 of June 19, 1945, and Pres. Decree 137 of Oct. 27, 1945, in Legal
Opinion, supra note 14, at 22 (Frowein). A "considerable number" of such convictions were se-
cured. Id. These Decrees were repealed in 1948. Opinion of the Legal Service of the European
Parliament, Conclusions, para. 171k, at 27, cited in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 22
(Frowein).
23. Provisional National Assembly Law No. 115 of 8 May 1946 Concerning the Legality of
Actions Connected to the Struggle to Recover the Liberty of the Czechs and Slovaks, art. 1, cited
in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 23 (Frowein). The Provisional National Assembly assumed
legislative authority on Oct. 28, 1945. Id. at I I (Frowein).
24. "[L]oss of citizenship for people who were forcibly transferred followed a clear logic.
Unless they were deprived of the citizenship of the state from the territory of which they were
transferred, they would, at least in theory, be able to claim reentry." Legal Opinion, supra note 14,
at 21 (Frowein).
25. Act 33/1948 of Mar. 25, 1948 (repealing Decree 16 of 1945); Act 87/1950 of Aug. 1, 1950
(repealing Decree 137 of 1945); Act 65/1966 of Jan. 1, 1966 (repealing Decree 71 of 1945). Opin-
ion of the European Parliament Legal Service, 62, cited in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 63
(Kingsland).
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C. The Expulsions or Transfers26
Soviet forces occupied some Czech territory, and at the end of the war
Czech partisans controlled other areas. Yet significant territory remained
in German hands or was occupied by American forces at the cessation of
hostilities in May, 1945, and very few Germans in those areas had fled
(unlike those in eastern Germany). Czechoslovak authorities therefore
took possession-after hostilities ended-of territories with a population
of three million Germans, concentrated in the border regions.
The expulsions took place in several phases: so-called "wild" expul-
sions before the Potsdam Conference; sanctioned but unregulated expul-
sions in late 1945; and expulsions under a regulated regime from 1946 to
1950. Most were expelled into the Soviet sector, ultimately settling in
the American sector, in the circumstances of extreme deprivation pre-
vailing in postwar Germany. Estimates of the number who died en route
-- of exposure, starvation, malnutrition and direct violence-vary
widely,27 but the deportation was thorough. There were some three mil-
lion Germans in Czechoslovakia in 1938; today there are 38,000 in the
Czech Republic,28 and just over 5,000 in Slovakia. 9
26. Terminology is freighted in this debate. In Czech, odsun is standard and in the former
GDR Umsiedlung, whereas in the FRG it was more common to refer to Aussiedlung and Ver-
treibung. See, e.g., Scott Bruntstetter, Escaping History: The Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as
a Leitmotif in German-Czech Relations, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE,
supra note 14, at 269, 276-77 (noting that Vertreibung implies illegality or illegitimacy, while
odsun "suggests a more legitimate and legal removal," and that the 1997 German-Czech Declara-
tion refers to vyhdnini instead of vyhneni, which would imply cruel expulsion, although both
translate as Vertreibung). But in English, "expulsion" does not exclude a reading of legality and
legitimacy; it is perfectly possible to refer to morally and legally acceptable expulsions or to im-
moral and illegal transfers. I use "expulsion" as a convenient word to describe the removal of per-
sons from a territory against their will; the argument works with any other term.
27. Estimates range from 20,000 to 250,000 deaths among Sudeten Germans from violence or
proximate causes during deportation. See P. Wallace, Putting the Past to Rest: The Sudeten Ques-
tion Is Still Causing Trouble in Central Europe, TIME EUROPE, Mar. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.time.com/europe/magazine/article/0, 13005,901020318-216394,00.html. Sudeten
sources favor the higher end, while Czech historians generally estimate 30,000 deaths attributable
to the expulsions.. Kopstein, supra note 8, at 77 n. 15. See also infra note 31. The Czech-German
Historical Commission could not agree on the number of Sudeten Germans killed in the expul-
sions. Bruntstetter, supra note 26, at 277 n.34.
28. Czech Census of March 2001, cited in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 30 (Frowein). As
many as 200,000 Germans may have remained after the expulsions, but although loyal, antifascist
Germans were exempted, they too were subjected to property confiscations and discrimination,
and most emigrated. See Czech Government Issues Apology to Ethnic Germans Who Actively Op-
posed Nazism but Were Persecuted After WWII, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2005,
http://www.bhhrg.org/mediaDetails.asp?ArticlelD=455 [hereinafter Czech Government Issues
Apology]. There were very few trials to establish loyalty during the period of expulsions. But see,
e.g., Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 807/1998, Koutny v. Czech Republic, U.N. Doc.
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Germans were also expelled from the eastern portions of Germany,
Poland, the Soviet Union, 30 Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania-nearly
fourteen million in all.3 Other peoples were expelled, too: Poles (to
lands emptied of Germans), Ukrainians (to lands emptied of Poles),
Hungarians, 32 Romanians, etc.-in the tens of millions. And during the
war, before all this, massive deportations had been carried out by the
Nazis, leading to the extermination of Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, slave work-
ers, and others,33 and by the Stalinist regime, which internally deported
Chechens, Meshketian Turks, Tatars, and other Soviet peoples. Such
acts-especially those the occupying Germans committed-had pre-
pared the way psychologically for the postwar expulsions,34 although
CCPR/C/68/D/807/1998 (2000) [hereinafter Koutny] (noting a case of restored citizenship, al-
though confiscated property was not returned); Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 823/1998,
Czemin v. Czech Republic, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/823/1998 (2005).
29. The smaller German population of Slovakia was also subject to the Decrees. See MS, Slo-
vakia Has Just One Vestige Left of German Minority Presence, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY, Nov. 25, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/11/3-cee/cee-25 1103.asp.
30. This includes areas of Germany later annexed to Poland and the Soviet Union, including
much of present-day western and northern Poland and Russia's Kaliningrad oblast. See, e.g.,
Tomasz Kamusella, Ethnic Cleansing in Upper Silesia, 1944-1951, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at 293-310; Gregor Thum, Cleansed Memory: The
New Polish Wroclaw (Breslau) and the Expulsion of the Germans, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at 333-58.
31. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FUR VERTRIEBENE, FLOCHTLINGE UND KRIEGSGESCHADIGTE, DIE
BETREUUNG 8-9 (1966) (giving the German population in the affected areas at the war's end as
16.6 million; total expelled as 11.73 million, killed or missing in the expulsion process as 2.111
million; and remaining or returned as 2.717 million). These figures are contested in part because
the proper assignment of cause of death is controversial. One source notes that "[a]n estimated 2
to 3 million died as a result of the expulsions." Roy Gutman, Deportation, in CRIMES OF WAR,
supra note 4, at 124. However, more recent estimates suggest much lower figures of deaths, per-
haps no more than 500,000. See WIKIPEDIA, Expulsion of Germans After World War II,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expulsion of Germans-after-WorldWarII (last visited Sept. 28,
2006) (discussing estimates).
32. The Beneg Decrees also sanctioned expulsion of Hungarians from southern Slovakia; ap-
proximately 80,000 Hungarians were expelled. Miria G~czi, Prigai Szobor Benesnek A Bajor
Miniszterelndk Csalcdott, MAGYAR RADIO ONLINE, May 16, 2005,
http://www.radio.hu/index.php?cikk id=136939. However, comprehensive expulsion was never
attempted, and today Hungarians constitute around ten percent of Slovakia's population. See
R6bert Barta, The Hungarian-Slovak Population Exchange and Forced Resettlement in 1947, in
ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at 565-74; Edward
Chfszfr, Ethnic Cleansing in Slovakia: The Plight of the Hungarian Minority, in ETHNIC
CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at 559-64.
33. See Gutman, supra note 31, at 123.
34. See German-Czech Declaration on Mutual Relations and Their Future Development,
F.R.G.-Czech Rep., art. II, Jan. 21, 1997, available at http://www.mzv.cz/servis/
soubor.asp?id=1873 [hereinafter 1997 German-Czech Declaration] ("The German side is also
conscious of the fact that the National Socialist policy of violence towards the Czech people
helped to prepare the ground for post-war flight, forcible expulsion and forced resettlement.").
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these latter were far larger and occurred in a time of peace, in the con-
text of total victory.
D. The Potsdam Agreement
Whatever the Beneg Decrees provided, the victorious Powers sanc-
tioned the population removals. At the first postwar conference in Pots-
dam in August, 1945, the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet
Union issued an Agreement providing for a process of 'orderly and hu-
mane' transfers of an unspecified portion of the German population.
35
As the Potsdam Agreement shows, the Powers knew the expulsions
were occurring but did not object, instead considering them necessary
and providing material support. Although the British and Americans ex-
pressed reservations about the manner and timing,3 6 nothing in the
Agreement they signed suggests any fundamental opposition to the ex-
pulsions as such, or any belief that the sovereigns (Czechoslovkia, Po-
land, and Hungary) then expelling Germans should be compelled to
stop.
37
This much is evident, even uncontroversial, from the text of the
Agreement. If in making a legal assessment we consider the broader
context, we note that all the supposedly separate sovereigns whom the
Agreement addressed were in fact under the influence of the Powers,
and that expulsions were also carried out by forces controlled by the So-
viet Union (and in Hungary, under the aegis of a Control Commission
on which the western Allies were represented). The Powers were fully
aware of this, and in signing the Agreement, had all this in mind. So, the
lines of real power then prevailing suggest the Czechoslovaks were
35. See Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, Babelsberg (Ciicilienhof), Aug. 2, 1945,
in BUNDESMINISTER DES INNERN, DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK: II REIHE, BAND I,
DIE KONFERENZ VON POTSDAM 2121-22 (1992) [hereinafter Potsdam Agreement].
36. See DE ZAYAS, supra note 8, at 90-102.
37. See Alfred de Zayas, Anglo-American Responsibility .for the Expulsion of the Germans
1944-48, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at 245-52 (not-
ing strong U.S. and British opposition to the manner of expulsion and their sense that they were
unable to prevent expulsions from Soviet-controlled areas). Other actors drew similar conclusions.
See, e.g., 1 INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, REPORT ON ITS ACTIVITIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD
WAR 673-74, cited in id at 252
(Had it been borne in mind that the repatriation of some 1,500,000 Greeks from Asia
Minor, after the first World War, had taken several years and required large-scale relief
schemes, it would have been easy to foresee that the hurried transplanting of fourteen
million human beings would raise a large number of problems from the humanitarian
standpoint, especially in a Europe strewn with ruins and where starvation was rife.)
Nothing in this actually criticizes the expulsions as such, only their "hurried" manner.
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hardly acting in a fully independent fashion: Beneg signed the Decree
stripping Germans and Hungarians of citizenship August 2, 1945-the
same day the Potsdam Agreement was issued.38
E. The Cold War
Little change in the political dispensation affecting expellees occurred
during the Cold War. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) regained sovereignty, although the
Powers retained certain rights. In Czechoslovakia, where a Communist
regime consolidated power in 1948, the content of the Decrees remained
valid law, although after 1950 there was no further occasion for their
application. Some, though not all, of the Decrees were rescinded over
time.
The GDR recognized the expulsions as "irrevocable, just and final" in
1950,39 but the FRG conducted a rejectionist policy, maintaining claims
to occupied territory and representing expellees' interests.40 However,
this support was largely domestic, for in 1954 the FRG signed the Set-
tlement Convention, which provided an effective quitclaim against any
past or future measures taken by France, Great Britain, the United
States, or their allies "with regard to German external assets or other
property, seized for the purpose of reparation or restitution, or as a result
38. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 61 (Kingsland) ("The decree [on citizenship] was not
signed by Benes until the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference to ensure that it was in line with
the Allies decision."); see also Czech News Agency, Czech Press Survey, FIN. TIMES INFO., Apr.
9, 2002 (calling the Decrees "a practical reaction to decisions made in Potsdam"). Subsequent in-
ternational agreements arguably obliged Czechoslovakia to seize expellees' property. See Agree-
ment on Reparation from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied Reparation Agency
and on the Restitution of the Monetary Gold, art. 6(A), Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, 555 U.N.T.S.
69 ("Each Signatory Government shall... hold or dispose of German enemy assets within its juris-
diction in manners designed to preclude their return to German ownership or control....").
39. SUDETENDEUTSCHER RAT E.V., THE SUDETEN GERMAN PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 33 (1971) [hereinafter THE SUDETEN GERMAN PROBLEM].
40. Id. at 33 (reproducing the Bundestag Declaration of July 14, 1950 on Protection of Sude-
ten German Interests, protesting the decision of the GDR to recognize the expulsion of Sudeten
and Carpathian Germans, and rejecting the authority of its "sham government" to conclude such
an agreement).
The Prague Agreement is incompatible with the inalienable right of man to his
homeland. The German Bundestag, therefore, solemnly protests against the surren-
der of the right to their homeland of those Germans from Czechoslovakia whose in-
terests are now under the protection of the German Federal Republic, and declares
the Prague Agreement to be null and void.
Id. The Allied High Commissioners also rejected the Prague Agreement. Id.
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of the state or war." '' West Germany's Ostpolitik after 1969 led to a se-
ries of treaties and declarations with the states from which the expellees
had been ejected, but not to returns. In 1973, the FRG and Czechoslova-
kia concluded a treaty nullifying the Treaty of Munich but preserving
citizenship changes effected by Munich,42 mutually confirming Sudeten
Germans' FRG citizenship, and, implicitly, their loss of Czechoslovak
citizenship.
The Sudeten Germans, and the even larger populations of Germans
expelled from other areas, integrated into the two Germanys.43 Many
expellees formed Landsmannschaft associations to press for recognition
and compensation and less frequently, given the circumstances of the
Cold War, for return or revision of the borders. 4 The expellees became
41. Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, ch. 6,
arts. 3(1), 3(3), May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4117, at 223, as amended by Protocol on the Termination
of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954 (entered into force
May 5, 1955) [hereinafter Settlement Convention] (providing that:
[n]o claim or action shall be admissible against persons who shall have acquired or trans-
ferred title to property on the basis of the measures referred to in paragraphs I and 2 of
this Article, or against international organizations, foreign governments or persons who
have acted upon instructions of such organizations or governments).
"German external assets" contemplated the property of ethnic Germans in other countries as well
as German citizens. In any event, Sudeten Germans under the subsequently annulled wartime re-
gime would have met either definition. Germany's renunciation of claims concerning property and
assets did not affect its claims concerning sovereign control of territory administered by Poland
and the Soviet Union, which remained outstanding pending a final peace treaty, but after the repu-
diation of the Munich agreement, there were territorial aspects of the expellee controversy regard-
ing the Sudeten Germans. Cf Felix Ermacora, Aus dem Rechtsgutachtens fiber die sude-
tendeutschen Fragen 1991, Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, http://www.sudeten.de/bas/
content/al0 4 l.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) ("Zu den sudetendeutschen Fragen gehort nicht
die territoriale Frage; sie kann als durch den Prager Vertrag von 1973/74, der das Munchner Ab-
kommen fir nichtig erklirte, im Zusammenhalt mit dem Einigungswerk als gelst angesehen wer-
den.").
42. Treaty of Mutual Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslo-
vak Socialist Republic, art. 11(2), Czech Rep.-F.R.G., Dec. 11, 1973, BGB1. I1 at 990, 13 I.L.M. 19
[hereinafter Treaty of Prague]; see also Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 21 (Frowein).
43. See, e.g., DIE BETREUUNG, supra note 31, at 80 (showing expellees in each land as per-
centage of the population, ranging from 1.7 percent in Saarland to 27.2 percent in Schleswig-
Holstein).
44. See, e.g., Charter of the German Expellees, in Documentary Appendix, supra note 16, at
835; Eichstatter Declaration of November 1949, cited in Maria Cornelia Raue, Doppelpunkt hinter
der Geschichte: Die Prager Deutschlandpolitik 1990-1997, 66 (Jan. 29, 2001) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Humboldt University, Berlin) (outlining Sudeten German goals including regaining
lost territory), available at http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/raue-maria-cornelia-2001-
01-29/PDF/Raue.pdf. Today, German irredentist sentiment is extremely marginal. Cf MS, Ger-
man Irredentist Posters in Karlovy Vary, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Mar. 20, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/03/3-cee/cee-200302.asp (noting appearance of posters in
Prague and Karlovy Vary declaring, "The Sudetenland was German and will be German again").
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an important political force on the right, with Sudeten Germans particu-
larly strong in Bavaria and the conservative CDU/CSU. 45 However, ex-
pellees did not achieve recognition for any of their claims outside the
West German context.46
F. 1989 and the EU Accession Process
With Communism's collapse, Germany was reunited. A peace treaty
signed in 1990 confirmed Polish and Soviet title to territories those
countries had administered since the end of the war, but did not provide
return of expellees or restitution.47 The Final Treaty kept in effect the
quitclaim provisions of the 1954 Settlement Convention concerning ex-
ternal German assets.48
In 1992, Germany and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics, both
now free of Soviet influence, signed a Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness
and Friendly Cooperation. 49 The Czech Republic enacted a property res-
titution law covering expropriations after 1948 but exempting Decree-
related confiscations. 50 A Czech constitutional court decision subse-
quently reaffirmed the validity of the Decrees as a foundation of the
state and its values, 5I a view confirmed by the government. 52 In 1993,
45. THE SUDETEN GERMAN PROBLEM, supra note 39, at 33-38 (reproducing texts of declara-
tions made by various West German political parties and the Sudeten German Association).
46. See generally Bruntstetter, supra note 26, at 267-80 (describing postwar German-Czech re-
lations and the position of the Sudeten expellees in German society).
47. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1186
[hereinafter Final Treaty]; Agreement between the Federal Republic of German and the Republic
of Poland in Relation to the Ratification of the Border Between Them, F.R.G.-Pol., Nov. 14, 1990,
31 I.L.M 1292. Germany's recognition of the transfer of territory undercut one of the expellee
groups' standard arguments. See PHILLIP A. BOHLER, THE ODER-NEISSE LINE: A REAPPRAISAL
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 135-36 (1990). The restoration of the pre-war border between
Czechoslovakia and Germany had already been confirmed. See Treaty of Prague, supra note 42,
art. 11(2).
48. Exchange of Notes Concerning the Relations Convention and the Settlement Convention,
Fr.-F.R.G.-U.K.-U.S., Sept. 28, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 454 (providing for the termination of the Settle-
ment Convention simultaneously with the entry into force of the Final Treaty, but providing that
Chapter 6, Articles 1 and 3-and therefore apparently Article 2 by incorporation-pertaining to
the quitclaim "shall, however, remain in force").
49. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechischen und
Slowakischen Foderativen Republik Ober gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit, Czech Rep.-F.R.G.-Slovak., Feb. 27, 1992, BGBI. II at 463.
50. See Keith B. Richburg, Close to Joining EU, Czechs Confronted with Darker Past: Repa-
rations Sought for Treatment of Ethnic Germans After WWII, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2002, at
A 16.
51. See Finding No. 55/1995 of March 8, 1995, Dreithaler, Const. Ct. Czech Rep., Case No.
P1. US 14/94, ndlez Ustavniho soudu j. 14 / 1994 / Sbrika nflezu a usneseni Ustavniho soudu,
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the Czech and Slovak Republics became separate states, with each main-
taining the continuity of its legal system, including the Decrees.53
Initially there were indications of rapprochement on the Sudeten
question: in 1990 President Vdclav Havel and President Richard von
Weiszdcker exchanged apologies on state visits. 54 However, relations
soon turned tense, with Sudeten German groups in particular demanding
limits on cooperation pending extensive reparations, a view at least indi-
rectly supported by the German government.55 In 1997, Germany and
the Czech Republic signed an extremely cautiously worded Declaration
in which, depending on one's view, the Czech side either does or does
not apologize for aspects of the expulsions.56 While the measure of
apology may be ambiguous, the absence of obligation is clear:
Both sides agree that injustice inflicted in the past belongs in the
past, and will therefore orient their relations towards the future....
[E]ach side remains committed to its legal system and respects
the fact that the other side has a different legal position. Both
sides therefore declare that they will not burden their relations
with political and legal issues which stem from the past.
57
The Declaration created some joint commissions to support research
and exchange, but not to endorse restitution to Sudeten expellees.
5 8
Thereafter, Czech politicians resisted calls for further gestures. Although
public debate in Germany and Austria about how to remember the war
available at http://test.concourt.cz/angl verze/doc/p-14-94.html [hereinafter Dreithaler] (consid-
ering in particular Decree 108/1945).
52. "[T]he debate surrounding the decrees, their potential declaration null and void from the
very beginning or their amendment or repeal, in effect questions the very foundations of post-war
Czechoslovak legislation." Czech Foreign Office, Opinion on the Benes Decrees at 9, in Legal
Opinion, supra note 14, at 54 (Kingsland).
53. Id. at 9 (Frowein).
54. Bruntstetter, supra note 26, at 272-73.
55. Chancellor Helmut Kohl reportedly stated in 1993 that the Czech Republic's prospect for
joining the European Union would be harmed if it did not negotiate with Sudeten groups. Patrick
Macklem, Rybni 9, Praha 1: Restitution and Memory in International Human Rights Law, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (2005); see also Pauer, supra note 5, at 173-75 (discussing strains in the
relationship in the early 1990s); Raue, supra note 44, at 123-52 (discussing the negotiations lead-
ing to the 1997 German-Czech Declaration),.
56. The Declaration uses the term lituje in Czech. 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note
34; WIKIPEDIA, Deutsch-Tschechische Erklairung, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benutzer:Nolanus/
Deutsch-Tschechische Erkl%C3%A4rung.
57. 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note 34, art. IV.
58. See id., arts. VII-VIII.
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has since intensified, 59 neither state pressed the matter in an official fo-
rum again.
In 1997, the EU entered accession negotiations with the Czech Re-
public. The Sudeten question, although peripheral to the process, proved
a persistent and troubling issue, especially in relations with Germany
and Austria.60 In 2001 and 2002, the issue achieved prominence in elec-
tions in those states and Hungary, where right-wing parties called for re-
peal of the Decrees, but the controversy receded after all these parties
lost at the polls.
Thus, when the Czech Republic became a full member of the EU on
May 1, 2004, it had neither repudiated the Decrees nor engaged in any
act of restitution. The Czech government has since issued an expression
of appreciation to Germans who actively opposed Nazism, regretting
that "some of these people did not receive the appreciation they de-
served.,61 Although the controversy continues to surface, the impetus of
the debate faded with thefait accompli of accession. So: what have con-
sequences of that been for the shape of our law?
IV. THE CONSENSUS REJECTING SUDETEN CLAIMS AND ITS
RATIONALES
One of the many weighty, non-existent problems which trouble
us, is the Sudeten question. It doesn't exist, because the Sude-
tenland as a legal concept no longer exists; it doesn't exist, be-
cause there is nothing to solve; it doesn't exist because it was laid
to rest by official documents signed by long-dead men of power.
59. See JORG FRIEDRICH, DER BRAND: DEUTSCHLAND IM BOMBENKRIEG 1940-1945 (2002);
GIGNTER GRASS, IM KREBSGANG (2002); VOLKER HAGE, ZEUGEN DER ZERSTORUNG: DIE
LITERATEN UND DER LUFTKR1EG: ESSAYS UND GESPRACHE (2003); W.G. SEBALD, ON THE
NATURAL HISTORY OF DESTRUCTION (Anthea Bell trans., 2003) (1999); Christoph Amend & Jens
Jessen, Kann man den Deutschen trauen?, DIE ZEIT, Nr. 19, May 4, 2005,
http://www.zeit.de/2005/19/Titelei-trauen; Jacques Rupnik, The Other Central Europe, 11 E.
EUR. CONST. REv. 68, 69 (2002) (noting "a new German fascination with the 'lost provinces' of
the East").
60. Pavla Kozakova, Benes Decrees Confirmed, TOL, Apr. 30, 2002 (on file with author).
61. Czech Government Issues Apology, supra note 28 (noting the government's commitment
of thirty million koruna to "document the fate of Sudeten German antifascists over the next couple
of years," but also citing Paroubek's response to concerns about expellees demanding compensa-
tion, that "[i]t's a gesture of appreciation and apology and it does not mean any risk for us").
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There is nothing to solve, but there is much to think about.
- . Neff 62
A. The Consensus for Rejection-The Views of Relevant Sources
This section assesses the sources of legal argument about accession
and the Sudeten controversy from 1997, when the EU opened negotia-
tions, until accession in 2004. A number of actors weighed in: EU insti-
tutions, states and officials, international and domestic courts, scholars,
activist groups, and individuals. These actors in turn produced or inter-
preted a variety of textual sources: treaties and agreements, 63 declara-
tions, 64 officials' statements, 65 court judgments, 66 resolutions of the
European Parliament 67 and the Legal Opinion commissioned by it, views
of the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, 68  advocacy by non-
governmental organizations, 69 and academic commentary7 0-in short, all
the materials from which claims about customary international law are
constructed.71
62. 0. Neff, Dialog opren na pevnou hranici, Mladd Fronta Dnes, Mar. 26, 1993, quoted in
BURCHER, supra note 8, at 1.
63. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the
Future," U.S.-F.R.G., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298.
64. See, e.g., 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note 34.
65. Ginter Verheugen, Speech at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University (Apr.
11, 2002) [hereinafter Verheugen Speech] (transcript available at http://www.evropska-
unie.cz/eng/speech.asp?id= 1332).
66. Such court judgments have been issued by both Czech and international tribunals. See
Dreithaler, supra note 51; Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, App. No. 42527/98,
2001 EuR. CT. H.R. [hereinafter Prince Hans-Adam]; Case Concerning Certain Property (Liech-
tenstein v. Germany), 2005 I.C.J. (Feb. 10) [hereinafter Liechtenstein], available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ila/ilaframe.htm.
67. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the Czech Republic's Application for Mem-
bership of the European Union and the State of Negotiations, COM (2000) 703 final (Sept. 5,
2001), 2002 O.J. (C 72 E) 181 [hereinafter European Parliament Resolution].
68. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 747/1997, Des Fours Walderode v. Czech
Republic, UN DOc. CCPR/C/73/D/747/1997 (2001) [hereinafter Des Fours Walderode].
69. Kozakova, supra note 60 ("Otto Habsburg, chairman of the Pan-European Association and
a direct descendant of the last Austrian emperor, recently repeated his criticisms of the Benes de-
crees.").
70. MS, Czech News Agency Says Reports on Benes Decrees Contradict One Another....
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 3 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/l0/
031002.asp [hereinafter MS, Czech News Agency Says] (discussing various scholars' views).
71. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39-40 (7th ed. 1997) (listing newspaper reports of state actions, statements of government
spokesmen, laws, judicial decisions, extracts from foreign ministry archives, writings of interna-
tional lawyers, treaties, and non-binding resolutions and declarations as sources of customary in-
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Depending on one's preferred theory of customary international law,
greater or lesser priority might be given to these actors in deriving legal
norms: 7 2 The most dominant theories adopt a statist view of customary
law's creation,73 while a minority advocates identifying a broader range
of actors in a dynamic conversation. 74 Still, regardless of one's ap-
proach,75 the outcome in this instance is the same: no model of custom-
ternational law); W. Michael Reisman, The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture: International
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (Apr. 24, 1981) in 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101,
107 (identifying "international and national officials, the elites of multinational enterprises, the
media, many interest and pressure group leaders, and most human beings" as legal "communica-
tors").
72. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (5th ed. 2003) (noting "confusion be-
tween law-making, law-determining and law-evidencing... [in] methods"); Anthea Elizabeth Rob-
erts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 758-59 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, The Method Is
the Message, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 419 (1990) (discussing various approaches).
73. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(I)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
available at http://www.icj-cij .org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute. htm;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)
(noting that customary law "results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation"); MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES
16-28 (2d ed. 1997); Detlev F. Vagts, International Relations Looks at Customary Law: A Tradi-
tionalist's Defence, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1031 (2004). For classic statements of customary law, see:
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v.
Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 20, 1969): Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 2000) (containing classic and recent statements of cus-
tomary law). "The Court has, however, often been criticized for not doing the kind of systematic
analysis of practice and opinio juris that...North Sea Continental Shelf recommended." W.
MICHAEL REISMAN, MAHNOUSH H. ARSANJANI, SIEGFRIED WIESSNER & GAL S. WESTERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 15 (2004); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The
Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000) (criticizing lack of con-
sistent norms for assessing state action and opiniojuris).
74. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World
Community: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988); Reisman, supra note
71, at 101 (criticizing law's "myth[ic]" reliance on traditional sources); Siegfried Wiessner & An-
drew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 101 (2001) (criti-
cizing positivism for "its common focus on 'existing' rules, emanating solely from entities
deemed equally 'sovereign,' [that] does not properly reflect the reality of how law is made, ap-
plied and changed"); Vagts, supra note 73, at 1032 (arguing for "break[ing] open the black boxes
of nation-states and look[ing] at the interactions of the flesh and blood individuals involved" and
affording a more active role to bureaucrats, officials, and judges in defining customary interna-
tional law).
75. Some scholars argue forcefully that customary law is epiphenomenal. See generally JACK
L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). But see Mark A.
Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith
and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143 (2001); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Custom-
ary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 569 (2005) (refuting claims that customary
international law is "behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent"), This Article is not
concerned with debates about causation in states' seeming compliance with customary law, but
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ary law yields an outcome favorable to Sudeten claims. At the level of
law-making authority, all of these actors reveal a decisive consensus
around four core rationales for rejecting Sudeten claims. We will exam-
ine the views of some representative sources of customary law-the
Czech Republic, EU states and institutions, the Legal Opinion, the Pots-
dam Powers, international adjudicative bodies, and the writings of pub-
licists-before turning in sub-section B to the four underlying rationales
for rejecting Sudeten claims that they share.
1. The Czech Republic
As successor to the state from whose territory the Sudeten Germans
were expelled, the Czech Republic has a natural interest in any connec-
tion between the accession process and restitution. 76 Any indication that
it believed itself to be under an obligation concerning restitution to the
expellees could constitute powerful evidence for a claim of customary
legal obligation.77 However, the Czech Republic has consistently op-
posed any repeal of the Decrees or other form of restitution, and has re-
jected any connection between these matters and its accession to the EU.
For the Czech Republic's political organs, the 1997 German-Czech
Declaration constitutes a definitive closure to the question of expellees'
claims as a matter of law or inter-state relations.78 In the Declaration, the
Czech Republic defined its historic role in these terms:
The Czech side regrets that, by the forcible expulsion and forced
resettlement of Sudeten Germans from the former Czechoslova-
kia after the war as well as by the expropriation and deprivation
of citizenship, much suffering and injustice was inflicted upon
innocent people, also in view of the fact that guilt was attributed
collectively. It particularly regrets the excesses which were con-
trary to elementary humanitarian principles as well as legal norms
rather the effects on the doctrinal structure states formally acknowledge. For this Article's pur-
poses it is sufficient to find a correlation between customary norms and states' actions, and thus a
(possibly unexplained) predictability; all sides of the debate on customary law's effect suppose
such a correlation, or they would have nothing to argue about.
76. Many of the issues discussed here would also apply to Slovakia as the other legal succes-
sor to Czechoslovakia. See Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 40 (Bemitz). Poland also has related
or parallel issues regarding postwar expulsions and relations with EU member states.
77. See SHAW, supra note 72, at 80-84 (discussing the concept of opinio juris-the role of
states' sense of legal obligation in constructing customary law claims). See also infra Part IV.C.
78. See, e.g., MS, Czech Foreign Minister Rules out Negotiations on Benes Decrees, RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Nov. 3, 2003 [hereinafter MS, Czech Foreign Minister],
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/11/031103.asp.
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existing at that time, and it furthermore regrets that Law No. 115
of 8 May 1946 made it possible to regard these excesses as not
being illegal and that in consequence these acts were not pun-
ished.79
This expression of regret, which as a matter of language does not ac-
tually regret the expulsions as such, was made in the context of Ger-
many's acceptance that the Declaration would close the matter. None-
theless, in the face of repeated attempts by political actors in Germany
and Austria to link the expulsions to accession, the Czech government
did engage the issue further, though largely to reaffirm a solid front re-
jecting any further steps.
In the run-up to elections in Germany, Austria, and Hungary in 2002,
politicians in those countries increased their rhetorical assaults on the
Decrees, and with them, opportunities for the Czech Republic to clarify
its position.8 0 Czech officials and politicians were nearly unanimous in
resisting calls for restitution,81 with most opposing even symbolic ges-
tures beyond those already made.82 More broadly, the Czech govern-
ment insisted that the Decrees were not only compatible with a just legal
order, but synonymous with it: "[T]he debate surrounding the decrees,
their potential declaration null and void from the very beginning or their
amendment or repeal, in effect questions the very foundations of post-
war Czechoslovak legislation." 3
In April 2002, the Czech Parliament unanimously approved a joint
79. 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note 34, art. III.
80. For example, in response to then Prime Minister Viktor Orban's call for the repeal of the
Decrees, the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia cancelled a summit
meeting. Representation of the European Commission in the Czech Republic, Benes Decrees
"Should Be No Obstacle" (Mar. 18-25, 2002), http://www.evropska-unie.cz/eng/
article.asp?id= 1310.
81. See MS, ... While Parties Agree on the Text of Envisaged Declaration, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 22, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/220402.asp (noting
broad agreement among Czech parties about the Decrees).
82. See BW, Klaus Opposes Czech Compensation for Sudeten Germans, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 16, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/160402 (noting
Klaus' rejection of "symbolic compensation" as an attempt to revise the postwar settlement; not-
ing also a "Stop Nationalism" petition organized by Bishop Vaclav Maly to oppose political ex-
ploitation of the Decrees, and Klaus' criticism of it).
83. Czech Foreign Office, Opinion on the Benes Decrees, in Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at
54 (Kingsland); see also MS, Czech Republic Submits Benes Decrees Assessment to European
Parliament..., RADIO FREE EuR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 4, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/ 040402.asp [hereinafter MS, Czech Republic Submits]
(reporting on the Czech Republic's official assessment of the Decrees submitted to the European
Parliament).
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resolution declaring that the Decrees are part of the post-war settlement
and the state's legal history, and that "legal and property relations" aris-
ing from them are "unquestionable, inviolable, and unchangeable, 84 a
view President Havel publicly supported. 85 Some Czech politicians in-
terpreted the Resolution as the Czech Republic's final position on the
matter; Vaclav Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party declared that he
would advise his generally pro-EU party to oppose Czech membership if
the EU itself did not give "legal guarantees" that the Decrees would not
be questioned after accession.
86
The Resolution also noted, however, that the Decrees are not cur-
rently applicable, indicating that they "were implemented in the period
after they had been issued and no new legal norms can be established on
their basis today. 87 As the Resolution suggested by simultaneously de-
fending the Decrees' inviolability and acknowledging their current non-
applicability, the Czech position centered on the Decrees' lack of con-
temporary legal effect as the reason for their irrelevance in the accession
process. In May 2002, for example, Prime Minister Zeman asserted that
"[o]ur analysis shows there is no discrimination today" and that conse-
84. MS, Czech Lower House Approves Resolution on Benes Decrees, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 24, 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/240402.asp [herein-
after MS, Czech Lower House Approves Resolution]; see also MS, Text of Czech Resolution on
Benes Decrees Made Public, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 23, 2002,
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/230402.asp [hereinafter MS, Text of Czech Resolution]
(noting that the draft resolution "rejects attempts to open issues connected with the end and with
the results of World War II," and declares that property restitution is "the exclusive prerogative of
Czech constitutional bodies").
85. President Havel Supports Parliament 's Resolution on Benes Decrees, RADIO PRAHA, Apr.
23, 2002, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/27207. Havel has on occasion expressed regret regarding
the expulsions, and in particular for application of a collective guilt principle; his comments have
"provoked a wave of protests on the Czech scene." CTK News Agency, Appeals for Reconcilia-
tion Sometimes Give Way to Strong Words, Aug. 24, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library
[hereinafter CTK, Appeals for Reconciliation]. In a letter to German President Richard von
Weizstcker in December 1989, Havel called the expulsions a "deeply immoral act," a comment he
repeated on a visit to Germany in 1990. Bruntstetter, supra note 26, at 272-73; Macklem, supra
note 55, at 17. Sudeten and Bavarian reaction was relatively hostile, however, with Sudeten lead-
ers interpreting Havel's goodwill gesture as an admission of guilt and demanding monetary repa-
rations. Pauer, supra note 5, at 173-75.
86. MS, Czech Lower House Approves Resolution, supra note 78; see also Kozakova, supra
note 60. Neither the EU nor its member states ever gave such guarantees.
87. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, The Czech Republic EU Entry/Postwar Decrees, CENT.
EUR./BALTIC MEDIA ROUNDUP ON EU-RELATED ISSUES 18-24 APR. 02, Apr. 25 2002, available
at LEXIS, News Library (summarizing CTK News Agency reports); see MS, Text of Czech Reso-
lution, supra note 84.
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quently the Czech Republic considers the Decrees "extinct, ' 88 an inter-
pretation deriving from the 1995 Dreithaler ruling of the Czech Consti-
tutional Court.89 In a joint statement at that time, Zeman and EU Com-
missioner for Enlargement, Gtinter Verheugen, likewise declared that
the "Decrees are not part of the Accession Negotiations and should have
no bearing on them" because they "no longer produce legal effects."
90
Thus, the official Czech position has been more nuanced than simply
completely rejecting claims for restitution on any grounds. Official
Czech pronouncements do not insist on the absolute righteousness of all
actions at the time or their continued correctness without any scruple or
modification. In addition, Czech politicians and observers have distin-
guished between legal and moral or political claims arising from the ex-
pulsions. Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda noted in late 2002, that
"[s]trictly from the legal point of view, we have no problems.... But we
still have the problem of political or moral gestures." 91 Michael Zan-
tovsky, Chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security Committee
of the Czech Senate, noted that:
There is no question of any official repeal of the decrees.... Le-
gally, we're off the hook.... Morally, I think there is a sense that
during the Second World War, atrocities were committed by the
Nazis for which Germany and Austria took responsibility, and af-
ter the war, acts were committed by the newly liberated countries,
including Czechoslovakia, which were morally indefensible, and
that any decent person should say 'I'm sorry' for.9 2
In 2002, then Labor and Social Affairs Minister Vladimir Spidla sug-
gested compensation for expellees who had been active anti-fascists, a
88. MS, EU Urges Calm in Czech-German Dispute over Benes Decrees, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, May 24, 2002, http://rferl.org/newsline/2002/05/3-CEE/cee-
240502.asp?po=y [hereinafter MS, EU Urges Calm].
89. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 15 (Frowein) (discussing the Czech Constitutional
Court's ruling in Dreithaler on Decree No. 108 of October 25, 1945). The Human Rights Com-
mittee has noted that "following the Court's judgment...the Benes' [sic] decrees have lost their
constitutional status." Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 669/1995, Gerhard Malik v. Czech
Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/669/1995 (1998) [hereinafter Malik]. This seems to be at variance
with Czech interpretations of the Court's logic about "extinction."
90. Press Statement, Milog Zeman & Giinter Verheugen (Apr. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id= 1188&ido=l&idj=l&amb=l [hereinafter Zeman-
Verheugen Joint Statement].
91. Richburg, supra note 50, at A16 (quoting Foreign Minister Svoboda).
92. Id. (quoting Czech Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security Committee Chairman
Zantovsky).
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proposal supported by Zeman. 93
But these modifications are only partial. "Extinction" seems clearly
different from complete repudiation or abrogation, and Czech pro-
nouncements on extinction invariably insist on the continuity of the De-
crees in the legal system. Indeed, extinction appears to be compatible
with the absence of relevant facts as much as with legal inoperability. 94
The extinction argument may moderate Czech rejection of a restitution
claim, but is still radically different from acknowledging an obligation
vis-A-vis the expellees as a group, or from conceding any international or
European aspect of the question.
As for moral and political arguments, by their very construction these
do not give rise to a legal obligation. Frowein notes that "[i]n the Ger-
man-Czech-Declaration of 1997 the Czech side regrets that the confisca-
tions inflicted injustice upon innocent people but no consequences fol-
low therefrom" 95-and the Czechs successfully resisted making any
additional gesture in any event. In addition, although the comments by
Svoboda, Zantovsky, and others might be construed as distancing the
Czech Republic from the expulsions and thereby delegitimizing them,
on a close reading, no official Czech position contemplated apology for
the expulsions as such but only for excesses and crimes committed in the
course of them. Nothing in the Czech view contemplated a fundamental
revision of official memory of the expulsions as legal and legitimate, or
any consequences for them in the present.
96
In the final months before accession, the Czech government main-
tained its position. In September 2003, for example, on the occasion of
93. CTK, Appeals for Reconciliation, supra note 85. Spidla suggested compensation would af-
fect "several dozen" or "several hundred" people, while Zeman indicated it might apply to those
Germans who had actively resisted or been placed in concentration camps. Czech Politicians
Don't Rule out Compensation for Some Sudeten Germans, CZECH Bus. NEWS, May 20, 2002
[hereinafter Czech Politicians Don't Rule out Compensation].
94. That is to say, an absence of Germans rather than an absence of legal force. Cf Dreithaler,
supra note 51, at para. 35 (finding that Decree 108/1945 "has already accomplished its purposes
and for a period of more than four decades has not created any further legal relations, so that it no
longer has any constitutive character"). There is absolutely no suggestion in any of the sources,
nor in this Article, that any Czech official believes the Decrees could be invoked against the re-
maining German population.
95. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 13 (Frowein).
96. Compare this view of Interior Minister Stanislav Gross:
In cases of obvious and provable injustice we are not against holding talks on these is-
sues but it is impossible to link them with the issue of the deportation of Sudeten Ger-
mans... because we think that the deportation of Sudeten Germans after World War Two
was a right solution and was adequate to that period.
Czech Politicians Don 't Rule out Compensation, supra note 93 (ellipsis in original).
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Chancellor Gerhard Schrider's visit to Prague, Prime Minister Vladimir
Spidla declared "disputes between the Czech Republic and Germany
over the deportation of the Sudeten Germans after World War II are a
thing of the past.",97 On November 2, 2003, Foreign Minister Svoboda
... ruled out any political negotiations with Germany on the ex-
pulsion from Czechoslovakia of the Sudeten Germans at the end
of World War II.... Svoboda said the government stands by the
joint 1997 German-Czech declaration aimed at the reconciliation
of the two neighboring countries.... It is possible to debate what
happened, but in no way to negotiate,' [Svoboda] said. 98
Thus, no institution of the Czech Republic had repudiated the Decrees
or engaged in any other act of restitution by the time it became a mem-
ber of the EU. Equally important, the Czech Republic had not in any
fashion conceded the right of the EU or other member states to intervene
in the matter, whether as a condition of accession or in any other way.
To the degree any other relevant actor continued to press claims that the
Czech Republic had an obligation to make restitution-and as we shall
see, such claims were very few-it has consistently maintained a posi-
tion as a persistent objector to those claims.99
97. MS, Czech Premier Says Relations with Germany 'Better Than Ever Before,' RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Sept. 5, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/O9/050903.asp (para-
phrasing Spidla).
98. MS, Czech Foreign Minister, supra note 78 (citing Svoboda's comments on TV Prima; in-
sertion of "[Svoboda]" in original).
99. See, e.g., MS, Sudeten Germans Call on Czech President to Hold Talks on Compensation,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Apr. 23, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/04/
230403.asp [hereinafter MS, Sudeten Germans Call on Czech President] (arguing that "Prague
has consistently rejected efforts to orchestrate anything but token compensation for the expul-
sions"). In the run-up to accession, the Czech Foreign Ministry website included these comments:
The decrees dating from 1940-45 are historical acts, which for their most part lack any
significance today. They reflect the continuity of Czechoslovakia's legal status during
the period of its struggle against Nazism and form a part of a complex of wartime and
post-war events and approaches. On the bilateral, Czech-German level, this question was
resolved by way of the Czech-German Declaration adopted in 1997.... [A] discussion of
those decrees lacks any legal significance or meaning; it can be nothing more than a his-
torical debate. Such a 'screening' of the history of individual candidate states for mem-
bership in the EU seems quite unprecedented....
... The Decrees.. form a part of the Laws of the Czech Republic although they are now
operationally outworn.
Czech Foreign Ministry Website, supra note 2. See also Ambassador Se~ka's Letter to the EP
Foreign Committee Chairman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic,
http://www.czechembassy.org/wwwo/mzv/?id=1 1097%20&ido=6569&idj=2&amb=l (containing
similar language, adding, inter alia, that "[t]he Czech Republic does not intend to re-open this his-
torically closed distressful chapter of the European history at the European level. We assume that
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In August 2005, the Czech government issued a unanimous declara-
tion expressing appreciation, in highly general terms, for the loyalty of
antifascist Germans and regretting their mistreatment:
The government of the Czech Republic expresses its profound
appreciation to.. .German nationals living on the Czech territory
before World War II who during the war remained faithful to the
(then) Czechoslovak republic and actively participated in the
struggle for its liberation, [and regrets that] some of these people
did not receive the appreciation they deserved.100
Even this formulation was highly contested within the Czech Repub-
lic, 10 1 and any connection to compensation, revocation of the Decrees,
or-most importantly for our question-to the treatment of the Sudeten
Germans as a whole or a legal obligation to engage in restitution, has
been rejected. 102
Domestic courts' jurisprudence also constitutes evidence of state
practice, and various Czech courts have considered the expulsions.
Some cases were heard during the 1940s and 1950s, but since the col-
lapse of Communism and the institution of a restitution law for post-
1948 confiscations, many Germans have petitioned for the return of
property, or otherwise challenged the legality of the expulsions, denatu-
ralizations and confiscations. In an early case, Dreithaler, the Court ex-
pressly considered one of the Decrees both as an artifact of Czech law
re-opening of this issue could have far more reaching negative impacts on the current structure of
the European continent," and calling the Decrees "a long time ago closed [sic] event of our com-
mon European history.").
100. AP, Czech Government Issues Apology, supra note 28 (ellipsis in original).
101. In June 2005, in "an unusual admission for a left-wing leader," Paroubek wrote that rec-
ognition of anti-fascist Germans "should be a gesture by which the Czechs would show that they
are aware of a certain historical responsibility for the mass resettlement of former Sudeten Ger-
man fellow citizens under the principle of collective guilt that was understandable at the time but
today is completely unacceptable." Dinah A. Spritzer, Rethinking the Postwar Expulsions: WWII
Commentaries Note the Fate of Former Czechoslovak Citizens, THE PRAGUE POST, June 16,
2005, available at http://www.praguepost.com/P03/2005/Art/0616/news7.php (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Paroubek's June 8, 2005, article in PRAVO). President Vaclav Klaus termed the
proposal "exceptionally dangerous" and commented that Paroubek "has completely gone out of
his mind." CTK, Appeals for Reconciliation, supra note 85. Klaus also called the declaration "an
empty gesture because... it is impossible to track down most of those the apology addresses, and in
many respects they are part of a problematic group." Jan Velinger, Government Apologises for
Czech Victimization of Loyal, Anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans After WWII, RADIO PRAHA, Aug. 7,
2005, http://www.radio.cz/en/article/69979.
102. See AP, Czech Government Issues Apology, supra note 28.
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and in its international context.'1 03
Dreithaler petitioned under the restitution law10 4 to regain confiscated
property and have Decree 108/1945 declared void ab initio or annulled
as unconstitutional, "undemocratic in character and purpose and inhu-
mane in substance, ' 0 5 and incompatible with the "legal canons of civi-
lized European societies."'10 6 The Court rejected these claims and reaf-
firmed the democratic values of the pre-war legal regime, as part of a
civilized, European, international system:
[T]he Czechoslovak legal order would [not] have manifestly pre-
ferred the preeminence of the domestic legal order... irrespective
of the requirements, in particular, of international law. For...the
principle of the democratic legitimacy of the governmental sys-
tem... lays stress on its links to the system of values, which also
make up the foundation of the international legal order.
... [C]onvictions concerning the imperativeness of smashing the
Nazi regime and of compensation...of the damages caused by
that regime and the events of the war, were found in the value
orientation which was formed during the Second World War and
shortly thereafter. Thus, not even in this respect does Presidential
Decree No. 108/1945...conflict with the 'legal canons prevalent
among civilized European societies in this century,' rather it was
a legal act that was a product of its era, supported by international
consensus. 107
The Court also found that the means employed to defend those values,
which the Court called "society's lone supporting structure," were a
proportional response to past (and implicitly future) threats to Czech so-
ciety. The Court denied that ethnic confiscations constituted an improper
instance of collective guilt, because it denied that guilt was even being
considered:
[N]o presumption of 'guilt' is concerned, not even for persons of
German nationality, rather it is a presumption of 'responsibility.'
103. See Mark Gillis, Facing up to the Past: The Czech Constitutional Court's Decision on the
Confiscation of Sudeten German Property, 2 THE PARKER SCH. J. OF E. EUR. L. 709 (1995) (dis-
cussing Dreithaler); Raue, supra note 44, at 68-69, 128-30 (discussing Dreithaler).
104. Zikon . 182/1993 Sb. § 74.
105. Dreithaler, supra note 51, at para. 3.
106. Id. at para. 2. The Regional Court had declared that the Decree was "a valid part of 'our
legal order."' Id. (citing the Regional Court in Usti nad Labem, Liberec Branch, file no. 29 Co
647/93-30).
107. Id. at para. 9.
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... [T]he category of 'responsibility' is a much broader concept
than that of 'guilt', so that in this respect it has a far more exten-
sive value, social, historical, as well as legal, dimension .... [T]he
fact that Decree No. 108/1945...is based on the presumption of
responsibility of persons having German nationality does not
mean that it has a discriminatory nature; it does not represent a
form of nationalistic revenge, rather it is merely a proportionate
response to the aggression of Nazi Germany.
0 8
By insisting that the Decree was not a collective ethnic punishment,
the Court may have implicitly acknowledged the illegitimacy of collec-
tive punishment, perhaps contributing to the formation of a customary
norm outlawing it. But it also necessarily reaffirmed the state's right to
confiscate property on grounds that materially distinguish between indi-
viduals by ethnicity, since the burden of proof was different for ethnic
Germans and Hungarians than for Czechs and Slovaks:
Thus, even though the decree speaks in terms primarily
of.. .German nationality,10 9 in actuality this decree has a more
general scope and can be considered as one of the documents re-
flecting the age-old conflict between democracy and totalitarian-
ism.... [A] person was not considered an enemy, be he, for ex-
ample, of German nationality, if he actively stood up in the
defense of democracy or if he suffered under the totalitarian re-
gime, whereas on the other side, one qualified as an enemy if,
without regard to his nationality, he actively stood up against de-
mocracy. 110
Even the Court's own formulation does not actually identify a non-
ethnic rationale: A German was an enemy unless he actively resisted
Nazism, while 'one'-that is, a Czech or Slovak-was an enemy only if
he actively supported Nazism. A merely passive Czech or Slovak re-
tained his property, while a merely passive German was subject to con-
fiscation. And the Court later made it very clear that it did indeed think
an expressly ethnic distinction reasonable:
[T]here does seem to exist after all a fundamental difference be-
tween the responsibility of the 'rest of the world' and that of the
German nation, between the silence and passivity of some and the
108. Id. at paras. 23, 26.
109. Meaning "ethnicity."
110. Dreithaler, supra note 51, at para. 22.
2006]
92 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
silence and the active role played by others, a difference which
has some significance for the burden of proof. For it was a con-
siderable portion of the German nation which in myriad respects
directly and consciously participated in the creation of the power
structure in Nazi Germany, in the expansion of Nazi Germany
into Czechoslovakia, and generally in Nazi aims and actions.'
Finally, the Court noted as "determinative in the present case" that the
Decree's consistency with the Constitution or international treaties can-
not be reviewed because it "no longer [has]... any constitutive charac-
ter"1 12 and extended this logic to the Decrees as a whole:
[T]he legislation...concern[s] what is in essence an already
closed circle of problems and issues intimately connected with
the wartime events and the economic renewal of the land. In addi-
tion, the normative acts from this period accomplished their pur-
poses in the immediate post-war period, so that from a contempo-
rary perspective they no longer have any current significance and
already lack any further constitutive character." 
3
Here the Court developed what other Czech officials later referred to
as the "extinction" thesis. Consistent with the general lines of the Czech
position, the Court's decision reaffirmed the centrality-if present inop-
erability-of the Decrees in the Czech legal order. And as a practical
matter, in finding that the Decrees were not reviewable, it necessarily
did not find that they violate any international obligation of the Czech
Republic.
Czech courts have granted restitution in a small number of cases,' 14 in
111. Id. at para. 24. Cf Gillis, supra note 103, at 720, cited in Alexander M. Karn, Restitution
and Retrodiction: Talking Back to the Past in Post-Communist East-Central Europe, 7 n. 10,
available at http://www.eucenter.scrippscol.edu/publications/papers/kam.pdf
([T]he real problem consisted in the means for determining who were enemies and trai-
tors: in the case of the Germans and Hungarians, they were presumed to be unless they
could prove their loyalty, and other citizens were assumed to be loyal unless the state
could prove otherwise .... [This represented] a clear example of discrimination on the
basis of nationality... [but is] proportionate to the end of re-establishing a democracy.).
112. Dreithaler, supra note 51, at para. 34.
113. Id.
114. Including for Dreithaler. Shortly after the ruling on Decree 108/1945 was issued, the
Constitutional Court held that a lower court had improperly dismissed a related claim for return of
property because "the circumstances of the seizure of the Dreithaler house.. were unclear" and
may have occurred in 1949, and thus come under the restitution law. Judgment of June 22, 1995,
Const. Ct. Czech Rep., Case No. IV. US 56/94, nhlez UJstavniho soudu 6j. 56 / 1994 / Sbrika
n~lezu a usneseni Ustavniho soudu, available at http://test.concourt.cz/angl-verze/doc/4-56-
94.html; see Steve Kettle, Sudeten German Wins Restitution Case in Czech Constitutional Court,
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extremely limited and highly particular circumstances. 1 5 However,
there is no suggestion that the fundamental lines of Dreithaler have been
altered. Czech jurisprudence informs and confirms the message of Czech
political actors: the Decrees remain part of the legal order, if no longer
operative, and no restitution is required. On the contrary, that jurispru-
dence identifies the expulsions as consistent with and constitutive of the
legitimate Czech and international order.
2. European Union Member States and Institutions
Several EU member states addressed the Sudeten controversy."H6 As
sovereign states, member states are core actors in customary law, pos-
sessing the standard tools for generating norms. Each of the then fifteen
EU member states had to agree to the accession of the Czech Republic,
and their decision to grant membership necessarily suggests a belief that
the candidate respects the principles in the Treaty of European Union,
including respect for human rights." 7 Any member state could have ve-
toed accession if it believed the Czech Republic was in violation of EU
law or fundamental human rights, or otherwise obliged to offer restitu-
tion. None did so, nor did any member lodge a formal demand for resti-
tution, even when the Sudeten issue was explicitly raised in EU institu-
tional fora. On the contrary, member states favored delinking the
Sudeten controversy from the accession process. France, for example,
consistently supported Czech membership, rejecting any claim that the
OMRI DAILY DIGEST, June 23, 1995, http://www.mojozone.org/pub/news/950623.new (noting
that, despite being a German, Dreithaler had retained his citizenship after 1948); Chandler Rosen-
berger, From Kokoschka to Modigliani: Czech-German Relations Today, 20 INSTITUTE OF
CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS, Aug. 1994, available at http://people.bu.edu/crr/
ICWA%20for/o2OWeb/Awakening.htm.
115. See, e.g., MS, Czech Supreme Court Makes Milestone Ruling in Restitution Controversy,
RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Sept. 12, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/09/3-
CEE/cee-120903.asp?po=y (noting that former nobleman Frantisek Oldrich Kinsky has received
certain properties, but also that a Supreme Court ruling recognizing the precedence of restitution
legislation over the Civil Code would have detrimental effects on lawsuits by other expellees); see
also Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, Revenge of Old Europe/Czech Policy Under Fire: Nobility
Seeks to Win Back Seized Property, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/12/09/empireed3_.php.
116. Great Britain is discussed below with the Potsdam Powers, but comments here apply to
it, as well.
117. Only states that respect the Union's foundational principles-"liberty, democracy, re-
spect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law"--may apply for member-
ship. Treaty Establishing the European Community arts. 6(1), 49, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
as amended by Treaty of Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 (Consolidated Version, Dec. 24,
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1) [hereinafter EU Treaty].
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controversy was relevant to accession.'8
Germany, the member state with the strongest historical and demo-
graphic links to the expellee population, likewise did not raise any ulti-
mate objection. Sudeten groups in Germany expressly called on the gov-
ernment to link restitution to accession. Erika Steinbach, a member of
the Bundestag and president of the Association of Displaced Persons,
protested:
Who in the year 2002 cannot distance himself from a political
event that contradicts all norms of international law and questions
the E.U. suitability of his country? Chancellor Schr6der is ur-
gently called upon to link the question of Czech E.U. entry to the
abandonment of the Benes Decrees."19
Steinbach's views represented those of a powerful constituency
within Germany, but not of a law-generating actor. Had her view been
adopted by Germany, it would have constituted indicia of possible obli-
gation in international law; Schrdder, of course, did not at any point as-
sert such a linkage. 120 Rather, Germany approved the Czech Republic's
accession without requiring any restitution for Sudeten claims.
German politicians on the right linked strong objections to Czech
membership to the Sudeten issue, and raised the matter in European in-
stitutions, yet even these advocates for Sudeten restitution limited the
scope of their objections. For example, Edmund Stoiber, Prime Minister
of Bavaria and candidate for Chancellor for the CDU/CSU in 2002, fre-
quently condemned the expulsions and called for restitution, 12 1 and yet
he also advocated keeping calls for the repeal of the Decrees separate
from accession. "For me these issues represent no condition for the ad-
mission of the Czech Republic to the EU, but the Czech Republic has to
know that if it does not make a clear line, the theme will continue in
Europe."' 122 And, of course, these were only the views of opposition
118. See, e.g., Statements Made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Spokesperson,
Paris (excerpt), Apr. 19, 2002, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/briefing/us 190402.asp.
119. Wallace, supra note 27.
120. Cf MS, Czech President Warns against 'Opening Sensitive Issues of the Past'..., RADIO
FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 30, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/301003.asp
(noting Chancellor Gerhard Schrdder's comments in Bratislava that he "would welcome an offi-
cial Czech apology," but that "the issue should not burden Czech-German relations").
121. See, e.g., id (noting Stoiber's comment that "[t]he expulsion of the Sudeten Germans
cannot be justified under any circumstances").
122. Czech Politicians Don't Rule out Compensation, supra note 93 (quoting Stoiber at a
Sudeten German rally in Nuremberg).
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politicians, never those of the German state. 123
According to some observers, Germany had declared the matter set-
tled when it signed the German-Czech Declaration. As noted above, the
Czech expression of regret in the Declaration was made in the context of
Germany's acceptance, in the same Declaration, of the existing Czech
legal system, the absence of any obligation to make changes to it, and
commitment to the Czech Republic's accession. As the Legal Opinion
notes:
[W]ithin the accession process it would be difficult to ask for the
repeal of the legislation concerned since Germany, the country
most directly affected by these developments, did not insist that
[the amnesty law] must be partly repealed in the negotiations
leading to the Declaration of 1997. The Declaration is not a
treaty. But it is a carefully worded text, negotiated in detail,
which, on the basis of the principles of good faith and estoppel in
international law, is of relevance in German-Czech relations.' 
24
As Kingsland notes, "[t]his agreement, at the very least, implies ac-
ceptance by Germany of the expropriation of property under the Benes
Decrees,"'' 25 and the Declaration "indicates acceptance by Germany of
the effects of Act 115/1945 [regarding amnesty for acts against expel-
lees] and strongly implies that a repeal is not considered necessary by
Germany."' 2 6 Nor have German courts-which in any event are con-
strained by the Settlement Convention from considering most claims
against seized assets' 27-- considered that Sudeten claims implicate any
international obligations requiring revision.
128
Austria, the other state with a significant expellee population, had not
raised the expellee issue in the same manner as Germany during the
123. Gattini, supra note 4, at 516 ("[T]he various governments of the Federal Republic of
Germany have never officially supported the claims of the Vertriebenen [expelled].").
124. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 29 (Frowein). Cf Gattini, supra note 4, at 516 (noting
that the "[d]eclaration demonstrates the wish of the German federal government, if not to consider
the issue closed once and for all, at least to commit itself not to make claims for itself or to lend
support through diplomatic channels for claims made by its citizens").
125. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 59 (Kingsland).
126. Id. at 63 (Kingsland).
127. See discussion of Settlement Convention, supra note 41 and infra note 205.
128. See, e.g., Gattini, supra note 4, at 518 (discussing the German Federal Constitutional
Court's rejection of a claim by Prince Hans Adam I1 of Liechtenstein of an alleged violation of the
Grundgesetz, Article 25, "which guarantees that the public bodies of the Federal Republic shall
observe customary international law," but also noting that the Court relied on the Settlement Con-
vention, and did not reach the merits).
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Cold War period. Nonetheless, in the late 1990s, the level of diplomatic
dispute between Austria and the Czech Republic over the expulsions
was even more heated-and after its own admission to the EU, Austria
had the right to veto accession. However, although Austrian officials and
politicians frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the Czech Repub-
lic's position, 129 Austria never declared that failure to repudiate the De-
crees or to otherwise undertake restitution constituted a violation of any
international or EU norm or a reason to oppose accession. Austria ap-
proved Czech accession without requiring any restitution for Sudeten
claims.
Indeed, in both Germany and Austria-as well as in Hungary-
rightist politicians raised the question of the expulsions and restitution,
but felt constrained by their conceptions of the EU process to limit the
scope of linkage between accession and restitution; whatever their sym-
pathies, they were not prepared to insist on formal linkage. 130 In all three
countries, those politicians sympathetic to restitution lost, and therefore
did not form state policy in the run-up to accession and their objections
remained peripheral and private.
EU institutions likewise ultimately raised no objection. The Union
does not possess international legal personality, and EU institutions'
formal authority in customary law creation is questionable, yet although
its powers are dependent on and derivative of the member states, it has a
separate institutional structure and its actions are routinely considered in
scholarship and advocacy. It is difficult to imagine a successful custom-
ary law argument running directly contrary to the expressed view of
what is casually but increasingly called "Europe."
Accession requires actions by the European Council, the European
Commission, and the European Parliament.' 31 Before the Union could
open accessions negotiations, the Council and Commission had to con-
129. See, e.g., MS, Czech President Sends Mixed Signals in Vienna, RADIO FREE EUR.IRADIO
LIBERTY, Apr. 24, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/04/3-CEE/cee-240403.asp (noting
Austrian President Thomas Klestil's statement that "the Sudeten German question had not yet
been solved 'in a satisfactory manner"'). Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schflssel called on the
Czech Republic to voluntarily compensate Sudeten expellees-implying that, his sympathies
aside, he did not believe the Czech Republic was necessarily obliged to do so. Wallace, supra note
27. J6rg Haider, leader of the Freedom Party, called for abolition of the Decrees. See id.; see also
Rob Cameron, Freedom Party Furious over Benes Decrees Resolution, RADIO PRAHA, Apr. 25,
2002, http//:www.radio.cz/en/article/27283.
130. See Wallace, supra note 27 (quoting analyst Jonathan Stein, saying "Politicians are trying
to show they are capable of defending national identity, but E.U. integration limits the scope of
this to symbolic battles").
131. EU Treaty, supra note 117, art. 47(1)-(2).
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firm that the Czech Republic had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria as a
minimum basis for membership.13 2 These criteria, though highly gen-
eral, require candidates to guarantee basic human rights and respect for
minorities. 133 Consequently, approval indirectly indicates EU institu-
tions' (and member states') views on a candidate's compliance with hu-
man rights norms.
Thus, in declaring that the Czech Republic had met the criteria, the
Commission necessarily implied either that the Decrees were no longer
valid, or that they did not violate human rights norms. 134 The Commis-
sion and Council approved and later revised an Accession Partnership
with the Czech Republic establishing the conditions for accession," 35 and
none of these documents mentions the Sudeten issue or in any way con-
ditions progress towards membership on restitution. The Council did not
take any action in connection with the Sudeten controversy,' 36 and later,
during the controversy, Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen de-
clared the Czech Republic in compliance with EU law 137 and expressly
disassociated the Sudeten issue from accession, noting: "[I]t is to be
hoped that... the Czech Republic, Germany and Austria... can reach an
understanding about how to deal with their own past.... It is also desir-
able for this to happen before the Czech Republic joins. But it is not a
132. Id. art. 47(1).
133. "Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minori-
ties.... Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership
including adherence to the aims of political... union." Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen Euro-
peans Council (June 21-22, 1993), EUR. COUNCIL DOc. SN 180/1/93 Rev 1, available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921 .pdf.
134. 1 do not mean to suggest that the Commission's determination was legalistic; accession is
a highly political process. I only note the absence of any opinion that there might be a legal(istic)
obstacle. As a thought experiment, imagine the Commission were to reject a candidate's applica-
tion and specify human rights violations as the reason. This would surely constitute a datum in a
claim that the applicant state was violating human rights. Any such posture is entirely absent in
the Czech case.
135. See Commission Regulation 622/98, 1998 O.J. (L 85) 1 (EC) (revised 1999 and 2001).
136. See Reply to Written Question E-0574/02 by Nelly Maes (Verts/ALE) to the Council,
2002 O.J. (C 309 E) 29 (EC) (English, French original) (noting, in reply to an MEP question, that
the Council "has not discussed the question whether the Beneg decrees in the Czech and Slovak
Republics might be compatible with Community law"), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/ce309/ce30920021212en00290029.pdf.
137. "1 no longer see any insurmountable barriers that would prevent negotiations from being
concluded at the end of this year. ... The European Commission has always maintained the view
that the legal order of the Czech Republic meets the Copenhagen accession criteria." Verheugen
Speech, supra note 65 (adding "I say this quite deliberately, aware that only very recently, the past
has cast a shadow over the accession negotiations").
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condition."' 138
The European Parliament' 39 was the only EU institution to evince
even guarded support for Sudeten claims and for the view that restitution
might be obligatory. In a Resolution of September 5, 2001, the European
Parliament welcomed "the Czech government's willingness to scrutinise
the laws and decrees of the Beneg government, dating from 1945 and
1946 and which [are] still on the statute books, to ascertain whether they
run counter to EU law in force and the Copenhagen criteria., 140 This
suggests Parliament believed the Decrees were still law and might vio-
late EU norms, although it left the determination of this issue up to the
Czech government. Parliament may have contemplated that the Decrees
would have to be abolished if indeed they contradicted EU law, although
the Resolution does not explicitly indicate this.
Outside the frame of the Resolution, individual MEPs took public po-
sitions on the controversy, inserting views in the official record and cre-
ating a legislative history relevant (in some models) to determining cus-
tomary law. Some MEPs argued that failure to revoke the Decrees
should bar the Czech Republic from membership:
[S]ome deputies of the European Parliament expressed the view
that although controversy over the Benes decrees should not dis-
rupt the accession process the Czech Republic should not be al-
lowed to join the EU until it had revoked the decrees. [One MEP]
said she hoped that the resolution which the Czech Parliament is
planning to approve will not close the door to further negotia-
tions. 141
Even these MEPs were evidently concerned with minimizing the ob-
stacles to accession. On balance, however, their view clearly prioritizes
obligation, demoting a smooth accession process to the level of political
preference.
However, other MEPs strongly opposed any linkage with accession.
The Party of European Socialists (PES), while calling the Decrees "re-
pressive," also declared that they "are not part of the accession negotia-
tions and should have no bearing on them," and noted that "[t]he PES
138. Id.
139. The European Parliament must assent to accession by majority vote. EU Treaty, supra
note 117, art. 47(1).
140. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 67, at 185, 41.
141. EP Deputies Say Benes Decrees May be an Obstacle to Czech EU Accession, RADIO
PRAHA, Apr. 23, 2002, http://www.radio.cz/en/news/27207.
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underlines once more that the enlargement of the EU is a forward-
looking process that should not be hampered by reliving past battles.
Our history should, of course, not be ignored but it must be put in the
right context."'
' 42
The arguments individual MEPs raised give texture and complexity to
the legislative history, though it is not clear that their views contribute
much to the identification of customary legal norms. Even if they did,
they would not alter the core assessment that in the end, despite the ten-
tative concerns indicated in its Resolution, Parliament approved the
Czech Republic's accession without raising any objections that might
have suggested a legal obligation on the Czech Republic, the member
states, or the Union.
3. The Legal Opinion
Parliament took one other significant step that demonstrated it
thought the Decrees might pose an obstacle to accession: it commis-
sioned an external Legal Opinion on the Sudeten question. 143 The Presi-
dency of the Parliament issued three recognized legal experts the follow-
ing mandate:
- focus on today's validity and legal effects of the so-called
Beneg-Decrees and the restitution laws related to them, and on
their status in the context of compliance with EU law, with the
criteria of Copenhagen and international law relevant for acces-
sion;
- give due consideration to available legal opinions, in particular
of the legal services of the European institutions; [and]
- indicate whether any action from the candidate countries con-
cerned ought to be taken in view of their accession.144
This mandate focused on the Decrees' relationship to EU law in terms
of Union competences but as the last part makes clear, the Legal Opin-
ion was also intended to explore whether the Czech Republic needed to
make changes before the member states and EU should, or even could,
grant it membership. As one of the authors put it, "[t]he question to be
142. PES Rejects Link between Benes Decrees and Czech EU Accession, NEWSL. PARTY EUR.
SOCIALISTS, Apr. 16, 2002 (on file with author) (quoting PES Vice-President Jan Marinus
Wiersma and Parliamentary group vice-president Simon Murphy). Note that this exact phrase is
used in the Verheugen Speech, supra note 65.
143. Legal Opinion, supra note 14.
144. Id. at 5 (Frowein).
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considered is whether the Benes Decrees could prevent the accession of
the Czech Republic to the European Union.'
' 45
The resultant Legal Opinion, with a brief set of Common Conclusions
and a separate exposition by each author,' 46 is not binding, but does rep-
resent the foremost legal scholarship on the matter, and carries the im-
primatur of Parliament. For those who take a broad view of customary
law's formation, it is clearly of consequence-indeed, it is exactly the
sort of document upon which customary law's glossators often rely.
The Legal Opinion's Common Conclusions are that:
1. The confiscation on the basis of the Benes-Decrees does not
raise an issue under EU-law, which has no retroactive effect.
2. The Decrees on Citizenship are outside the competence of the
EU.
3. The Czech system of restitution, although in some respects
discriminatory...does not raise an issue under EU-Law.
4. It must be clarified during the accession procedure that crimi-
nal convictions on the basis of the Benes-Decrees cannot be en-
forced after accession.
5. A repeal of [the 1946 law] exempting "just reprisals" from
criminal responsibility, does not seem to be mandatory in the
context of accession. The reason is that individuals have relied on
these provisions for over 50 years and as such have a legitimate
expectation that they will not now be prosecuted for these ac-
tions. However, as we find this law repugnant to human Rights
and all fundamental legal principles, we are of the opinion that
the Czech Republic should formally recognise this.
6. We have based our opinions on the understanding that from
accession all EU-citizens will have the same rights on the terri-
tory of the Czech Republic. 147
Although we will consider some complexities, the Common Conclu-
sions largely reject the claim that the expulsions or their effects raise le-
gal obstacles to accession. The only modification which the Conclusions
consider mandatory-the only point on which the Czech legal system is
incompatible with EU or human rights norms-is enforcement of in ab-
sentia criminal convictions. The Conclusions also note two points of
145. Id. at 53 (Kingsland).
146. Frowein's is evidently the principal opinion, as, for example, Bemitz's opinion is called
"On the Study by Professor Dr Jochen A. Frowein." Id. at 37 (Bernitz).
147. Id. at 1.
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concern--"discriminatory" elements in the property restitution system,
and the fundamental "repugnancy" of the criminal amnesties-but then
confirm that these do not raise issues under EU law. Likewise, individ-
ual authors note that "[f]rom the viewpoint of modem standards of hu-
manitarian law, this legislation and its application deserves harsh cri-
tizism [sic],' ' 148 and that "[i]t may be true that the expropriation of
property... if done today, would probably constitute a breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights,"'149 but the authors do not find
any actual incompatibility with EU law.
The one issue on which the Legal Opinion finds a clear contradiction
of EU norms concerns enforcement of in absentia convictions. Relying
on ECHR rulings, the Opinion finds that "arrest and detention of people
entering the Czech Republic, on the basis of in absentia convictions in
summary procedures in 1945 or 1946, would run counter
to.. .fundamental rights and rule of law guarantees."' 50 It also suggests
that this would violate EU norms on freedom of movement.1 51 The
Opinion calls on the Czech government to investigate if any such possi-
bility actually exists today: "It is therefore of importance to verify
whether enforcement of these judgments is precluded.... This must be
clarified during the accession procedure. Legal certainty requires that
nobody should have any doubts here. The Czech Government must take
a clear position. If necessary legislation must be enacted."'
' 52
The Opinion suggests that "[t]his must be seen as a condition for ac-
cession"153-a statement that is as much an admonition to the member
states about their obligations in extending membership as it is to the
Czech Republic about undertaking reforms.
The Legal Opinion also considers the amnesty granted for acts against
Germans, which encompassed both wartime resistance and "just repri-
sals" against Nazis "and their accomplices" through October 28,
1945.'14 The Opinion notes that this amnesty, which it calls "unique" in
148. Id. at 42 (Bemitz).
149. Id. at 58 (Kingsland).
150. Id. at 22-23 & n.32 (Frowein) (referring to "Judgment of 12 February 1985, Colozza v.
Italy, Series A, No. 89; Judgment of 13 February 2001, Krombach v. France, Application no.
29731/96; ECHR, Judgment of 11 July 2002, Osu v. Italy, Application no. 36534/97").
151. Id. at 47 n. 1 (Bernitz) (discussing "C-348/96, Donatella Calfa, [ 1999] ECR I-I 1").
152. Id. at 23 (Frowein). Kingsland would allow retrials according to accepted procedure. Id.
at 62-64 (Kingsland).
153. Id. at 23 n.2 (Frowein).
154. Law No. 115 of 1946, Czechoslovak Provisional National Assembly, cited in Legal
Opinion, supra note 14, at 23 (Frowein).
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postwar Europe for excusing reprisals, 55
still has legal effects [and]... has been used to exempt acts from
criminal sanctions which violated elementary humanitarian prin-
ciples as has been recognised in the German-Czech Declaration
of 1997. Such a legislation is, applying the standards of Art. 6
TEU, a blatant violation of the guaranty of human rights, the rule
of law and the obligation of the State to protect all individuals on
its territory against violence. 
156
Nonetheless, having asserted that the amnesty violates fundamental
norms, the Opinion raises a "settled expectations" objection against ex-
posing individuals to criminal prosecution fifty years after the fact. More
precisely, the Opinion notes that settled expectations argue against mak-
ing revocation of the amnesty an obligation of accession:
[I]it is very doubtful whether it could be argued that it is a neces-
sity, under the fundamental principles applying for the Union,
that people who have committed crimes more than 50 years ago
should now stand trial after they have had the confidence
throughout their life that they could not be prosecuted for such
crimes. 157
Lastly, we may read some implied legal standards in the assumption
that all EU citizens will have the same rights after accession-which
suggests that deviation from that standard might violate EU norms-and
in the comment that the confiscations occurred before the EU's creation
in "the very special circumstances after World War 11I,158 which sug-
gests that comparable confiscations might raise a legal issue if they hap-
pened today.
Taking all its arguments together, what the Legal Opinion clearly
prohibits is any possibility that expellees could suffer any additional
disability (such as having a lesser right to acquire Czech citizenship or
property, or being subject a criminal charge) after accession. On the
Opinion's view, therefore, an expelled German must have the same right
155. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 24-25 (Frowein).
156. Id at 23-24 (Frowein).
157. Id. at 26-27 (Frowein). See also id. at 47 (Bernitz) ("The very existence today of such a
law in the statute book demonstrates the same hesitation to clean up the past as does certain as-
pects of the restitution legislation of the 1990s.... However... [it] would not be necessary, 56 years
later, to link firm demands for repeal of the law to the Accession Treaty as a condition.").
158. Id. at 13 (Frowein).
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to acquire property as any other EU citizen. 59 Any differentiation
"would be a fundamental breach with European Union traditions and
might even give rise to legal challenge as a discriminating treaty provi-
sion not in line with the general constitutional principles on which the
European Union has been established., 160
However, this does not necessarily proscribe all present disability,
broadly understood. Any claim that the original confiscations constitute
a continuing harm that might violate EU norms is rejected:
[I]t is clear that the [confiscation] Decree [No. 108] was consid-
ered to have been validly adopted and having had the legal effect
of transferring property originally held by those against whom the
measures of confiscation were taken. Therefore, it has relevance
for the present legal status of the property concerned in the Czech
legal order.' 61
And the assumption of obligatory equality-"the understanding that
from accession all European Union citizens have equal rights in the ter-
ritory of the Czech Republic"' 62 -is a sub-text to the Opinion's core
finding, that "[t]he Czech accession to the European Union does not re-
quire the repeal of the Beneg-Decrees or other legislation...." 63 In
reaching that view, the Opinion logically rejects any legal relationship
between EU law and restitution of citizenship or property, while claims
concerning the actual expulsion are not addressed at all.
The Legal Opinion declares that, owing to the supremacy of EU law,
any Decrees incompatible with that law would be "automatically inap-
plicable,"'' 64 but it does not itself actually definitively identify any such
159. Provided, of course, he is also a citizen of another EU state-nothing in the Legal Opin-
ion contemplates that the Czech Republic would need to treat expellees who are citizens of a non-
member state equally on questions of citizenship, property, or admission to its territory. Thus, it is
inaccurate to suppose, as the Legal Opinion apparently does, that EU law somehow cures any
harm to expellees as a group-it only does so incidentally for expellees who happen also to be EU
citizens, who are the real beneficiaries of this equality norm.
160. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 10 (Frowein).
161. Id. at II (Frowein).
162. Id. at 33 (Frowein).
163. Id. (Frowein).
164. Case 106/77, Amministrazione della Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978
E.C.R. 629, 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 283 (1978).
("[lIn accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the relation-
ship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions
on the one hand and the national law of the Member States on the other is such that those
provisions and measures.. .render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of
current national law....").
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Decrees. And since, as we have seen, no EU institution has ever asserted
any incompatibility and no domestic Czech court has found any incom-
patibility,'65 the inference must be that the Decrees (that is, the set of le-
gal norms rejecting restitution claims) are compatible with EU law and
with the fundamental norms underlying that law. Even the one point
which the non-binding Legal Opinion indicates might violate EU law-
in absentia conviction-was not repealed prior to accession, and no ob-
jection was raised to this.
4. The Potsdam Powers
The states involved in the original expulsions rejected any link to ac-
cession. The Soviet Union, United States, and United Kingdom were all
signatories to the Potsdam Agreement and were in actual and legal con-
trol of Germany and Austria during the expulsion period.166 The Soviet
Union was in effective control of much of Poland, Czechoslovakia and
eastern Germany during the expulsions. The United States was in con-
trol of portions of western Bohemia at the end of the war. The United
Kingdom was not in occupation of any expulsion source territory. Rus-
sia, as successor to the Soviet Union, is also an expulsion source coun-
try, being possessed of Kaliningrad oblast, formerly part of East Prussia,
its title to which was confirmed in the 1990 peace treaty.
167
Of course, the Potsdam Powers' role and rights had been entirely ex-
tinguished by the 1990s, and therefore by the time the controversy arose
they were in the same formal position as any other state. However, it is
generally conceded that actors with an immediate stake in a controversy
have greater salience in the construction of customary law, and to the
degree the controversy involved the contemporary evaluation of histori-
cal actions, the views of the participants who were directly implicated
carries the greatest weight.' 68 Repudiation of the historical or contempo-
rary effects of the Potsdam Agreement by its own signatories would
surely have greater weight than that of any three states chosen at ran-
165. Id. ("[E]very national court must.. apply Community law in its entirety.. and must ac-
cordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or sub-
sequent to the Community rule.").
166. France, although an occupying power, was not a signatory to Potsdam.
167. Final Treaty, supra note 47, art. 1, §§ 1, 3.
168. Recall the Czech Republic's formal position that the Potsdam powers authorized the ex-
pulsions. The Dreithaler Court repeatedly emphasizes that confiscation was "supported by inter-
national approval, in particular on the part of the western democracies, unambiguously expressed
in the decisions of the Potsdam Conference." Dreithaler, supra note 51, at para. 3 1.
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After it came under attack from German, Austrian, and Hungarian
politicians concerning the expulsions, the Czech Republic solicited re-
confirmation of the Potsdam Agreement's validity from the three Pow-
ers. 169 At the time of the Czech Parliament's Resolution, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair publicly supported the Czech position, declaring
"the results of the war could not be brought into question."'170 At a press
conference in Prague in April 2002, Blair reportedly "adhered to the
British cabinet's stand of 1996 which declared World War 1I results un-
changeable and the Potsdam conference.. .unchallengeable" and further
indicated that the "decrees were an issue ensuing from the past, which
should not influence the EU enlargement process."'1 71 Russian President
Vladimir Putin expressed clear support for the Czech position when Ze-
man visited him the following week. 172 Shortly thereafter, United States
Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman joined Blair's statement. 73
Presumably, a desire to reconfirm the postwar order and their own
role in it, as well as a desire to ensure the smoothness of the accession
process, led these states to prefer the Czech position over the potentially
disruptive Sudeten claims. But whatever the reasons, none of the Pots-
dam Powers has ever repudiated its role in the expulsions or accepted
169. See Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 19 (Frowein); see also NTIS, U.S. Dep't of Com.,
Izvestiya Interviews Czech Premier Zeman on Russian Visit, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr.
16, 2002 (quoting Zeman stating that "[i]n my opinion it is essential to get the support of all pow-
ers which signed the Potsdam treaty in 1945. That is not only in the interests of the Czech Repub-
lic, it is in the interests of these powers.").
170. Kozakova, supra note 60.
171. CTK News Agency, Blair Tells Czech Premier Postwar Decrees No Obstacle to Czech
EU Entry, BBC INT'L REP. (EUR.), Apr. 8, 2002 (quoting Zeman as saying he "highly esteem[s]"
Blair's reassertion of the 1996 cabinet declaration and "the validity of the Potsdam conference
conclusions"); see also Czech News Agency, Czech Press Survey, FIN. TIMES INFO., Apr. 9, 2002
(surveying article of same date by Jan Kovarik in PRAVO).
172. NTIS, U.S. Dep't of Com., Czech PM Zeman Obtains Russian President's Assurance
over Postwar Benes Decrees, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 18, 2002 (reporting on Jan
Horak, Putin: War Results Cannot Be Changed, PRAVO); Czech News Agency, Russia Fully Sup-
ports CzechRep's [sic] Position on Benes Decrees, FIN. TIMES INFO., Apr. 17, 2002 (noting
spokesman Sergei Prichodko quoting Putin as saying, "Attempts by some forces to reverse the
results of World War Two and to question the laws issued in this respect are ungrounded and have
nothing in common with reality").
173. CTK News Agency, US Official Backs Blair's Standpoint on Czech Postwar Decrees,
BBC INT'L REP. (EUR.), Apr. 18, 2002; Czech News Agency, U.S. Grossman Sides with Blair on
Benes Decrees, FIN. TIMES INFO., Apr. 18, 2002. 1 have found no text or report of the U.S. posi-
tion being expressed at any higher or more definitive level, to which the Legal Opinion apparently
alludes.
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that the expulsions require restitution;1 74 As the Czech Republic has
consistently and persuasively argued, Article XIII of the Potsdam
Agreement retains its unchallenged, quasi-constitutional role in the
postwar European order.
5. International Adjudicative Bodies
The Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights' 75 (the Committee), like similar international institu-
tions, plays an important if subsidiary role in shaping international law.
Its review of states' reports, as well as its interpretative function in gen-
erating General Comments, help define the content of human rights ob-
ligations. 176 In particular, its quasi-adjudicatory decisions in response to
individual communications brought under the First Optional Protocol to
the Covenant, 177 though not formally binding or enforceable, can estab-
lish "a duty to provide individual reparation and take preventive meas-
ures for the future,"' 178 which in turn indicates the shape of legal norms.
The Committee has considered a number of individual communica-
tions relating to the Sudeten controversy, although these concerned not
the expulsions as such 1 79 but post-communist Czech and Slovak prop-
erty restitution laws from the early 1990s, which provided compensation
for expropriations after 1948. That year marked the Communist seizure
of power, but it also marked the end of the major phase of expulsions.
As a date selected in the early 1990s to demarcate the legal and histori-
cal landscape, 1948 surely relates at least as much to that equally mo-
174. See de Zayas, supra note 37, at 245-52 (implying that U.S. and British governments have
never acknowledged any wrongdoing in connection with Potsdam or the related Tehran and Yalta
declarations).
175. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
176. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2000), cited in HENRY J. STEINER AND PHILIP ALSTON,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 711, 732 (2000) (discussing the "lawmaking proc-
ess of the Committee").
177. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
178. Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 422 (Philip Alston, ed., 1992) (noting that "as a source of case law, the material is less
developed than in, for instance, the European system, because the Committee does not go to the
same lengths in its published reasoning").
179. Consistent with its prior jurisprudence, the Committee has not considered itself compe-
tent rationae temporis to consider claims arising before the entry into force of the ICCPR, and it
has been reticent to assess the legality of confiscations, especially as the ICCPR does not protect
private property against confiscation as such. See Macklem, supra note 55, at 8-9.
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mentous episode, and indeed the complaints brought before the Commit-
tee alleged discrimination on the grounds that the Czech (or Slovak) au-
thorities had excluded them from compensation because of their German
ethnicity.' 80 Thus, the complaints did not technically concern the actual
expulsions and confiscations, but decisions to deny compensation in
1991 and 1992.8'
In certain of those cases the Committee found a violation of ICCPR
Article 26,182 allowing a narrow class of expellees who had retained
their citizenship after 1948 to claim recovery for confiscated property.'
83
But the Committee based this view on its objection to the requirement in
the legislation that claimants currently be Czech (or Slovak) citizens, 184
and it has never extended that logic to the massive denaturalizations
prior to 1948. In no case has it found that it was discriminatory for the
Czech Republic or Slovakia to limit restitution to the post-1948, com-
munist-era confiscations. 185 In Schlosser v. The Czech Republic, for ex-
180. Various communications alleged violations of ICCPR, Articles 2, 12, 14, 17, 26, and 27.
See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 643/1994, Drobek v. Slovakia, Individual Opinion
by Committee Members Quiroga and Klein, 2, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/60/D/643/1995 (1997) [here-
inafter Drobek] (alleging violations of Article 26); Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No.
670/1995, Schlosser v. The Czech Republic, Decision on Admissibility, I, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/64/D/670/1995 (1998) [hereinafter Schlosser] (alleging violations of Articles 12, 14, 26
and 27).
181. A claim based on actions in 1945 would presumably be outside the Committee's jurisdic-
tion ratione temporis, as the ICCPR did not enter into force until 1976. In Kouny v. Czech Repub-
lic, for example, the Committee found that a claim based on a 1951 decision confirming a confis-
cation under Decree 108/1945 would be "outside the Committee's competence ratione temporis
and thus inadmissible." Koutny, supra note 28, at 6.2.
182. ICCPR, supra note 175, art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimina-
tion on any ground such as race... language.. political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.").
183. See, e.g., Des Fours Walderode, supra note 68; Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 18
(Frowein) (noting the case "is characterised by very specific facts," since Des Fours Walderode
had retained his citizenship and left the country after the 1948 cut-off). The 1991 Czech property
restitution law as interpreted by the Committee must therefore allow the possibility of restitution
for some Germans denaturalized after 1948, albeit on grounds indistinguishable from those raised
by complainants who were never expelled or were ethnic Czechs. Cf Human Rights Comm.,
Commc'n No. 516/1992, Simunek v. Czech Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992 (1995)
[hereinafter Simunek]; Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 857/1999, Bla~ek, Hartman, and
Krifek v. Czech Republic, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/857/1999 (2001).
184. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 586/1994, Adam v. Czech Republic,
12.4-12.8, UN Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/586/1994, (1996); Simunek, supra note 183, 11.4-11.8. See
Macklem, supra note 55, at 10 (discussing the citizenship and equality aspects of these cases).
185. In fact, in 1994, the Czech Republic did amend its property restitution laws to extend a
right of recovery back to 1938, but only covering confiscations for "racial" reasons. See Kam, su-
pra note 111, at 4-5 (noting that the 1994 Restitution Act "was intended to settle Jewish claims
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ample, the Committee noted that it
has consistently held that not every distinction or differentiation
in treatment amounts to discrimination.... The Committee con-
siders that, in the present case, legislation adopted after the fall of
the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia to compensate victims
of that regime does not appear to be prima facie discrimina-
tory... merely because...it does not compensate the victims of in-
justices [allegedly committed by earlier regimes]. 186
In reviewing the Committee decisions, the Legal Opinion considers it
obvious that the Czech law may properly "limit restitution to people
who have shown loyalty to Czechoslovakia.... It cannot be deduced
from that view of the Committee that all others who do not fulfil [sic]
the requirement of loyalty must have a right to restitution."
187
The Committee's rationale therefore effectively rejects the core claim
of Sudeten expellees, at least as it relates to the ICCPR: that they were
victims of ethnic discrimination meriting contemporary restitution. The
Committee has declared almost all Sudeten claims inadmissible. 188 The
Committee's limited objections to the restitution law do not constitute
an objection to the expulsions, denationalizations or confiscations as
such. At no point has the Committee suggested that failure to abolish the
Decrees or make restitution to expellees as a class might violate Article
26 or any other norm, and the Czech Republic in fact has made no al-
terations to its laws in response to any decision of the Committee.189
Individual members of the Committee disagreed with the decisions in
several cases. In Drobek v. Slovakia,190 for example-a case later relied
upon directly by the same dissenters in several Czech cases 91-two
members suggested that the communication's author had stated a claim
without opening the door to competing claims made by the Sudeten Germans. Because the transfer
of Germans after World War Two was undertaken in the interest of 'national' (as opposed to a
'racial') consideration.. .the Sudeten claims were precluded from consideration.").
186. Schlosser, supra note 180, 6.5 (relying on Drobek v. Slovakia, which at 6.5 uses the
same language); see also Malik, supra note 89, 6.5.
187. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 20 (Frowein) (emphasis added).
188. See, e.g., Koutny, supra note 28 (noting inadmissibility ratione temporis and failure to
exhaust domestic remedies); Malik, supra note 89 (noting non-exhaustion of domestic remedies
and failure to substantiate claims under Articles 14 and 26); Schlosser, supra note 180 (noting
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and unsubstantiated claim under Articles 14, 26, and 27);
see also Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 18 (Frowein).
189. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 44 (Bernitz).
190. Drobek, supra note 180.
191. See Schlosser, supra note 180 (Quiroga & Klein, dissenting in part); Malik, supra note 89
(Quiroga & Klein, dissenting in part).
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of continuing discrimination in that Slovak authorities had excluded the
pre-1948 confiscations from the post-communist property restitution re-
gime. 192 The dissenters did not necessarily indicate agreement with the
claim, only that they thought it admissible on its face.' 93 Still, the dis-
senting view indicates an alternative interpretation both as to the sub-
stantive complaint and the procedural availability of a mechanism to
consider it. If this had been the preferred view, it clearly would have
constituted indicia of an entirely different scope of human rights obliga-
tions touching ethnic discrimination and expulsion. In particular, it
would have admitted a broader interpretation of continuing harm.
But this dissenting view was not the Committee's view, which rein-
forces the broader consensus that Sudeten claims, considered as a whole,
do not sound in contemporary human rights norms. The existence of the
dissents merely highlights the contours of that consensus. Asking
"whether in the view of the [Committee] the Czech restitution legislation
as regards confiscations under the [Decrees]... should be amended before
accession," Frowein locates the Committee's view in the broader legal-
political consensus rejecting Sudeten claims:
There are decisive arguments against such a view. Nobody has so
far argued that the Czech Republic should restitute all property
confiscated under the Bene-Decrees.... It is beyond question that
this would exceed the financial and legal possibilities of any state
in a comparable situation. But it would also raise an issue as to
the background of the confiscation, i.e. the transfer of the German
and Hungarian populations, confirmed at the Potsdam Confer-
ence.... [T]his decision has been recently confirmed by the pow-
ers which were parties to the Potsdam agreements.
1 94
Whatever the Committee's part in defining customary law's content,
international courts certainly play a prominent role. The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) is the "principal judicial organ of the United Na-
tions,"'195 competent to adjudicate a variety of disputes about breaches of
international obligations 96 to which it applies "international custom, as
192. Drobek, supra note 180, 1.
193. The dissenters also noted that Slovakia had not responded to the allegation. Drobek, su-
pra note 180 (Quiroga & Klein, dissenting).
194. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 19 (Frowein).
195. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 73, art. 1.
196. See id. art. 36(2)(a)-(d).
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evidence of a general practice accepted as law."' 97 Although its deci-
sions bind only the parties,' 98 the ICJ's interpretative authority is widely
accepted,' 99 and it would be difficult to imagine a robust consensus on
the scope of an international norm that ran counter to a ruling of the ICJ.
The same is even truer within the European context regarding decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),200 the normative in-
fluence of which also extends beyond Europe.20 '
The ECHR and ICJ have each adjudicated claims relating to the ex-
pulsions.02 These cases all had highly particular facts20 3 and were de-
cided on narrow jurisdictional grounds; both courts however, reached
decisions that effectively contracted the scope for Sudeten claims. In
Prince Hans-Adam H of Liechtenstein v. Germany, for example, the
ECHR decided that since the expropriation had occurred prior to the en-
try into force of the ECHR in 1953 and its Protocol I in 1954, "the Court
is not competent ratione temporis to examine the circumstances of the
expropriation or the continuing effects produced by it up to the present
197. Id. art. 38(l)(a)-(d). Section (d) provides that "judicial decisions and the teaching of the
most highly qualified publicists" shall serve "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law." Id.
198. Id. art. 59; see also U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1. The Court has jurisdiction subject to a
declaration of the state involved. Id. art. 36(1), para. 3.
199. See Vagts, supra note 73, at 1033 ("As the ultimate arbiters of custom the judges of the
International Court have the leeway to give a different weight to various factors in their analysis.
They may approach the issue rather passively, requiring a strong showing of state practice before
recognizing a rule. Or they may regard themselves as authorized to shape custom.").
200. The ECHR was created by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 (amended) [hereinafter Convention]. On
the ECHR's influence, see, for example, Andrew Drzemczewski & Meyer Ladewig, Principal
Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No. 11, 15
HUM. RTS. L.J. 81, 82 (1994) (calling the Convention's achievements "quite staggering, the case-
law of the [ECHR] exerting an ever deeper influence on the laws and social realities of the State
Parties").
201. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 176, at 808 ("[T]he jurisprudence of the Court...has
been influential in the normative development of other parts of the international human rights sys-
tem.").
202. See Liechtenstein, supra note 66; Prince Hans-Adam, supra note 66; Des Fours Wal-
derode v. The Czech Republic, App. No. 40057/98, 2003 EUR. CT. H.R. (Decision as to Admissi-
bility) [hereinafter Des Fours Walderode Admissability]; Kammerlander v. The Czech Republic,
App. No. 1972/04, 2004 EuR. CT. H.R., (Partial Decision as to Admissibility) [hereinafter Kam-
merlander].
203. Both courts have reviewed claims against Germany arising from the display in Cologne
of a painting that had been property of the House of Liechtenstein but was seized under Decree
12/1945. See generally Bardo Fassbender, Klageaussehluss bei Enteignungen zu Repara-
tionszwecken-Das Gemdlde des Fiirsten von Liechtenstein, in NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 1445 (1999); Gattini, supra note 4.
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date. 2 °4 The ICJ, though not confronting a similar restriction on its in-
stitutional lifespan, nonetheless also found it lacked jurisdiction ratione
temporis. It determined that there was indeed a dispute, but that it had
arisen "in the Settlement Convention 20 5 and the Beneg Decrees,' 20 6 that
is to say, prior to the entry into force in 1980 of the European Conven-
tion for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes on which Liechtenstein
based its claim. 20 7 Thus, neither court reached the substantive questions
implicated by Sudeten claims. This is not to say that they rejected those
claims, but evidently they did not feel compelled, or able, to affirm or
even consider them. Neither court's judgments provide any support for a
claim that the Czech Republic has a legal obligation to provide any form
of restitution. Certainly the Legal Opinion relies on Prince Hans-Adam
I1 in arguing that the Decrees do not violate any international or EU
norms.
20 8
204. See Prince Hans-Adam, supra note 66, 85 (finding also, at 87, no violation of Proto-
col 1, art. 1).
205. Although it might not be immediately apparent given that Liechtenstein is not part of
Germany, the Settlement Convention was thought relevant because property of the House of
Liechtenstein in Czechoslovakia was deemed by the German courts to be "external German as-
sets"-and evidently, the Czechoslovak authorities who confiscated it in 1945 though so, too.
German courts "have always relied on the assessment of the expropriating State." Liechtenstein,
supra note 15, 21-22. In any event, the German ethnicity (Volkszugehdrigkeit) as opposed to
citizenship (Staatsangeherigkeit) of members of the House of Liechtenstein is clear. A decision of
the Bratislava Administrative Tribunal of November 21, 1951, confirmed the valid application of
Decree 12/1945 against Prince Franz Joseph II (then Prince of Liechtenstein) as his German na-
tionality (ethnicity) was "a fact of common knowledge." Blumenwitz, Die tschechisch-
liechtensteinischen Beziehungen: Ein anhaltender Konflikt im Mitteleuropa, in FESTSCHRIFT
HACKER 347, 360 (1997), cited in Gattini, supra note 4, at 520 n.22 (noting also that "Prince
Franz Joseph 1I had acknowledged himself as 'German' in the 1931 census").
206. Liechtenstein, supra note 60, 52.
207. Article 27(a) of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes pro-
vides that "[tihe provisions of this Convention shall not apply to: (a) disputes relating to facts or
situations prior to the entry into force of this Convention as between parties to the dispute." Id.
18.
208. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 16 (Frowein) ("[O]ne may see a confirmation in [the
Court's judgment] of the validity of the confiscation measures in the international legal order....
[T]he judgment clearly confirms the view.. .that confiscations in 1945/46 do not raise an issue un-
der the [Convention]."). The Legal Opinion was written prior to the ICJ's decision in Liechten-
stein v. Germany. Relying in particular on Brok v. Czech Republic, Human Rights Comm.,
Commc'n No. 774/1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997 (2001) (finding a violation of Art. 26
for failure to extend restitution to a man whose property had been confiscated by the Nazis and
then nationalized after the war), and Malik, supra note 89 (refusing to find a violation of Art. 26
for excluding property seized under the Decrees), Prof. Macklem argues that the Committee is
more prepared to evaluate the past than is the resolutely modernist ECHR. Macklein, supra note
55, at 12-13, 19-20. 1 think this is fair enough, although arguably in their jurisprudence concern-
ing Sudeten claims both courts appear equally willing to "construct legal spaces for the expression
of collective memory." Id. at 13.
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The ECHR has also considered two related Czech property cases aris-
ing out of the expulsions. 20 9 In Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic,
the ECHR rejected a claim of continuing deprivation of property, hold-
ing, inter alia, that because the applicant had been deprived of his prop-
erty before the entry into force of the Convention,
there is no question of a continuing violation of the Convention
which could be imputable to the Czech Republic and could have
effects on the temporal limitations of the competence of the
Court... [and a]ccordingly the Court is not competent ratione
temporis to examine the circumstances under which the appli-
cant's family was deprived of the property, 210
and further that Des Fours Walderode had failed to demonstrate a claim
to either "existing possessions" or a "legitimate expectation" of their re-
covery, as required under the Convention, and thus that the complaint
was "incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Conven-
tion." 211 In Kammerlander v. Czech Republic, the ECHR held it was not
competent to adjudicate a complaint concerning the Czech Republic's
alleged failure to provide a remedy in response to the ICCPR Commit-
tee's views on the Des Fours Walderode communication. 1
Neither case suggests any scope for recognizing Sudeten claims, and
both cases reaffirm the ECHR's jurisdictional limits and its substantive
jurisprudence on the definition of possessions in a way that effectively
bars consideration of the vast majority of Sudeten claims.213 This sug-
gests the Court did not consider interpretations more amenable to those
claims to be necessary or correct.
209. These two cases necessarily exhausted Czech domestic remedies prior to being heard un-
der the ECHR, indicating that Czech courts either decided against them on the merits or rejected
their claims on procedural grounds.
210. Des Fours Walderode Admissibility, supra note 202, 2 ("The Law"). The Court's rea-
soning relies on its finding in Prince Hans-Adam, supra note 66, and in Malhous v. The Czech
Republic, App. No. 33071/96, 2001 EUR. CT. H.R. [hereinafter Malhous].
211. Des Fours Walderode Admissibility, supra note 202, 2 ("The Law") (discussing Con-
vention, art. 35, §§ 3-4 and Protocol 1, art. 1). Cf Malhous, supra note 210 (finding discrimina-
tory application of the post-communist restitution laws in regards to property confiscated in 1949,
unrelated to the Decrees regime).
212. Kammerlander, supra note 202 (holding admissible only as to a separate complaint of
unreasonable delay in proceedings, inadmissible in all other respects). Kammerlander was the
widow of Des Fours Walderode.
213. The ECHR has rejected a considerable number of Sudeten claims principally for failure
to exhaust domestic remedies. See Elutasitottik 90 Szuddtandmet Keresett Csehorszig Ellen,
MAGYAR RADIo ONLINE, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.english.radio.hu/index.phpcikk-id=164944.
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6. Publicists
International law recognizes the "teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists of the various nations" as a subsidiary source of evidence
for determining the rules of international law. 214 Their views are there-
fore of greater legal relevance than those of mere individuals or advo-
cacy groups. A publicist's view is subsidiary in the sense that its weight
and value only surfaces when some separate, otherwise authoritative
body relies upon-acknowledges and legitimates-that view.21 5 On the
other hand, publicists are instrumental in identifying the content and
meaning of authoritative actors' statements and activities. Without a
publicist's subsidiary and derivative intervention, the scope or even exis-
tence of a customary rule might not be clear to states.216
Scholars' views represent a greater diversity on the Sudeten contro-
versy than those of states or international organizations, which as we
have seen almost uniformly resist claims for restitution. Some (espe-
cially German) scholars argue vigorously for the expellees' claims, es-
pecially the incompatibility of the amnesty provisions with human rights
norms, 217 while others argue equally vigorously against them 21 8 or adopt
214. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 73, art. 38(l)(d).
215. The Legal Opinion occupies a hybrid position. It is technically just three noted scholars'
views. However, its attachment to a recognized international body gives it a somewhat different
character-making it in turn the object of publicists' arguments. Certainly other scholars assume it
has a different value than a journal article and treat it accordingly, and therefore this Article does,
too.
216. Vagts, supra note 73, at 1035 ("It is the publicists who provide the lawyers involved in
the process with the data about state practice and opiniojuris that the actors need to judge the ex-
istence of the rule. And writers may nudge the rule in ways that they deem preferable.... Publicists
have a general interest in expanding the field in which they officiate.").
217. See, e.g., DE ZAYAS, supra note 8; FELIX ERMACORA, DIE SUDETENDEUTSCHEN
FRAGEN: RECHTSGUTACHTEN (1992); C. TOMUSCHAT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION 451, 470 et seq. (A. Von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2002), cited in
Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 13 (Frowein); Dieter Blumenwitz, Gutachten zur 'Legal Opinion
on the Beneg-Decrees and the Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union' (Dec. 28,
2004), available at http://www.sbg.ac.at/whbib/templates/blumenwitz-gutachten%20z.%20
frowein.htm (criticizing the Legal Opinion's findings); Dieter Blumenwitz, Entfalten die Beneg-
Dekrete und das Gesetz Nr. 115 vom 8. Mai 1946 (Straffreiheitsgesetz) noch heute eine
diskriminierende Wirkung, die dem Volkerrecht und dem Recht der Europiischen Union ent-
gegensteht?, (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.sudeten.de/bas/down/Gutachten.pdf (finding
continuing effects of the Decrees); Christoph Pan & Beate Sibylle Pfeil, Die Beneg-Dekrete und
Ihre Gegenwartigen Rechtswirkungen auf die Deutsche Minderheit in Tschechien (SUdtiroler
Volksgruppen-Institut, Bozen/Bolzano, Italy) (Apr. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.sudeten.de/bas/down/Pan-Gutachten.pdf (arguing for existence of continuing effects
of the Decrees). See also Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft, http://www.sudeten.de/bas/content/
al0_4.htm (linking to legal opinions by various scholars critiquing the Decrees and expulsions or
their continuing effects).
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a middle position.21 9 However, very few scholars have identified any ex-
tant or even nascent legal obligation to afford expellees restitution.
220
Whatever the merits of any individual scholarly view, it is difficult to
sustain an argument that the scholarly community's views as a whole
provide evidence of an obligation in customary law. The most one could
say is that there is not a consensus either way, and that alone militates
against other actors' relying on publicists' views to expand customary
law to obligate the Czech Republic. Indeed, as we have seen, no state or
adjudicative body has used publicists' arguments to support Sudeten
claims, while many have used such arguments to reject those claims.
State actions and other analyses of Sudeten claims are located within
a much broader social dialogue about expulsion, dispossession, restora-
tion and remembrance.221 As noted above, such groups are well outside
the classical conception of relevant actors in forming customary law.
The only actors clearly calling for linking accession to restitution were
German expellee groups; 222 Czechs, for their part, remain as strongly
supportive of the original expulsions as they are resistant to restitu-
218. See BURCHER, supra note 8; Schiller, supra note 20, at 401; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem,
Veilkerrechtswidrigkeit der Konfiskation eines Gemdldes aus der Sammlung des Firsten von
Liechtenstein als Angeblich 'Deutsches' Eigentum, in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-
UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 410, 411 (1996); MS, Czech News Agency Says, supra note 70 (dis-
cussing various scholars' views of the Legal Opinion both favoring and opposing the idea that the
Decrees warrant criticism). Very few Czech scholars have questioned the fundamental validity of
the Decrees or called for restitution.
219. Cf. Christian Tomuschat, Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen. Zur Frage des Beste-
hens von Rechtsansprfichen nach Vdlkerrecht und Deutschem Recht, in 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 12 (1996) (resisting characteriza-
tion of the expulsions as "genocide," but arguing that "es wahrend der Vertreibung... zu einzelnen
Akten des V6lkermordes gekommen ist").
220. German legal scholars generally disagreed with the German courts' rationale that the
seized property of the House of Leichtenstein should be considered "external German assets" un-
der the Settlement Convention. See, e.g., Fassbender, supra note 203, at 1446; Seidl-
Hohenveldern, supra note 218, at 411; see also Regional Court of Cologne, Oct. 10, 1995, 5 0
182/92, in PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 419 (1996). This
by no means necessarily places all German academics in the position of uniformly criticizing the
expulsions' illegality or of calling for restitution, however. In any event, academic critiques did
not sway the German courts of any level to find for Liechtenstein.
221. Cf Vagts, supra note 73, at 1035 ("[T]he general public may, on rare occasions, become
concerned about an asserted violation of customary law.").
222. See, e.g., MS, Sudeten Germans Call on Czech President, supra note 99 (noting call by
the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft for Czech President Klaus to hold talks on compensation
and to "'give reconciliation a new chance'); Wallace, supra note 27 (noting Association of Dis-
placed Persons head Erika Steinbach's call to Chancellor Schroder "to link the question of Czech
E.U. entry to the abandonment of the Benes Decrees."). See also Sudetendeutsche Landsmann-
schaft, http://www.sudeten.de/bas/indexa.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
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tion.2 23 Human rights groups such as Amnesty International or Human
Rights Watch and EU research or lobby groups have not addressed the
issue in any significant fashion.224
Although some of actors discussed above have questioned individual
acts or excesses undertaken in the course of the expulsions, I have not
found any authoritative, legally generative statement that the Sudeten
expulsion, denaturalization, or confiscation under their total circum-
stances were illegal or require apology, repeal, or compensation today.
On the contrary, almost all actors, and all traditionally identified sources
of customary international law, accept the expulsions as necessary and
legitimate. At most, a few observers cabin the expulsions off as sui
generis, but this seems unsatisfactory as a matter of method. The con-
sensus of states, pan-European and international institutions, and other
actors clearly and categorically rejects any claim to restitution. What
then are the argumentative rationales of this consensus, and what do they
imply?
B. The Four Rationales of the Consensus-Why Rejection Is
Preferred
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past
and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think
of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The
subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the
surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition.
- Hannah Arendt
22s
The consensus rejecting Sudeten claims centers on four rationales:
three closely related "technical" arguments about temporal and institu-
tional limitations-the effects of time, subsequent state action, and insti-
tutional competence-and one argument relying on an entirely different
moral calculus.
223. A 2005 poll found that fifty-four percent of Czechs agreed that the expulsions were
"just," and sixty-four percent agreed that the Decrees should "remain valid," while only five per-
cent agreed that the expulsions "call for an apology" (up from three percent in 1995). Spritzer,
supra note 101 (citing CVVM polling agency).
224. Kozakova, supra note 60 (noting Pan-European Association chairman Otto Habsburg's
repeated criticism of the Beneg Decrees).
225. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1951) ix, "Preface to the First
Edition."
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1. Antiquity
One line of argument relies on the passage of time to explain why
Sudeten claims should fail today. The expulsions and confiscations oc-
curred sixty years ago; any harm they caused happened long ago and
lacks continuing effect, and in any event, new expectations have arisen
around social circumstances, such as property rights, that have changed
over time.
Although some observers concede that Decrees with specific continu-
ing effects might require revision-as we have seen, the Legal Opinion
suggests that enforcing in absentia convictions would violate EU
norms-all define continuing harm in a way that excludes any effects
from the original loss of property or citizenship or the expulsion itself.
For example, the Legal Opinion's view is that expellees must not suf-
fer present-day disability after accession. Expellees must have the same
right to acquire property (including their own former property) or citi-
zenship as any EU citizen, and differentiation "might...not [be] in line
with the [EU's] general constitutional principles." 226 But harm that has
already been suffered cannot, in the Legal Opinion's view, constitute the
basis for a legal obligation. Likewise, for the Legal Opinion, the fact that
denaturalization operated at a specific time in the past and would not
prevent anyone from keeping or acquiring citizenship now is disposi-
227tive.
Similarly, the Czech Republic's view (joined by the EU Enlargement
Commissioner) that the Decrees are 'extinct' follows this temporal ar-
gument. 228 As noted, the Czech Parliament's 2002 Resolution reaffirmed
the "legal and property relations" arising from the Decrees, 229 but also
declared that the Decrees were not now applicable,2 30 since although
they remain in force, changing circumstances have stripped them of ef-
226. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 10 (Frowein).
227. Id. at 51 et seq. (Kingsland).
228. See Representation of the European Commission in the Czech Republic, Czech Acces-
sion "Should Not Be Hindered by Benes Decrees" (Apr. 15-22, 2002), http://www.evropska-
unie.cz/eng/article.asp?id= 1343 [hereinafter European Commission, Czech Accession] (noting the
Verheugen-Zeman Joint Statement that the Decrees "no longer produce legal effects" and "are not
part of the accession negotiations and should have no bearing on them").
229. MS, Czech Lower House Approves Resolution, supra note 84; see also MS, Text of Czech
Resolution, supra note 84 (noting that the draft resolution "rejects attempts to open issues con-
nected with the end and with the results of World War II," and declares that legislation on prop-
erty restitution is "the exclusive prerogative of Czech constitutional bodies").
230. See MS, Text of Czech Resolution, supra note 78.
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fect;231 Dreithaler demonstrates (indeed anticipates) the same logic.
Sudeten claimants contend they continue to be denied the benefits of
citizenship and property, but the universally accepted Czech view is that
those acts were discrete in time, and since there will be no additional
acts relying on the Decrees, they lie dormant. Of course, whatever "ex-
tinction" means as a legal category, it is something short of repudiation,
abolition, or supercession. International acceptance of the Czech view
necessarily accepts the Decrees' continuity and cannot be assimilated to
a claim that the Decrees offend legal norms or that their revision is
obligatory. At most, acceptance locates legal obligation somewhere in a
continuing effects debate.
The settled expectations of those benefiting from the Decrees are also
invoked. For example, the Legal Opinion acknowledges that the am-
nesty for reprisals against expellees "still has legal effects, ' 232 but con-
siders it "very doubtful" that EU fundamental principles would require
"people who have committed crimes more than 50 years ago [to] now
stand trial" in order to approve Czech accession.
233
Similarly, the frequent invocation by various actors of the need to
"move forward" and not be held hostage to by-gone debates evinces
both a belief that the passage of time can have a decisive legal effect,
and that the claims of new generations may have priority.234 Underlying
all these arguments about time and settled expectations is the sense that
revision could destabilize the post-war order of Europe from which all
states and populations have benefited; this is certainly the logic invoked
to defeat Sudeten claims that might require changes in that order.
Passage of time also allows space for the sole theme of disapproval
evident in the sources: the notion that aspects of the expulsions may
have been acceptable in the past but would not be now. For example, the
Zeman-Verheugen Joint Statement acknowledged that "[s]ome of these
acts would not pass muster today if judged by current standards-but
they belong to history., 235 However, this limited form of distancing does
23 1. See MS, EU Urges Calm, supra note 88 (quoting Zeman that the Decree was "extinct").
232. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 23 (Frowein).
233. Id. at 27 (Frowein). See also id. at 47 (Bemitz) ("The very existence today of such a
law.. demonstrates [a] hesitation to clean up the past.... However... [it] would not be necessary,
56 years later, to link firm demands for repeal of the law to the Accession Treaty as a condition.").
234. The new generations would include, in particular, the two million Czechs who settled the
depopulated territories. See, e.g., Eagle Glassheim, Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environ-
mental Devastation in Czechoslovakia's Borderlands, 1945-1989, 78 J. MOD. HIST. 65 (2006)
(discussing resettlement of north Bohemia).
235. European Commission, Czech Accession, supra note 228.
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not approach condemnation of the expulsions-the example cited here,
for instance, refers to "some of these acts," not the expulsions as such,
and the German-Czech Declaration does the same. 236 This view also re-
inforces the sense that historical wrong does not require contemporary
compensation.
This temporally limiting view also converges with the Union's for-
ward-looking rhetoric, which disfavors claims from the past as antitheti-
cal to the integrative project. Thus, in opposing a linkage to accession,
Commissioner Verheugen declared that "[w]e should use the language
of 2002, not of 1945, '' 237 while EU Commission President Romani Prodi
declared that "[w]e should focus on the future. The EU was founded on
the sense of [mutual] forgiveness, of opening a new era., 238 The Legal
Opinion notes that "the Union is based on fundamental values which are
completely different from nationalistic ideologies of Europe of the
past., 239 It is evident in consensus of the sources that this new era fore-
closes claims arising from the other side of the epochal divide.
2. Subsequent State Action
A second line of argument relies on subsequent state action to fore-
close claims not terminated by time alone. According to this argument,
during the Cold War and 1990s various bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments affected the status of expellees, and the collective effect of these
agreements has extinguished expellees' claims or estopped states from
pursuing them. On this logic, Sudeten claims might have been valid at
some point but have been progressively narrowed and ultimately termi-
nated by instruments such as the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, the 1954
Settlement Convention, the 1973 Treaty of Prague, the 1990 Final
Treaty, and the 1997 German-Czech Declaration. These state acts con-
stitute the legal (rather than merely factual) termination of continuing
effects that allows the consensus to dismiss Sudeten claims today.
The Czech Republic considers the German-Czech Declaration a de-
finitive closure to the issue in law.2 40 Similarly, MEP Phillip Whitehead
criticized the expulsions' cruelties but also believed the Declaration
236. 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note 34, art. III ("The Czech side regrets that, by
the forcible expulsion.. much suffering and injustice was inflicted upon innocent people.... It par-
ticularly regrets the excesses....").
237. MS, EU Urges Calm, supra note 88.
238. Id.
239. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 42 (Bernitz).
240. See, e.g., MS, Czech Foreign Minister, supra note 78.
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foreclosed the matter:
The expulsions... decreed by the wartime Czechoslovak govern-
ment, in conjunction with the three powers at Potsdam, were of
their time.... The wrongs involved in something so indiscriminate,
like those committed to a greater extent in the Reich Protectorate
and by Hitlerite Germany generally, were the subject of the 1997
declaration.. .which offered mutual apologies, in the spirit that
'injustices inflicted in the past belong in the past.' 241
At least one observer goes further. Kingsland argues that Germany is
actually estopped from objecting to accession due to its reliance in
Prince Hans-Adam on the 1954 Settlement Convention barring Germany
from objecting to disposition of seized "German external assets, 242 as
well as by the 1997 Declaration, which "extends [this] argument to
cover the other Decrees:,
243
[T]he fundamental and underlying principle of the EU was the
unification of Europe following World War II. Any attempt by
Germany to preclude the Czech Republic from membership
based on actions taken in the immediate aftermath of the war is
clearly contrary to the whole basis on which the EU was founded
and to its continuing aims and obligations.244
This is a far-reaching claim-in effect that Germany had an affirma-
tive obligation not to prevent Czech accession.245 But even arguments
squarely in the mainstream effectively assert that the states with interests
in the Sudeten question have in fact already extinguished those claims.
Of course, an estoppel argument begs the question of what sort of
rights are implicated by expellees' claims. If those claims are purely a
function of the treaty relations between Germany and the Czech Repub-
lic, for example, then those states can dispose of the claims as they see
fit, and this is arguably what these states have done. However, if expel-
241. Phillip Whitehead, Czech Accession and the Benes Decrees, BCSA REV. MAG., Apr. 4,
2002 (on file with author).
242. Prince Hans-Adam, supra note 66. See also Settlement Convention, supra note 41, ch. 6,
art. 3(1). Presumably Kingsland's argument would also draw this conclusion from Germany's
subsequent, similar and successful argument concerning the Settlement Convention in the closely
related litigation against Lichtenstein before the ICJ, which was decided after Kingsland wrote.
See Liechtenstein, supra note 66.
243. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 66 (Kingsland).
244. Id. at 67 (Kingsland). I do not find other support for Kingsland's view.
245. Germany certainly maintained before the ECHR and ICJ that the Settlement Convention
barred its courts from adjudicating claims concerning property seized under the Decrees.
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lees were thought to have a valid human rights claim-invoking a jus
cogens peremptory norm, for example-then no mere bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty could defeat it.246 By saying that states' official acts have
terminated Sudeten claims, the consensus necessarily defines those
claims as the sort that can be terminated. This separates them from per-
emptory norms with special protection and rejects their status as human
rights claims or claims about international crimes. 247 To some degree
this may be a tautology-states cannot opt out of fundamental human
rights, yet if states do in fact agree to terminate a claim, it must not have
been a fundamental right-but this does seem to be the logic underlying
the consensus' reliance on prior state action in rejecting Sudeten claims.
3. Post Facto and Institutional Limitations on Competence
A third line of argument relies on theories of institutional competence
to extinguish Sudeten claims. One variant says that review of the expul-
sions by European institutions that were created later in time would be
ultra vires, not because state action has extinguished the claim, but be-
cause these young institutions lack formal competence to judge ancient
events. In another variant, these institutions lack competence on consti-
tutional grounds not necessarily defined by time.
As an example of the first variant, the ECHR and ICJ found they
lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis over cases implicating the expul-
sions, with the ECHR noting that this also barred consideration of any
"continuing effects produced by it up to the present date. 24 8 Similarly,
the EU arguably cannot consider claims arising from acts and agree-
246. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. n. It is increasingly settled in international law that individuals have, in certain
circumstances, direct claims against other states for restitution, and not only indirectly as benefici-
aries of their own state's personality. Cf Amnesty International, supra note 5, 7.1.4, 7.2
("[S]tates have no authority to waive the individual right to reparations for their nationals through
such treaties or agreements... international treaties seeking to waive reparations have no effect on
the individual right to pursue claims."). But see d'Argent, supra note 5, at 288 (outlining a techni-
cal argument that states are not prohibited from renouncing claims arising from a peremptory
norm).
247. Cf Int'l L. Comm'n, State Responsibility, art. 41(2), UN Doc. A/CN.4 L.602/Rev.1
(Aug. 10, 2001) ("No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within
the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation."), cited in Gat-
tini, supra note 4, at 514 n.5 (criticizing its application to the Sudeten case).
248. See Prince Hans-Adam, supra note 66, at 32-33, 87 (finding no violation of Protocol I,
art. I).
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ments predating its creation. 249 Not all actors assumed that the EU to-
tally lacked competence. As noted, the European Parliament's Resolu-
tion hinted that the Decrees might "run counter to EU law.. .and the Co-
penhagen criteria." 250 However, claims of temporal non-competence
provided a compelling rationale for many actors considering if there was
any basis for Sudeten claims at the European level.
Another variant relies on claims about institutional non-competence
ratione materiae. For example, since EU member states retain "clear na-
tional competence" 251 over questions of citizenship,252 the Legal Opinion
considers that denaturalization "is not an issue which raises any prob-
lems in the context of the accession procedure." 253 More broadly, Com-
missioner Verheugen sought to calm Czech fears about restitution by
excluding such claims from Europe's legal order: "[S]ections of Czech
public opinion are still worried that people in the Czech Republic could
still be driven out of their homes by some kind of lawsuit for reposses-
sion. The law as it stands makes that quite impossible and no-one in
Europe would or could even change that...."
254
Such ultra vires arguments rely on a narrowing, technical view of ac-
tors' legal obligations, but then this is precisely why they can powerfully
limit claims of obligation, as they do in the Sudeten case. Of course, lim-
its on the competence of the EU and other international institutions do
not limit the competence of its member states, whose sovereignty and
legal personality extend back to the period of the expulsions. Conse-
quently, the member states' individual decisions not to condition mem-
bership on the Decrees' repeal or any other restitution confirms the
sense that they do not believe Sudeten claims implicate any fundamental
norms or create any legal obligation.
255
249. See EU Treaty, supra note 117, art. 307 ("The rights and obligations arising from agree-
ments concluded before I January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their acces-
sion... shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.").
250. European Parliament Resolution, supra note 67, 41. As noted, the Parliament did leave
the determination to the Czech government.
251. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 21 (Frowein).
252. See EU Treaty, supra note 117, art. 17.
253. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 22 (Frowein). However, there must be a temporal com-
ponent in the Legal Opinion's analysis, since it also notes that denaturalization on an ethnic basis
would violate fundamental norms and therefore concern EU institutions if undertaken today.
254. Verheugen Speech, supra note 65. Cf MS, Czech Republic Submits, supra note 83 (not-
ing Czech Ambassador to the European Union Libor Seka's comments that "those Benes Decrees
that are criticized in some countries deal with aspects that the current EU legislation does not
cover at all, such as citizenship, expropriation, privatization, and nationalization").
255. See id. ("Laws and administrative practices in all EU Member States must be compatible
with Community law.... If any country's laws fall short of what is required, that problem must be
2006]
122 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The three lines of argument discussed above seem closely related:
both the passage of time and states' agreements affect estimates of con-
temporary legal effect or obligation for past events, while particular in-
stitutions may not consider themselves competent to judge the past pre-
cisely because they were created after the events in question. In any
event, actors often muster all three arguments in combination to reach
the consensus conclusion that Sudeten claims have no merit and that the
Czech Republic's accession raises no questions of legal obligation.256
4. "Cause and Effect ": Retribution for Collective Guilt
There is a fourth rationale, radically different in view and effect: Ar-
guments rejecting the contemporary relevance of Sudeten claims fre-
quently raise Sudeten Germans' historical participation in Nazi atroci-
ties. Unlike the other three rationales which rely on the passage of time
and subsequent events-standards which could eventually extinguish
any claim-references to collaboration supply a different rationale
which separates this claim from others on moral grounds. This in turn
requires, not that time should pass, but that it should be preserved.
The consistently forward-looking pronouncements of actors in the
consensus are often curiously paired with insistence on a precise histori-
cal chronology-as the German-Czech Declaration puts it, on "cause
and effect in the sequence of events." 257 As Verheugen declared in 2002:
put right before accession. That goes not just for the Czech Republic, but for all countries.") (em-
phasis in original).
256. See, e.g., Daily Press Briefing, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy
Spokesperson, Benes Decrees, Apr. 19, 2002, http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/briefing/
us190402.asp (calling the controversy "a very old matter," noting that the Decrees "concern a pe-
riod of history that European integration has aimed to supersede," and "have no bearing now and
cannot interfere with the continuation and completion of the country's membership negotiations,"
because they predate the EU treaties, and saying that the 1997 Declaration "seeks to overcome
historical disputes and focus on the future," that [t]he enlargement process has been conceived in
that same spirit," and that [i]ts aim is.. to set the seal on the reunification of the European conti-
nent").
257. "At the same time both sides are aware that their common path to the future requires a
clear statement regarding their past which must not fail to recognize cause and effect in the se-
quence of events." 1997 German-Czech Declaration, supra note 34, art. I. Cf JM, Polish, German
Presidents Call for 'Reevaluation' of 20'h-Century Expulsions, RADIO FREE EUR./RADI0
LIBERTY, Oct. 30, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/10/301003.asp ("Polish President
Aleksander Kwasniewski and his German counterpart Johannes Rau called in a joint declara-
tion...for a 'frank European dialogue' concerning mass expulsions in the last century.... 'The
Europeans should together reevaluate and document all instances of displacement, flight, and ex-
pulsion that took place in the 20th century so that their causes, historical context, and conse-
quences become clear to the public,' the declaration reads.")
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There is no sense in keeping scores of suffering and injustice on
one side and setting them off against suffering and injustice on
the other. Sense lies in recognising that human rights are univer-
sal, that injustice is injustice, everywhere, whoever it is done to,
and that is should not be allowed to happen again. I am not trying
to explain anything away here: not the historical context and not
the sequence of cause and effect that is familiar to us all.25 8
Others have noted this sequence more bluntly. MEP Whitehead said
the expulsions were "directed at a national minority that had thrown in
its lot with the Third Reich, ' ' 259 while Prime Minister Zeman based ob-
jections to restitution or forgiveness on Sudeten Germans' treason
against Czechoslovakia and complicity in genocide as Hitler's "Fifth
Column. '260 The Dreithaler decision comprehensively develops its
analysis of the Decrees as a generalized response to "problems and is-
sues intimately connected with the wartime events." 261 The Legal Opin-
ion frames its discussion of Sudeten claims and Czech obligations by
noting that "[i]t must also be kept in mind, in the present context, that
Germany had started to forcibly transfer populations," 262 and declares
that reprisals
were actions in reaction to what had happened to the Czechoslo-
vak population by [sic] Germans between 1938 and 1945. Al-
though most of the victims were innocent it cannot be overlooked
that the violence committed against Germans at that time was in
particular a reaction to what had happened during German occu-
pation. To quote [historian] Ian Kershaw...:
"The raw brutality with which the Germans had treated those
whose countries.. .they had occupied now backlashed against
the whole German people. During the last months of the war
the Germans harvested the storm of unlimited barbarity which
258. Verheugen Speech, supra note 65.
259. Whitehead, supra note 241.
260. Otmar Lahodynsky, Populisticher Pro-Nazi-Politiker, PROFIL, Jan. 21, 2002, translated
by author (interview with Prime Minister Milos Zeman). See Wallace, supra note 27 (noting con-
troversy surrounding Zeman's interview with Profil).
261. Dreithaler, supra note 51, at para. 34 (noting elsewhere that
[a]fter the period of the violent occupation by Nazi Germany, and as a consequence of
the losses and blows that Czechoslovakia suffered thereby, no other route was left open
to the Czechoslovak government leaders than to deal with the consequences of the Nazi
occupation and the events of the war, to a certain degree at least).
262. Legal Opinion, supra note 14, at 11 n.2, 12 (Frowein) (emphasis added).
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the Hitler regime had sowed., 26
3
This is not quite right, since the "harvest" occurred not just "during
the last months" but after the war, in peacetime. Still, the point is that
this account sets the treatment of German civilians in the context of their
collaboration during the war. But why do this--or more precisely, why
do this now? The Legal Opinion was written at the beginning of the
twenty-first century while these events took place a half-century ago;
surely, as the other rationales of the consensus suggest, time and subse-
quent acts should render the precise causal sequence immaterial?
The relevance of such precise causal-temporal references in legal
analysis of contemporary claims is unclear unless one recognizes that it
is in fact a rationale of revenge and collective guilt. Most sources com-
menting on the Sudeten claims resort explicitly to such causality-they
link Sudeten collaboration to the subsequent expulsions264-and there-
fore accept this rationale. This has implications for describing the real
shape of the underlying legal-political rule because, obviously, this is a
form of justification.
V. A MODEST OBSERVATION: FOUR IMPLICATIONS OF REJECTING
SUDETEN CLAIMS
... weil es wohl nichtssagende geschriebene, nicht aber
nichtssagende ungeschriebene Normen geben kann.
- M Sass6li 265
263. IAN KERSHAW, HITLER 1936-1945, at 986 (2000), translated in Legal Opinion, supra
note 14, at 28 n.2 (Frowein).
264. See, e.g., CTK, Appeals for Reconciliation, supra note 85 (reporting President Klaus'
speech in March, 2003 and his view that "it is necessary to respect the way historical events fol-
lowed each other, or that the transfer was a reaction to the Nazi terror"). Even statements notion-
ally in favor of Sudeten claims adopt this causal sequence. See, for example, the comments of Jose
Ayala Lasso, High Commissioner for Human Rights, at a German expellee ceremony in Frankfurt:
There is no doubt that during the Nazi occupation the peoples of Central and Eastern
Europe suffered enormous injustices that cannot be forgotten. Accordingly they had a le-
gitimate claim for reparation. However, legitimate claims ought not to be enforced
through collective punishment on the basis of general discrimination and without a de-
termination of personal guilt.
Statement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the German Expellees
at the Ceremony held at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt am Main, on 28 May 1995, on the Occasion of
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Expulsion of Ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe,
1945-1948, in Documentary Appendix, supra note 16, at 840.
265. M. SASSOLI, BEDEUTUNG ELINER KODIF1KATION FOR DAS ALLGEMEINE VOLKERRECHT
187 (1990), translated by author ("There can be entirely meaningless written norms, but not
meaningless unwritten norms.").
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[M]an's worst folly is a persistent attempt to adjust, smoothly, ra-
tionally, to the unthinkable.266
Both the consensus and its four rationales seem uncontroversial. No
state or other relevant actor supported Sudeten claims, and the rationales
they provided-it had been a long time, states had already disposed of
the issue, Europe's institutions and its very order preclude revisiting this
matter, and the expulsions were after all a consequence of the Germans'
own conduct in the war-likewise receive broad support. There is sim-
ply no traction for the Sudeten claims, which failed to deflect Czech ac-
cession in any way. Yet this very absence of effect implies several sur-
prising things about the shape of our law.
A. Is There a Sudeten Corollary Limiting the Law of the
Holocaust?
The accretion of judicial decisions, treaty commitments and custom-
ary law expressed in Nuremberg, the Genocide and Geneva Conven-
tions, and the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals seems to confirm an iron
rule prohibiting ethnic cleansing-a Law of the Holocaust. Yet that
body of law had crystallized before the Sudeten controversy reached its
decisive point in the early twenty-first century, raising the question:
what is the effect of rejecting Sudeten claims on this iron rule?
In his 2002 speech, Commissioner Verheugen linked the forward ori-
entation of the Union, the ancientness of the Sudeten expulsions, and a
curiously elliptical expression of causality in describing "how we deal
with the burden of the past... [t]he fact is: in today's uniting Europe, ex-
pulsion, dispossession, oppression or discrimination as a political means
are unthinkable. Anywhere. And under any circumstances. However,
equally unthinkable is a repetition of the fascist terror which had pre-
ceded all this. 26 7 On its face, this rejects expulsion absolutely. Yet the
formulation is more precise: total rejection-followed, strangely, by
"however"-is balanced against another "equally unthinkable" event.
The implication must be that if fascist terror or its equivalent were to re-
peat itself, then a righteous Europe's response could be repeated as
266. The Price of Survival, TIME, Apr. 11, 1969, at 108 (reviewing KURT VONNEGUT,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE, OR THE CHILDREN'S CRUSADE (1969)).
267. Verheugen Speech, supra note 65.
2006]
126 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
well.268
Indeed, most efforts to isolate the expulsions as products of their time
deploy causal justifications that necessarily contemplate similar action in
similar circumstances. For Whitehead, "[m]easures taken in response to
a time of unparalleled evil are not applicable in the modem era of de-
mocratic resolution." 269 This seems to suggest that expulsions are ille-
gitimate because democracies do not need them, yet the argument's en-
gine is the absence of "unparalleled evil."' 270 Nor does it condemn the
expulsions as such: there is none of the categorical rejection characteriz-
ing discussion of, say, the Holocaust or Japanese internments, and in
cabining the expulsions as unique ("unparalleled"), it necessarily re-
serves a potential response should history repeat. The seeming fixity of
our resistance to expulsion-its 'unthinkability'-is actually a function
of the conflict preceding it: under sufficiently exigent circumstances,
expulsion as a legal means would be thinkable.
271
At its narrowest, the Sudeten Corollary to the Law of the Holocaust
holds that when a dictatorship engages in aggression and the most ex-
treme depredations, other states (whether democratic or not) may engage
in collective, ethnically determined expulsions and confiscations after
the conflict-or may later defend their legal immunity if they do. Even
this narrow postulate would limit the seemingly universal prohibition on
expulsion suggested by the Law of the Holocaust.
The Corollary further suggests that states may shield themselves from
liability for mass expulsions (or for failing to oppose them) by several
strategies: they may define the initial harm of expulsion as discrete and
non-continuing; they may structure subsequent interactions through in-
stitutions with purely prospective competence; or they may simply wait
for time to pass. Perhaps the Corollary's "unthinkable potential"-the
fact that we reserve this option in law, but tend, with Verheugen, not to
acknowledge it in advance of using it-necessitates denial of restitution.
268. This immediately follows Verheugen's aforementioned invocation of "cause and effect."
269. Whitehead, supra note 241.
270. After all, two signatories of the Potsdam Agreement were democracies.
271. In this light, the way in which proposals to expel Germans developed throughout the war,
becoming increasingly ambitious in response to events and the logic of the war, is illuminating.
Cf Christopher Kopper, The London Czech Government and the Origins of the Expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra note 14, at
255-66.) This path of deliberation shows-as has been frequently observed, more recently, in
connection with the genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia-that such plans do not spring up spon-
taneously or at the last moment, but rather are the consequence of layered discussions. Were such
an event to occur again, its enormity would bend the deliberative space around it to produce solu-
tions of similar scope that would be considered reasonable under the circumstances.
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If it were acknowledged, the likely consequences of that potential would
have to be calculated and discounted in the present. Denying restitution
not only stabilizes geopolitics and lowers actors' costs today-it lowers
the costs, in a possible future, of exercising the option.
This claim is limited and precise. There are abundant indications that
renewed use of the Decrees today would be incompatible with the Euro-
pean legal order, and that ethnically based expulsions or confiscations
are generally condemned as unacceptable; this Article does not seek to
argue otherwise.272 The technical turn-the determination that the De-
crees are extinct or outside the EU's competence-does have a certain
legally generative effect; it is not trivial that rather than enthusiastically
approving the Decrees, the EU has indicated that their reactivation in
present circumstances would be incompatible with EU law. But this
technical turn simply masks a moral and political--one might say con-
stitutional-determination that itself is deeply and undeniably generative
of the legal order.
And so, this Article argues that we have not disposed of the broader
question about whether or not ethnically discriminatory measures are
available under specific and predictable circumstances. On the contrary,
the statements and actions of states and European institutions reveal a
complex but clear conditionality: such measures are unacceptable in the
absence of exigent challenges to the European order. Europe and its le-
gal order have not rejected resort to ethnic cleansing under all circum-
stances; they have reserved this right-and an immunity from restitution
after invoking it-in response to grave threats to that order. That is the
true shape of the law.
B. How Do We Understand the Relationship of Sudeten and
Holocaust Claims?
States have been subjected to various claims for restitution for past
expulsions. Might not the consensus view (which defines continuing ef-
fects narrowly and excludes long-term effects of denaturalization or con-
fiscation) limit the scope of restitution claims in other contexts? A tech-
272. See, e.g., Verheugen Speech, supra note 65 ("The presidential Decrees are no longer of
legal consequence. .. .[They] are obsolete, extinct, dead law.... Any attempt to resurrect them as
politically relevant or to use them in any way today can only bring trouble.") While this acknowl-
edges that the Decrees remain part of the legal system, clearly disapproval is there, too. Certainly
this Article does not argue that expulsion or ethnic discrimination could be casually undertaken
today under just any circumstances. Readers who imagine this Article is making such an argument
have assuredly misread its intention, and perhaps its proofs.
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nical, temporally-limned interpretation could eventually terminate
claims by refugees in Sudan, Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, or Israel-
Palestine, for example, since nothing in a technical interpretation allows
reference to the nature of the claim or anything other than its ancient-
ness. Either a continuing effects analysis can extinguish any claim, or
we must have a theory as to why some claims merit greater protection
against the effects of time.
Such a theory is available. It might be supposed that in observing the
failure of Sudeten claims, we simply rely upon the temporal and juris-
dictional rationales identified earlier, but this cannot be right, or at least
not the entire reason. As already indicated, there is a fourth, moral ra-
tionale. It is this rationale that distinguishes the Sudeten circumstances
from the other restitution claims subject to the same temporal and juris-
dictional objections that do merit compensation. I speak of course about
claims by the victims of Nazism. Technical objections that defeat Sude-
ten claims do not operate with equal effect against victims of the Holo-
caust and Nazi aggression, 273 who have received compensation, 274 resto-
ration of property,275 and official apologies.276
To be sure, most restitution for Nazism mobilizes political or moral
claims that do not necessarily create law under strict models of custom-
ary law.277 At the same time, more expansive theories would readily
273. See, e.g., Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (allowing suit by a Holocaust victim
against Austria under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for return of paintings seized in
1938). See also Charles H. Brower 1I, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. 2240, United
States Supreme Court, June 7, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (2005).
274. See Saul Kagan, An Outline, in REVISITING THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST LEGACY: COMING
TO TERMS WITH FORCED LABOR, EXPROPRIATION, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION 20-21
(Oliver Rathkolb ed., 2004); Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Involvement in Claims by Victims of the Ger-
man Holocaust or Their Heirs, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 879, 883-92 (1999).
275. See, e.g., Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (finding for Altmann in dispute over several paintings
by Klimt in the possession of the Belvedere Museum); see also Carol Vogel, Lauder Pays $135
Million, a Record, for a Klimt Portrait, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/arts/design/I 9klim.htmlei=5088&en=37eb32381038a749&
ex=1308369600&partner-rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print; Michael Kimmelman, Klimts Go
to Market, Museums Hold Their Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at El (reviewing the case
and the dispensation of the paintings).
276. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE: INSIDE THE EPIC
BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST 381 (2002) (discussing President Rau's 1999
apology); Kagan, supra note 274, at 21 (noting Chancellor's Adenauer's 1951 "solemn declara-
tion before the Bundestag assuming moral and legal responsibility").
277. Cf North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4, 44 (Feb.
20, 1969) ("There are many international acts.. which are performed almost invariably, but which
are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense
of legal duty."). See Rainer Hofmann, Compensation for Victims of War-German Practice after
1949 and Current Developments, Remarks at the Meeting of the Japanese Society for Interna-
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identify the public-private funds established ex gratia by Germany, Aus-
tria and Switzerland to settle lawsuits (and the intense involvement of
other states such as the U.S. in the negotiations) as indicia of legal obli-
gation. 278 In addition, some anti-Nazi claims are advanced in unambigu-
ously legal modes. For example, national tribunals-sources for con-
structing claims about customary law 279-have awarded judgments to
Holocaust claimants relying variously on domestic law, international
treaties, and settlement arrangements. 280  Even judgments that limit
Holocaust restitution are routinely crafted so as to reaffirm moral
tional Law, (Oct. 8-9, 2005) at 6, (available at http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jsil/annualdocuments/
2005/2005_autumn/Hofmann.pdf)
([Germany's treaty obligations for payments to individuals] "were acknowledged only
insofar as they could be based on a pertinent piece of domestic German legislation. This
approach reflected the-then- unchallenged position that individuals had no right, un-
der international law, to individual claims for compensation. ... [T]he adoption of domes-
tic German legislation to provide for the compensation for individual claims was seen as
the fulfilment of a moral-and not a legal-obligation: Thus, the ensuing rights.. were
not considered as the domestic implementation of an existing general obligation under
international law.... This understanding continued to prevail in the Federal Republic of
Germany after 1970.").
278. Germany's creation of the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future" to
compensate victims of deportation and forced labor would conventionally be seen as a merely po-
litical act, but in Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany (Italian Court of Cassation, Mar. 11,
2004), the court took this "as evidence that the facts alleged by petitioners were not episodic
events but part of an overall strategy pursued by the German Reich." Andrea Bianchi, Ferrini v.
Federal Republic of Germany: Italian Court of Cassation, March 11, 2004, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
242, 243 (2005) (turning a political fact into legal evidence to defeat a sovereign immunity claim).
See Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," U.S.-
FRG, July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298; Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass., sez. un., 3
nov. 2004, n.5044, Giust. Civ. 2004 II, 1191; Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De Vittor, State Im-
munity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 89 (2005); see also Hofmann, supra note 277, at 9 (discussing the Foundation "Remem-
berance, Responsibility and the Future" and noting that the law establishing the Foundation "aims
at providing justice to the victims by acknowledging Germany's, as well as the companies', moral
and political responsibility for their suffering-it does not, however, speaks of any legal obliga-
tion to do so") (emphasis in original). Some authors also assert that non-state communities can
attain effective legal personality that can affect the contours of legal indicia, as in the case of the
Jewish organizations that negotiated for reparations from Germany as full parties alongside other
states. See, e.g., Torpey, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that "the assault on the Jews eventually gave
them a kind of legal standing in international law (quite apart from the existence of Israel), setting
an important precedent for other groups to lay claim to a similar status").
279. "Judicial decisions in the municipal sphere.. .provide prima facie evidence of the atti-
tudes of states... and very often constitute the only available evidence of [their] practice." IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2003).
280. See, e.g., William Glaberson, For Betrayal by Swiss Bank and Nazis, $21 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005 (discussing U.S. federal court award pursuant to the 1998 settlement to
families whose Swiss trusts were expropriated in 1938).
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claims,2'8  and all such claims adumbrate a moral consensus beyond the
legally practicable: "In the scheme of the wrongs of the Holocaust,
[plaintiffs lawyer] said.. .the theft of a sugar refinery near Vienna long
ago was a small injustice. 'But now, 70 years later.. .this is one of the
few wrongs you can actually remedy.' ' 282 More broadly, universal repu-
diation of Nazism and the Holocaust, such as Germany's apologies, con-
stitutes the legal matrix underlying the consensus that such behavior to-
day would violate international law.2 83 It is at least plausible to suggest
that Germany's acts of restitution for the crimes of Nazism-and other
states' responses---constitute proofs of a customary legal norm prohibit-
ing such actions and requiring some form of restitution.
Thus, although the extent to which restitution for Nazism's crimes is a
legal obligation is contested,284 such claims exhibit an accepted core of
281. See, e.g., Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past: A Survey of Jewish Efforts
to Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 233, 234-35 (1998) ("Although Jews
should be legally entitled to full restitution of all confiscated and converted properties, such a
wholesale return would be unrealistic."); Press Release, Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, Settlement of Class Action Suits (Aug. 12, 1998) (available at
http://fcit.coedu.usf.edu/HOLOCAUST/resouRce/assets/concl2.htm) (noting that the 1998 Wash-
ington Conference Principles on Nazi Confiscated Art, "while not legally binding represent a
moral commitment among nations which all in the art world will have to take into account").
282. Glaberson, supra note 280. Plaintiff in the case was the same Maria Altmann who recov-
ered in the Klimt paintings case noted above. See In re Holocaust Assets Litig., Case No. CV96-
4849 (Cl. Res. Trib. for Swiss Bank Account Cases, Apr. 13, 2005),
http://www.asil.org/ilib/2005/05/ilibO50509.htm#j3 (reviewing the award to Altmann out of the
fund established by a consortium of Swiss banks to settle claims arising from Nazi confiscations,
pursuant to the settlement of class action litigation in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York); see also KLIMT: ADELE'S LAST WILL (Dissidents/L'Express 2006) (viewed at the
Neue Gallerie, New York, Sept. 2006) (including footage of the lawyer, Schoenberg, using very
similar language with reference to the Klimt paintings).
283. Formal apologies or other acts of restitution can be ex gratia, but can also contribute to a
claim in customary international law. See Mark Gibney & Erik Roxstrom, The Status of State
Apologies, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 911,915 (2001)
("Statements by high level officials-such as apologies-may under certain circum-
stances, constitute evidence of state practice and therefore 1) contribute to the formation
of customary international law; 2) constitute a source of interpretation for... determining
the content of obligations arising from treaty law; and 3) serve as a unilateral declaration
that is at least binding on the state that issued the apology.").
284. Claims by Nazi victims have often been defeated by technical-temporal objections-
statutes of limitations, anti-seizure statutes, etc. See, e.g., People v. Museum of Modern Art (In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum), 93 N.Y.2d 729 (App. Ct. 1999) (applying New York's anti-
seizure statute to quash a subpoena for paintings on loan to the Metropolitan Museum of Art
claimed as property stolen by the Nazis). See also Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(denying jurisdiction and rejecting implied waiver of sovereign immunity for violation ofjus co-
gens for FSIA purposes in suit for money damages by Holocaust survivor for slave labor; Wald,
J., dissenting, found implicit waiver due to barbaric conduct). The U.S. subsequently intervened in
the Princz matter, leading to the Agreement Concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States
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reasonableness that Sudeten claims utterly lack. The expulsions have
never been repudiated in terms even vaguely analogous to condemnation
of the Holocaust-on the contrary, states accept the expulsions' legality
and legitimacy. No one has ever been convicted for organizing the ex-
pulsions. No compensation has been paid, even ex gratia. No state has
demanded the repudiation of the Decrees, even as a political quid pro
quo. By contrast, one can hardly imagine a state with explicitly anti-
Jewish legislation on the books, even in "extinct" form, being a candi-
date for EU membership.285
What is the effect of this on the rationales identified above? Even par-
tial vindication of claims by Nazism's victims vitiates the "ancientness"
objection to Sudeten claims-Holocaust claims are, of course, actually
older.286 It must be 'something else that distinguishes the cases. That
something, obviously, is a moral difference: the sense of obligation to
Holocaust victims and the sense that expellees (considered collaborators
in Nazi evil287) have no claim. Any potential for comparison between
Germans and their victims seldom surfaces-indeed, the moral construc-
tion of the rule requires their incommensurateness.
This moral difference is the distinguishing element between the Sude-
ten and Holocaust cases. Yet precisely for that reason, the Corollary lim-
its the restitution the Law of the Holocaust imposes for collective expul-
sions in general: restitution does not apply to expulsions carried out in
Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of Persecution, F.R.G.-U.S., Sept.
19, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 193 (1996). See Murphy, supra note 273, at 883-85 & n.2.
285. France has indicated that Turkey's membership in the EU, an event which may not come
to pass for twenty more years, might be contingent on admitting responsibility for the Armenian
genocide, an act that took place in 1915, predating both the Holocaust and the German expulsions
by thirty years. See Turkey 'Must Admit Armenia Dead,' BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 4092933.stm; France in Armenia 'genocide' row, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6043730.stm (discussing passage by the lower
house of the French Parliament of a bill criminalizing denial of the Armenian genocide, and not-
ing that "France's President Chirac and Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy have both said Turkey
will have to recognise the Armenian deaths as genocide before it joins the EU-though this is not
the official EU position").
286. The Holocaust ended no later than May 8, 1945, with the German capitulation. All save
the earliest wild expulsions of Sudeten Germans occurred after that date; all 'Potsdam' expulsions
occurred later.
287. Cf Kathleen McLaughlin, Allies Open Trial of 20 Top Germans for Crimes of War, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1945, at Al ("Nuremberg, Germany, Nov. 20-Four of the world's great powers
sit in judgment today on twenty top Germans.... The twenty-first defendant, tacitly although not
specifically named in the indictment, is the German nation that raised them to power and gloried
in their might.").
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righteous retribution, 288 and would not apply to any future expulsion that
could satisfactorily be described as belonging to that category.
The other rationales are therefore likely not controlling in any mean-
ingful sense, or even particularly informative. In fact, it is this moral dif-
ference that allows us to see how the other rationales operate, and how
the Sudeten case both is and is not sui generis. There is no general prin-
ciple of "antiquity,', 289 continuing effect, or other technical objection,
since these rationales are only functions of the broader, anterior moral
calculus we apply to an act of expulsion or its consequences: 290 for mor-
ally approved claims, technical arguments may never apply, while im-
porting a moral calculus ensures other, disfavored claims-such as those
by the expelled Germans-never receive protection.
291
C. What Are the Corollary's Implications for Customary
International Law?
Customary law is constructed on proofs that state actions were under-
288. For example, the fact that German expellees have the same right to acquire property after
accession is one of the Legal Opinion's core arguments against requiring restitution. Could a court
decision rejecting Holocaust survivors' claims to return of stolen art on grounds that they pres-
ently "have the same right to acquire the artworks" possibly find expression? Something distin-
guishes the cases.
289. Cf Council Draft Resolution on Looted Jewish Cultural Property, EUR. PARL. DoC. 8536
(Oct. 6, 1999) (declaring expropriations illegal, Article 3, and inviting member states' parliaments
to "give immediate consideration to ways in which they may be able to facilitate the return of
looted Jewish cultural property," Article 10, and to change legislation to facilitate restitution, Arti-
cle 13, including by removing statutory limitations, Article 13(a)). Austria passed an Art Restitu-
tion Act, invalidating certain expropriations during the Nazi era, in 1998. KLIMT: ADELE'S LAST
WILL supra note 282.
290. Even claims of ultra vires incapacity mask an underlying choice about when to reach
back into the past and when not to: successful efforts to reverse Nazi-era seizures are themselves
based on retrospective, postwar revisions. See, e.g., Flegenheimer Claim, 25 I.L.R. 91, 97 (It.-U.S.
Conciliation Comm'n 1958) (noting Italy's obligation in the 1947 peace treaty to invalidate prop-
erty transfers "result[ing] from force or duress exerted by Axis Governments"). In fact, much of
the edifice of the postwar European order-the definitions of crimes at Nuremberg, the 1974 nulli-
fication of the Treaty of Munich, the assertion of Czechoslovakia's territorial and political conti-
nuity, post-communist property reforms and European Court of Human Rights review of commu-
nist expropriation cases from 1949-is a function of post hoc revision, which therefore begs the
question, when do we revise and when do we not? Likewise, the final decision on EU membership
is a political one, taken by the states for whatever reasons they choose; there are no competency
restrictions on that, as the French position linking Turkish membership to recognition of the Ar-
menian genocide indicates.
291. Cf Timothy W. Waters, Contemplating Failure and Creating Alternatives in the Bal-
kans: Bosnia's Peoples, Democracy, and the Shape of Self-Determination, 29 YALE J. INT'L L.
423, 461-62 (2004) ("[T]he amount of time required is a function of the international commu-
nity's moral evaluation of a claim....").
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taken out of a sense of legal obligation-the concept of opiniojuris sive
necessitatis. 292 So what is the consequence of consensus that an act is
not obligatory? If states consistently demonstrate a belief that they are
not under a particular obligation, then they are not.293 Doesn't the Sude-
ten controversy tend that way? Private actors claimed the Czech Repub-
lic was obliged to repudiate the Decrees and that other states were
obliged to withhold accession until it did,294 but those claims were re-
jected, demonstrating that there is no obligation. That has important con-
sequences for describing the shape and content of customary law gov-
erning ethnic cleansing, because any lack of obligation indicates a zone
of permission.295
It might be objected that states' permissive attitudes do not give evi-
dence of opinio juris, the sense of obligation which customary law re-
quires for states' actions to have the force of law.296 Yet this is precisely
the point: permitting is as much a function of law as proscribing, and
when states act in a way that does not give rise to opinio juris, they es-
tablish proofs of permissibility that define the scope of other rules.297 In
this case, the absence of opinio juris shows that states do not feel they
have any obligation to reverse the effects of deportation or denaturaliza-
tion under analogous circumstances. Prior to the Sudeten controversy
one might have speculated that the norm prohibiting expulsion was
nearly total, yet states (and other actors) expressly rejected extension of
the prohibition (or the obligation to make restitution) to the Sudeten
case-and presumably therefore to similar cases. If a Sudeten Corollary
has any generalizable value, it would exempt similar expulsions under
similar circumstances from the general scope of prohibition.
Consider a counterfactual scenario: what if the EU or its member
292. See SHAW, supra note 72, at 80-84. See also supra, pt. III.A. As noted, some scholars
dispute the operative role of opinio juris and customary international law as a generative legal
category. See e.g. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 75. But see Norman & Trachtman, supra
note 75, at 569.
293. SHAW, supra note 72, at 84-86. But see Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Cus-
tomary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 268-93, cited in Norman & Trachtman,
supra note 75, at 544 (arguing that opiniojuris is sometimes not necessary).
294. Cf BROWNLIE, supra note 270, at 491 (asserting that states have a "duty of non-
recognition" of other states' acts "if in the careful judgment of the individual state a situation has
arisen the illegality of which is opposable to states in general").
295. See MALANCZUK, supra note 71, at 44 ("[I]n the case of a permissive rule, opiniojuris
means a conviction by states that a certain form of conduct in permitted by international law.")
(emphasis in original). Hohfeld's jural opposites 'privilege' and 'duty' are instructive.
296. See SHAW, supra note 72, at 80-84.
297. See Ruth Wedgewood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 830
(1999) ("Decisions not to act are a part of state practice and opiniojuris.").
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states had conditioned Czech accession on repudiation of the Decrees?
Or, following a refusal by the Czech Republic to give restitution, mem-
ber states had explicitly voiced their disapproval, or had explicitly con-
demned the original expulsions? Any of these scenarios would have
given rise to colorable claims about new customary rules repudiating
expulsion and defeating any residual option to expel in the future. Cer-
tainly scholars would have rushed to make such claims.298
One can always conjure stronger formulations of any rule, but this is
not just a lexical game. The EU, members, and candidates, collectively
advanced a highly consistent view that the expulsions were unrelated to
accession; at every critical juncture they rejected any obligation in re-
spect to Sudeten claims. This rejection was emphatic and total; the coun-
terfactual scenarios above are clear but unrealized alternatives. Logi-
cally, the clearest way to affirm the illegality of expulsion in general
would be to repudiate each instance of expulsion and provide restitution,
but that would have required the exact opposite response to the Sudeten
case.
As with genocide, scholars, courts and states wish to have the crimes
associated with ethnic cleansing embedded in customary law because
they are too important to our common humanity to be left to mere posi-
tivistic treaty-making 299 or to any voluntaristic law-making process.
300
Therefore, any indication that according to the mechanics of customary
legal interpretation such acts are clearly not embedded is of significance
for our efforts to map and determine the shape of that law. The common
298. Compare this to scholarly efforts to identify legal norms from the EU's recognition crite-
ria for successors to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Otto Kimminich, A 'Federal'
Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83 (Christian To-
muschat ed., 1993); Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination
with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993).
299. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. n ("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encour-
ages, or condones... systematic racial discrimination, or.. .a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights" and that as jus cogens norms, "an international
agreement that violates them is void."). Cf Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88
MICH. L. REv. 1946 (1990) ("Some norms seem so basic, so important, that it is more than
slightly artificial to argue that states are legally bound to comply with them simply because there
exists an agreement between them to that effect....").
300. Cf Theodor Meron, Customary Law, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 4, at 113 ("Both
scholarly and judicial sources have shown reluctance to reject as customary norms-because of
contrary practice-rules whose content merits customary law status perhaps because of the recog-
nition that humanitarian principles express basic community values and are essential for the pres-
ervation of public order.").
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intuition that Nazism's supporters and its victims occupy different moral
positions-and the deeper sense that at some point we are morally justi-
fied in making categorical decisions about entire communities because
of their general association with an evil regime 30 1 -may be right, but it
is also a definitional distinction. It excludes those two communities from
common identity or common treatment, and again, this may be right and
reasonable. It also means, necessarily, that deportation, denaturalization
and confiscation done on an ethnic basis constitute "ethnic cleansing"
when applied to innocents, but are justifiable acts of state when applied,
in limited and defined circumstances, to communities adjudged to have
passed beyond some moral and legal pale.
And this is true today, notwithstanding sixty years of treaties and new
institutions. It is not satisfactory to suppose that treaty-making and insti-
tution-building alone have made actions which were acceptable in 1945
illegal now while also observing that even older Holocaust claims are
nonetheless given different treatment-an observation which simply re-
turns us to the claim of moral difference. 30 2 And so, more fundamen-
301. In this context, it is interesting to note that one of the Dreithaler petitioners invoked the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. While temporal-technical objections could be brought to
bear against such a claim, the Court does not resort to this; rather its substantive analysis of Ger-
man "responsibility" simply does not consider the practical reality that confiscation, denaturaliza-
tion, and expulsion affected not only adult Germans who actively or passively supported the Na-
zis, but children as well, many of whom are still alive. There is no accommodation for them in the
Court's categorical analysis of what it calls the "fundamental difference between the responsibility
of the 'rest of the world' and that of the German nation, between the silence and passivity of some
and the silence and the active role played by others," Dreithaler supra note 51 at para. 24, nor
any consideration at all.
302. It is entirely possible to reconstitute, retrospectively, the legal and moral landscape of
past times. At present there are active scholarly attempts to establish a theoretical basis for show-
ing that slavery either always was illegal, or became illegal at a certain point, and that notwith-
standing its historical variation, it should be declared retrospectively illegal. As a descriptive mat-
ter, any of these turns are retrospective revisions, since it would have come as a great shock to
most actors in, say, 1700, that what they were doing was already illegal. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPMENT, YEARBOOK 2001, REPARATIONS: REDRESSING PAST WRONGS (George Ulrich &
Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003) (surveying developing arguments on reparations for slavery
and colonialism); see also World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance, Aug. 3 I-Sept. 8, 2001, Durban Declaration and Programme ofAction,
13 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12. Cf d'Argent, supra note 5, at 285 (surveying arguments about
retrospective illegality and noting that:
In order to make a claim for reparation as a matter of law (as opposed to morality or
politics), one would have to demonstrate the emergence of a new, presumably custom-
ary, rule affirming that slavery is now considered to have always been illegal. Without
such a rule, nothing really distinguishes contemporary endorsements of responsibility
from ex gratia promises.).
But the point here is this: if this could be done for slavery, colonialism, or any other past harm, it
could be done for the Sudeten claims-and so the question is, again, why is it not?
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tally, it is not satisfactory because no one wishes to admit that our com-
mitments against ethnic cleansing or genocide (whatever they are) could
be effaced by a mere treaty or be otherwise subject to state consent;30 3
they are too deeply held, morally, to allow that. Law is based not only
on formal instantiations but on underlying, anterior moral sensibilities-
this is the very rationale underlying customary law and human rights, af-
ter all.304
The very fact that our rejection of Sudeten claims is fundamentally
moral rather than technical or legal should indicate to us that the occa-
sion to apply such a distinction obtains, and will obtain, whenever the
moral conditions arise, regardless of the formal legal structures erected
atop that moral foundation. We profess an absolute legal rejection of
ethnic cleansing, but either we do not mean it or we mean something
morally narrower by the words "ethnic cleansing."
If it were objected that there is a peremptory norm (a rule of jus co-
gens) prohibiting "ethnic cleansing," as there is for genocide, 30 5 this
would not change the analysis or effect. Elevating the prohibition of eth-
nic cleansing to the level of ajus cogens norm only replicates our con-
cern with definition-what is included in the norm?-and simply high-
lights the moral difference between what is prohibited (population
transfers like Nazi slave labor and the Holocaust) and what is not (popu-
lation transfers like the German expulsions).
Thus, simply intoning that there is a human right or peremptory norm
against expulsion is an insufficient inquiry into customary law: one must
investigate the shape and content of norms through the cases in which
they are-and are not-invoked. The Sudeten expulsions and the con-
temporary response are one such case. Evidently, the prohibition of "ex-
pulsion" does not mean the kind of expulsion undertaken after the war in
303. Cf Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State 'Sovereignty, 'GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 37
(1995-96) ("[N]on-conventional human rights law... is 'constitutional,' in a new sense.... [It] is
not based on consent: at least, it does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular states re-
gardless of their objection.") The author links this development or claim to the concept ofjus co-
gens. Id.
304. Cf Koskenniemi, supra note 288, at 1952-53 (stating that the mechanics of customary
law are
useless because it is really our certainty that genocide or torture is illegal that allows us
to understand state behavior and to accept or reject its legal message, not state behavior
itself. ... [W]e are... compelled to admit that everything we know about norms which are
embedded in [state] behavior is conditioned by an anterior-though at least in some re-
spects largely shared-criterion of what is right and good for human life.).
305. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(1962) (identifying prohibition of genocide among the "basic rights of the human person").
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the kinds of conditions then prevailing. Perhaps there is a lexical ele-
ment after all: expulsions are prohibited, but then these were merely
transfers.3 °6
D. Why Isn't a Sudeten Corollary Acknowledged?
Our law does not forbid ethnic cleansing full stop--it forbids ethnic
cleansing except in defined cases, following extreme communal vio-
lence which provides a moral justification. But why are those cases un-
acknowledged? If there is a corollary, why cabin it off as a sui generis
"shipwreck on the law?" There is of course the sheer awkwardness of
admitting limits to our horror at ethnic cleansing or of advertising our
determination to reserve the rights of vengeance. When that potential is
acknowledged, it comes in surprising ways, such as Prime Minister Ze-
man's suggestion during a trip to Israel "that his hosts break the dead-
lock with the Palestinians by adopting the method that was so 'success-
ful' for the Czechs in 1945: expulsion." 30 7 But this is a minor view, as
most actors do not openly acknowledge the generative potential of that
method today. Whatever claim we can make based on observing state
action, we cannot simply assert that they publicly "approve of ethnic
cleansing in limited circumstances."
Indeed, if one assembled fifty statesmen or legal scholars and asked
them if ethnic expulsions would be legal today under any circumstances,
even after a major war, surely they would say "of course not., 30 8 Per-
306. Compare this to the arabesques of American policy distinguishing 'genocide' and 'acts of
genocide' in Rwanda. See Diane Orentlicher, Genocide, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 4, at 156.
307. Rupnik, supra note 59, at 68. Zeman was speaking about the West Bank, but the differ-
ences from the broader Palestinian case are instructive. Palestinian refugees from 1948 have
claims of roughly the same antiquity as the Germans, and probably no better chance of seeing
those claims vindicated since Israel will probably never allow any meaningful return, but it is easy
to find legally-generative support for Palestinian claims from a variety of relevant actors. This
constructs Israel's resistance as a violation of a reconfirmed norm rather than as behavior consis-
tent with international norms. (Of course, there is fierce controversy over exactly what happened
in 1948 and what laws or violations are at issue. The point, however, is that there is controversy,
and with it persistent claims about Palestinian rights and Israeli obligations-compare the Sudeten
case, in which there is near consensus that there is no obligation.) And if the international com-
munity eventually accedes in the face of Israeli recalcitrance, it may well construct an additional
limit on the scope of our commitment concerning responses to expulsion.
308. See supra note 4. Cf Alfred de Zayas, Ethnic Cleansing 1945 and Today: Observations
on Its Illegality and Implications, in ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE, supra
note 14, at 787-803 (arguing for the illegality of ethnic deportations both in 1945 and today, and
noting, at page 789, that "the victorious Allies at Potsdam were not above international law and
thus could not legalize criminal acts by common agreement. There is no doubt that the mass ex-
pulsion of Germans from their homelands... constituted 'war crimes' to the extent that they oc-
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haps this denial proves that an expulsion option is not embedded in cus-
tomary law, 30 9 and yet we have seen how the consensus demonstrates a
continued (if implicit) commitment to the expulsion option which is in
fact the observable position of relevant actors, even if they do not say so
when asked directly. Ask those same statesmen and scholars if the ex-
pulsions of the Germans were illegal at the time, or deserve compensa-
tion today, and most would equally surely conclude that they were not
and do not, and in saying so they would be mirroring the actual positions
of the EU, its member states, the Potsdam Powers, international tribu-
nals, and most observers. So, does bare verbal denial that an act is possi-
ble or legal actually outweigh expressions of policy indicating the con-
trary?
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full critique
on this point, there does appear to be a serious tension in contemporary
customary law's reliance on "state speech" to construct proofs of opinio
curred during wartime, and 'crimes against humanity,' whether committed during war or in peace-
time").
The Czech Foreign Ministry issued this statement prior to accession: "The Czech Republic is a
legal state. Currently, this country has no legislative norms that would facilitate the expropriation
of property without indemnification.... Naturally, it is equally impermissible to expel any group of
either native or foreign inhabitants...." Czech Foreign Ministry Website, supra note 2. In June,
2003, the Czech cabinet called both the expulsions and German aggression preceding it "unac-
ceptable from today's point of view." CTK, Czech News Agency, Strong Words Break Calls for
Czech-German Reconciliation, FIN. TIMES INFO., July 11, 2005.
309. Cf CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 34
(2003) ("Even massive abuses do not militate against assuming a customary rule as long as the
responsible author state seeks to hide and conceal its objectionable conduct....").
Without question, the recent textual trend has been to expressly condemn and prohibit forced
population transfers. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tion for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res.
60/147, (Dec. 16, 2005); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion & Prot. of Minorities, Draft Declaration on Population Transfer and the Implantation of Set-
tlers, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/23 (June 27, 1997) (prepared by Awn Shawkat Al-
Khasawneh); Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code on Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.53 (1996) (finding that deportation "implies expulsion from the na-
tional territory, whereas the forcible transfer of population could occur wholly within the frontiers
of one and the same State" and "a crime of this nature could be committed not only in time of
armed conflict but also in time of peace"). In addition, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
Second Additional Protocol prohibit the evacuation of occupied territory or displacement of civil-
ians, absent imperative military necessity. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 17, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, adopted June 8, 1977 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978).
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juris and state action.3'0 The Sudeten controversy presents a case in
which states' specific words and actions very clearly lead in one direc-
tion, even though their general rhetoric goes in the other. Which one is
more likely to predict the future shape of things? It is as if, unable to
bear to let matters go in the direction our own methods take them, we
seek to embed some moral ratchet in the law. Yet to build legal prescrip-
tions on bare rhetorical claims while ignoring the mass of actions and
policies that contradict them-to try to resolve the word-action problem
decisively in favor of rhetoric over action-risks creating an incredibly
thin vision of customary law, unhinged from reality, and lacking in de-
scriptive, let alone normative, power. It is something like asking people
their sexual history or how they would behave on a sinking ship: people
will give certain kinds of predictable answers, but these may not actually
predict anything and may not actually be true.
The role of moral revulsion or even embarrassment must be found
somewhere in our model of customary law's formation, but nothing in
its mechanisms appears to allow for such public scruple. Perhaps by re-
fusing to observe the obvious, we show an unwillingness to concede its
effect on legal obligation. Yet embarrassment presupposes something to
be embarrassed about, and in the very act of not speaking about a
thing-and knowing we do not speak about it-we make it real. The
consensus shaped a corollary reduction in the Law of the Holocaust's
prospective commitments the moment it rejected the core Sudeten claim:
that what they had suffered is also a matter for human rights, for Europe,
and for law.3
11
310. See, e.g., Norman & Trachtman, supra note 75, at 541 (noting that "[c]ustomary interna-
tional law... is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent" but reject-
ing the bases for such an attack); Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary
International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 5 (2003); see also Kelly, supra note 73.
311. One might object that none of this properly belongs in the realm of law, because law ex-
ists only in ordered societies. Yet the expulsions occurred in peacetime, and whatever the exigen-
cies (including the altogether reasonable uncertainty about Europe's future political dispensation
and Germany's role in it), there was sufficient order to refute the objection. If anything, the expul-
sions are remembered as the proximate means of reinforcing that restored order, as the Czech
Constitutional Court makes explicit in Dreithaler. By the Court's reckoning, the "period of non-
freedom" is defined as the period from September 30, 1938 (the day after the Munich Agreement)
to May 4, 1945. Dreithaler, supra note 5 1, at para. 12 (interpreting Constitutional Decree of the
President from Aug. 3, 1944, No. 11/1944, annex to the Interior Minister's Notice No. 30/1945,
and Government Order No. 31/1945). Thus, the Decrees were legislated after the restoration of
legal freedom. And indeed, any reading of the Dreithaler decision makes immediately clear how
essential to the Czech jurisprudential self-conception is the idea that the period from 1945 to 1948
constituted the continuity of a rights-respecting, democratic sovereign state. Czech jurisprudence
is very resistant to the claim that the Decrees were a function of extra-legal emergency. In any
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Law looks for prohibition; seeing none, it makes no mark and moves
on. Yet it is precisely by observing how we accept its legality and right-
ness that we can clearly see the categorical problem and the hidden con-
tent in the law. Those few-and they are few indeed-who believe the
expulsions were entirely and essentially wrong readily see a contradic-
tion between our commitments to "never again" and our contemporary
responses to Sudeten claims. But those who believe the expulsions justi-
fied-which is almost all of us-also have to reconcile that view with
our general opposition to ethnic cleansing. Rejecting restitution makes a
definitional diminution of our commitment against ethnic cleansing and
its effects inevitable. Indeed, the more strongly and successfully we de-
fend the legality and rightness of the expulsions and close the book on
restitution, the more we must acknowledge a corollary limit to the gen-
eral prohibition on ethnic cleansing and to our professed obligation to
make its victims whole in the future.
VI. FINALLY: LOOKING FORWARD, WHAT IS REMEMBERED
And it came to pass, when they had brought them forth abroad,
that he said, Escape for thy life; look not behind thee... lest thou
be consumed.... Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon
Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven.. .But
his wife looked back from behind him, and she became a pillar of
salt. 3 12
The absence in the legal record reflects a moral consensus about the
postwar order-a closing, not of history, but of reflection-and a quiet
recognition that expulsion remains our potential policy. I do not mean to
suggest the Corollary will swallow the rule against ethnic cleansing; on
the contrary, it is an extraordinary exception that increasingly stands as
the only instance of enforced movement of whole peoples we are still
prepared to defend.3 13 Yet it is this very singularity in what otherwise
event, to press the objection of "lawless times" too vigorously raises its own troubling problems: it
brings into question other moments of legal ordering arising from the war, such as Nuremberg,
and it simply begs the question of when and under what conditions our collective actions are gov-
erned by ordered law and when we are unrestrained. (Thanks to Marko Prelec for these points.)
312. Genesis 19:17, 24, 26 (King James). See also KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-
FIVE, OR THE CHILDREN'S CRUSADE: A DUTY-DANCE WITH DEATH 16 (Vintage 2000) (1969)
(employing roughly the same passage with reference to Allied bombing of Germany).
313. See Gibney & Roxstrom, supra note 283, at 911
(Within just the past few years there has been a spate of state apologies, as a number of
governments have either acknowledged a previous wrong against some particular group,
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appears so clear and uncontroversial a body of law-this fundamental
intractability-that makes the Corollary significant. For we do defend
them: although the German expulsions were the largest ever undertaken,
they do not merit apology or compensation. 314 Instead, they are relied
upon, unabashedly and successfully-and by our successful attempts to
explain why this one act of ethnic cleansing alone was in fact entirely
reasonable and just, we only define and entrench the exception's poten-
tial all the more.
Of necessity we do this in a manner hidden from our own sight. In our
law, our morals, our history, and our politics, we have found it useful to
remember the lesson in what Hitler told his generals about the Armeni-
ans on the eve of war: that we build our future by consigning to casual
oblivion events we in fact remember with full clarity, events for which
we will not apologize. It is a lesson that does not imply approval of the
Nazis' particular moral vision, only acknowledgement of the strategic
value in obliterating the ambiguities and obligations of memory.
Yet even this requires looking back. There is no valence to the ano-
dyne proposition that "Europe is forward-looking;" such vapidity could
or else the apology has been transnational in scope as one state has acknowledged doing
wrong to another state, but really to the people of this other country. (footnote omitted)).
Groups subjected to expulsion, appropriation, or extermination have had claims recognized by
formal apologies, reparations, return of property, or creation of special rights: victims of the Na-
zis, aboriginal Australians, Japanese-Americans, Native Americans, First Nations in Canada, and
inhabitants of Diego Garcia, for example. Claims by Armenians continue to be pressed in a variety
of fora, while claims for reparations by descendants of black slaves in the Americas have had rela-
tively little traction. See d'Argent, supra note 5, at 282
(Conditioned by the economics and politics of the period immediately following World
War It, the post-war settlements were indeed mostly partial compared to the damages
suffered.... [F]ollowing the major geopolitical changes of the early 1990s, many indi-
viduals decided to challenge those settlements and claim reparations.... All these
claims.. .are instances of the same global phenomenon of elderly victims or their heirs
contesting the old cosy interstate settlements or silence... .Initiated in domestic
courts.. .such claims, however, have rarely succeeded without some form of support by
an influential state leading to a global out-of-court settlement.).
See also Torpey, supra note 5, at 2-3 ("Indeed, in view of the remarkable spread of demands to
face up to the once subterra/nean past, one might well say that 'we are all Germans now' in the
sense that all countries (and many other entities as well) that wish to be regarded as legitimate
confront pressures to make amends for the more sordid aspects of their past and, often, to com-
pensate victims of earlier wrongdoing.").
314. Indeed, the new rules against ethnic cleansing have been curiously constructed: that there
is a near total absence of discussion of the German expulsions in the creation of these rules leaves
open the interpretative window-by ethnic cleansing, do we really mean expulsions like those? It
is at the least curious that, in constructing such a rule, we find ourselves condemning all such acts
in modem history, except one.
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counsel for any policy.315 So it is fascinating to observe just how much
forward-looking Europe is itself intensely, intently focused on vindicat-
ing and preserving a particular vision of history--on not succumbing, as
one opponent of restitution notes, to the "danger of de-contextualizing
the past., 316 Even attempts to simply brazen out a determined policy of
forwardness give away the game that everyone must put the same, very
well defined past out of mind: thus we find Verheugen, Janus-like, de-
claring that "[n]obody is questioning the European post-war settlement.
The EU Treaties do not aim to revise this settlement but to build a new
future."3
17
Any admonition to look only forward implies and requires a vision of
what is behind; Lot's wife turned because she could not believe without
seeing for herself. Her punishment was suitably biblical, but in this age
she is perhaps less an object lesson than simply that most modern of he-
roes-a victim.
Looking back, what would we see, or change? Does it matter that Hit-
ler may actually never have uttered that notorious line?318 It is an indica-
315. But see Gibney & Roxstrom, supra note 283, at 938 ("[W]hat state apologies have so of-
ten missed is that they are as much about looking forward as they are about looking backward....
So what an apology should seek to accomplish is not merely to uncover the wrongs of the past, but
to anticipate present and future wrongs as well."). Cf Rupnik, supra note 59, at 69 (noting the
Sudeten controversy represents a "difficult and painful debate about history.. that is becoming all
the more necessary for the sake offuture reconciliation.... In the thirties, the bate noire of Central
Europe was 'the order of Versailles.' Today it would be Potsdam.") (emphasis added).
316. Petition Against a "Centre Against Expulsions," For a Critical and Enlightened Debate
About the Past (Aug. 10, 2003), http://www.bohemistik.de/zentrumgb.html. ("[T]here is the dan-
ger of de-contexualizing the past, thus breaking the causal relationship between the Nazi policies
of radical nationalism and racial extermination on one hand and the flight and expulsion of ethnic
Germans on the other hand."). Cf Macklem, supra note 55, at 19
[E]quality may require treating different pasts differently. It may require forgetting the
treatment of ethnic Germans after the war because to remember suggests, wrongly, a
moral equivalence with the horrors of the Holocaust. Forgetting is simultaneously an act
of remembering, as it validates a collective Czech memory of ethnic Germans as com-
plicit in the Nazi occupation and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. But by remember-
ing some pasts, international human rights law betrays its modernist aspirations and re-
enters the history from which it seeks to escape.
317. Verheugen Speech, supra note 65.
318. The quote originates in a misinterpretation, a fabrication, or a truthful but uncorroborated
document. Apparently, a document recording a meeting in Obersalzberg on August 22, 1939, and
including the statement was to be introduced into evidence at Nuremberg but was withdrawn, al-
though copies were released to the press. Two other records of meetings that day introduced into
evidence (USA-29 and USA-30) do not include the comment. An apparent reference to the docu-
ment as L-3 or USA-28 appears in the record of the trials. See Louis LOCHNER, WHAT ABOUT
GERMANY? 2 (1942); Zweite Ansprache des Fiihrers am 22 August 1939, IMG Nurnberg 1014-
PS, Beweisstflck USA-30, at n.1, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/df/A-Hitler-
08-22-1939-at-Obersalzberg-on-extermination-of-the-Armenians.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2006);
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tion of the Protean nature of his "Armenian comment" that it is mobi-
lized by every imaginable type of commentator on these issues: the
United States Holocaust Museum 319 and Holocaust deniers, 320 advocates
for recognizing the Armenian Genocide 321 and opponents of acknowl-
edging Armenian massacres,322 mainstream scholars,323 members of
Congress,324 and Mumia Abu-Jamal.325 Underlying these cacophonous,
mutually exclusive mobilizations is a question of history and truth: Hit-
ler either said, or did not say, this or something like it.326 Yet what does
it matter? Customary law is built on proofs about states' actions and be-
see also An Armenian Deception: 'Who Remembers the Armenians-Adolph Hitler,' 17
ARMENIAN REPORTER, Aug. 2, 1984, available at http://www.atmg.org/ArmenianDeception.html;
WIKIPEDIA, Armenian Quote, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenianquote (last visited Sept. 28,
2006) (noting that "[i]n the absence of any means of either confirming or refuting the authenticity
of the quote, and in light of the intense partisan passions surrounding both the Armenian genocide
and the Holocaust, it is unlikely that this issue can ever be satisfactorily resolved").
319. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Frequently Asked Questions.. About the
Museum, http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/details.php?topic=06#15 (last visited Sept.
28, 2006) (citing Lochner and noting that "[t]his particular language does not appear in any of the
other primary source accounts of Hitler's speech").
320. Comments noting the quotation's apparent inaccuracy are quite popular on Holocaust de-
nial websites. See, e.g., Posting of Hannover to the CODOH Revisionist Forum: Holocaust Revi-
sionism Discussion, News! The 'Who Remembers Armenians' Lie Debunked/Forgery,
HTTP://FORUM.CODOH.COM/VIEWTOPIC.PHP?T=943 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) (linking to the An
Armenian Deception article and including the tagline "If it can't happen as alleged, then it
didn't"); Mark Weber, The Nuremberg Trials and the Holocaust: Do the 'War Crimes' Trials
Prove Extermination?, INST. HIST. REV./J. HIST. REV., http://www.ihr.org/jhr/vl2/
vl2pl67_Webera.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) (calling the document referring to the quote
"spurious").
321. See generally, KEVORK B. BARDAKJIAN, HITLER AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
(1985).
322. Bruce Fein, An Armenian and Muslim Tragedy? Yes! Genocide? No!, Foreword to THE
ARMENIAN ISSUE REVISITED, ASSEMBLY OF TURKISH AM. ASS'NS,
http://www.ataa.org/ataa/ref/armenian/fein.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); The Hitler Quote,
TALL ARMENIAN TALE: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FALSIFIED GENOCIDE,
http://www.tallarmeniantale.com/hitler-quote.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); TORKKAYA
ATAOV, HITLER AND THE "ARMENIAN QUESTION"/HITLER ET LA "QUESTION ARMENIENNE"
(1984).
323. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 306, at 156; Tina Rosenberg, Tipping the Scales of Jus-
tice, in WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 289 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
324. See Heath W. Lowry, The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians, 3 POL.
COMM. & PERSUASION (1985), reprinted in ARMENIAN ALLEGATIONS: MYTH AND REALITY 119-
32 (Assembly of Turkish American Associations ed., 1986), available at http://www.ataa.org/
ataa/ref/arm uscongress/armuscongress.html (identifying twenty-two U.S. Senators and Con-
gressmen who had variants of the Armenian comment read into the Congressional Record in sup-
port of Armenian Martyrs' Day remembrances).
325. Mumia Abu-Jamal, Hypothetical Holocausts?, PRISON RADIO, Oct. 1, 2005,
http://www.prison radio.org/Wi illiamBennett.htm.
326. The Hitler Quote, supra note 322 (noting variants).
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liefs, but it does not require the factual bases underlying those actions
and beliefs to be accurate in order to generate law. When actors in the
conversation that is customary law invoke a statement like the Armenian
comment, assigning it value either as a dispositive truth or as a falsity
implying an equally dispositive counter-truth, they make claims that can
sound in law. It is the legislative authority of the source and its belief
that generate indicia of a legal norm; historical truth is immaterial to that
process, which is a question of perception-memory-not evidence.
Hitler's statement, while perhaps not technically true (perhaps not true,
that is, that he ever said it), would nonetheless be legally generative if
relied upon to indicate something about the past that we invoke with ref-
erence to the future-because the future is invariably the point towards
which discussions of Nazism are directed.
And yet, what is belief built upon, other than estimates of truth? Hitler
did what we know he did, with the support of millions of Germans who
participated in his horrors. 327 Those guilty of evil deserve punishment,
each in their measure, and by that logic the expulsion of fourteen million
Germans was only that and only just; that is a morally coherent judg-
ment, one which most of us, states and individuals alike, appear to hold.
I think we all know that "individual, commensurate punishment" is not
quite what happened-not quite what we did-but that is what we and
our law say today, and who is to say it is wrong? Still, the reasons we
give now are justifications not only for what we did then, but for what
we are, under the right circumstances, prepared to do again. What we
say and the reasons for it shape our law whether we acknowledge it or
not; legal norms cannot be analyzed apart from underlying political and
moral values. This is the tension, indeed the flaw, in customary law's at-
tempt to play belief and act against each other to the advantage of what-
ever norms law's glossators prefer.
One need not personally advocate a Sudeten Corollary to observe that
every relevant actor advocates it in practice, even though the text of this
Corollary is nowhere to be read. And that may be all right. What we did
to the Germans may have been justified-we certainly justify it today.
(Or perhaps it is not right-in this article, as a matter of methodological
commitment, I have chosen not to say what I think.) The Corollary only
suggests that, since we do justify it, we can expect we will do it again as
the occasion arises; the only puzzle is why we do not admit this. And so,
327. See, e.g., DANIEL J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996).
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observing that, here is the claim this Article makes: there is something
troubling, not necessarily in the law we have, but in the way we make it.
Denial and diminution of the expulsions' seriousness-remembering
Sudetenland the way we do-have been both social result and source of
law.
The mythology of human rights-by which I mean both its myth of
origins and its mythic sense of purpose-imagines a movement arising
out of the horrors of the Second World War, committed to a normative
project that by protecting human dignity would render such wars unnec-
essary. What this origin myth ignores is that the Allies' war efforts and
the expulsions were not derogations from our most sacred principles-
they were the enforcement of those principles in response to terrible and
clear affronts. The war and its aftermath were entirely consistent with
the norms, aspirations, and methods of human rights because they were
an integral part of them.328 Our own principles confirm that were such
evil to descend on us again, we would again use just such methods, and
again say we were right in doing so. To dismiss or isolate expulsion as
supreme necessity, as if necessity were not a legally cognizable cate-
gory, is to deny the predictability of this "sequence of cause and effect,"
or to plead a kind of madness when it is obvious as a matter of history
that this is not madness but intention, just as self-defense and vengeance
are intended.
It is not, therefore, that the expulsions' true role is misunderstood-
again, as if "were we to understand rightly, we would recoil in horror
and reject what we have done." It is precisely because we do understand
expulsion-understand it to be a measured, legitimate response to evil
consistent with our moral commitments both then and now-that we ac-
cept it and ignore it as we do.
For who talks of the expulsion of the Germans? They do, of course;
they remember. But how do we? The facts are well known to those who
care to know. If the man on the street is ignorant of them, it is only be-
cause those facts are uninteresting, and because they are universally ac-
cepted as the justified foundation of Europe's future. Certainly there is
nothing in our discussion of the expulsions like the wholesale, un-
328. As noted, the Dreithaler Court expressly grounded its refusal to overturn Decree
108/1945 on fundamental democratic and civilized principles, and stressed that these were found
not only in the domestic legal order, but on anterior principles of the international order of which
Czechoslovakia formed a part. Dreithalter, supra note 51. Thus, the Court effectively linked the
reaffirmation of the Czechoslovak and international legal order to the expulsions, confiscations,
and denaturalization effected by the Decrees.
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equivocal condemnation of the Holocaust with all its gravitational effect
on legal argument. I am in no way equating these unique acts-but why
is it necessary to add this disclaimer? Some laws only work if hidden,
but there is a cost to hiding things, to building a future by not looking
back. It is surely a high price that-for fear of seeming to equate the vic-
tims of Fascism and of its opponents-it is all but impossible to speak of
these things, or to remember Sudetenland any other way.
* * *
* * *
